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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the matter of race in the context of Finnish
language acquisition among adult migrants in Finland. Here matter
denotes both the materiality of race and how race comes to matter.
Drawing primarily on an auto/ethno/graphic account of learning the
Finnish language as a participant in the Finnish for foreigners classes, this
thesis problematises the ontology and epistemology of race, i.e., what
race is, how it is known, and what an engagement with race entails.
Taking cues from the bodily practices of learning the Finnish trill or the
rolling r, this study proposes a notion of “trilling race” and argues for an
onto-epistemological dis/continuity that marks race’s arrival. The notion
of dis/continuity reworks the distinction between continuity and
discontinuity, and asks about the how of the arrival of any identity, the
where, and the when. In so doing, an analysis of “trilling race” engages
with one of the major problematics that has exercised much critical
attention, namely: how to read race differently. That is, to rethink the
conundrum of the need to counter “representational weight” (Puar 2007,
191) of race on the one hand, and to account for the racialised lived
realities on the other. 
The link between a study of the phenomenon of host country language
acquisition and an examination of the question of race is not as obvious as
it might seem. For example, what does the argument that the process of
language learning is racialised actually imply? Does it mean that race, as
a process of racialisation or an ongoing confguration of sets of power
relations, exerts force from an outside on the otherwise neutral process of
learning the host country language? Or does it mean that race, as an
identity category, presents as among the analytical perspectives, along
with gender and class for instance, of the phenomenon of host country
language acquisition? 
With these questions in mind, and to foreground the examination of
the question of race in the context of Finnish language acquisition among
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adult migrants, this thesis opens with a discussion of the art installation
Finnexia by Lisa Erdman. Finnexia is a fctitious drug said to facilitate
Finnish language learning through accelerating the cognitive learning
process and reducing the anxiety of speaking the Finnish language. Not
only does the Finnexia installation make visible the ways in which the
lack of skill in Finnish is fgured as the threshold – a border that separates
the inside from the outside – to integration, but also, and importantly, it
raises questions about the nature of difference, and the process of
differentiation that separates the individual from the social, fact from
fction, nature from culture. These puzzles animate much of the analysis
in this dissertation.  These concerns continue to be addressed in the rest of
part one. Whereas chapter two offers a reconsideration of the ambiguities
of ethnisme/ethnicity and race, chapter three dilates on the
methodological implications of a conception of the dis/continuity of race.
Part two focuses on the matter of race and examines the political
economy of visual-aural encounters, whereas part three shifts the focus
and rethinks the possibilities and limitations of transforming racialised
and normative constraints. Taking up these particular problematics, this
thesis as a whole argues that race trills itself: its identity/difference is
simultaneously made possible and impossible. 
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Part one 
Chapter One 
Introduction
Are you married to a Finn, or do you have Finnish relatives? Learn the
language faster and create stronger bonds with your family.
Afraid to join in on Finnish conversations? Finnexia boosts your
confdence level, and helps you overcome social barriers.
Are you seeking employment in Finland? With its fast-acting formula,
Finnexia gives you an edge in the job market.
Finnexia has helped many people obtain Finnish citizenship more
quickly … (and) many ethnically mixed families in Finland stay happy.
Studies show that Finnexia can strengthen family bonds and prevent
divorce and domestic confict.
 Finnexia.f1
Finnexia is a fctitious drug that features in an art installation. As I pass
1
www.fnnexia.f. There is also a video advertisement for Finnexia on Youtube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fB2D8NJE-88. This video was played during the
installation, and presented as a live commercial at the Helsinki railway station
between 20 - 22 September 2012, last accessed 11, July 2015.
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by the product display booth that is located in the busy central train
station in Helsinki on 20 September 2012, the Finnexia poster catches my
attention. Against the blue and white background, the poster reads
“Finnexia – Learn Finnish faster”. The word “faster” is emphasised using
an italicised and bold font. Is this a new course? I stop walking as I
continue to read and move my body closer to the product display:
“Finnexia is the frst medication to help people learn the Finnish
language. The Finnexia formula is a unique combination of cognitive
enhancement, anxiety reduction, and speech therapy, all in one
medication.”
What? Is this a joke? A medication for enhancing Finnish language
learning? As a migrant in Finland who is trying to learn Finnish, and as a
researcher interested in exploring the language learning process among
adult migrants in Finland, I feel intrigued, confused, excited, suspicious
and worried about the existence of such a product. Wondering about the
incentives of this pharmaceutical research and production, I approach
one of the organisers of the Finnexia advertising campaign. (I fnd out
later that she, Lisa Erdman is in fact the artist behind the installation).2
She assures me that Finnexia has gone through a clinical trial,3  and has
proven to enhance and to accelerate the language learning process. She
tells me, for example, that trials have shown a drastic reduction of
learning hours from 200 hours to 25 hours, and that the drug has been
proven to correct accents and lessen anxiety associated with language
learning.
The live commercial for Finnexia attracts the attention of many
passers-by. During the campaign, the organisers invite interested
bypassers to sit together and to share their Finnish language learning
experiences. If it proves diffcult for some participants to speak about
their experiences of learning the Finnish language, they are provided
with a variety of pictures that express emotions such as joy and sadness
2 This live commercial is the major part of Lisa Erdman's doctoral project. At the time I
spoke with her (on 20 September 2012), she was conducting her Ph.D research at the
Aalto University School of Arts in Finland. The doctoral project is titled Satirical
M e d i c a l A d v e r t i s i n g a s a T o o l f o r P o l i t i c a l D i a l o g u e ,
https://reseda.taik.f/Taik/jsp/taik/Research.jsp?lang_global=en&id=32961462, last
accessed 26 June 2015.
3 This conversation took place on the day (20 September 2012) I visited the live
commercial presentation. At that point, I did not know Lisa was the artist.
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and are asked to pick out one of the pictures that shows how they feel
about learning Finnish. It is mostly migrants who are learning or wish to
learn Finnish who participate in the conversations. Many of the
participants also express their suspicion of and curiosity about the
medication Finnexia. In spite of their mixed feelings towards Finnexia
and its claimed “all-in-one” effect, participants seem to be comfortable,
and even seem keen to share their experiences of learning the Finnish
language with the organisers and other participants. The organisers are
also interested in whether the participants would actually consider taking
the medications. 
During my visit to the campaign that day, I speak with two other
participants regarding Finnish language learning and their perception of
the medication. Both of them express disappointment that they cannot
speak Finnish fuently despite their various attempts to learn the
language. However, neither of them considers taking a medication, such
as Finnexia, for learning Finnish. One of the participants is still optimistic
about the possibility of learning the Finnish language, just as he would
learn any other foreign language. While he does not seem to doubt the
claimed effcacy of the drug, he would rather learn Finnish the hard way
than take a shortcut enabled by the medication. For him, learning Finnish,
though diffcult, remains an individual undertaking. Interestingly, there
are others who are eager to purchase the medicine at the event at which
the product is launched.4  
As an immigrant language learner and as a researcher on issues related
to language learning and integration, I feel at once curious, suspicious,
and critical about the actual workings of the drug, especially its claimed
effcacy. Despite my mixed feeling towards the advertised medicine, the
event is surprisingly pleasant, and makes one feel somewhat hopeful.5 In
the busy central station of Helsinki, many passers-by stop to speculate on
the product exhibit booth. Some of them express concerns about Finnexia,
others curiously observe the unfolding event, and still others participate
in the discussion mediated by the event organisers. In a sense then, the
installation provides the space for sharing experiences of learning the
4 I spoke with the artist Lisa Erdman again on 12.10.2012 at Aalto University, Helsinki.
She told me that there were some people who saw the live commercial at the Helsinki
railway station, and went to the local pharmacy to purchase Finnexia.
5 An observer of the event comments that it makes one feel hopeful.
http://newshub.f/archives/919, last accessed on 20 September 2012.   
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Finnish language.
What interests me most is the ways in which the advertisement for
Finnexia succinctly captures the ways in which the lack of Finnish
language skills is considered to lie at the root of all integration problems,
such as diffculties in bonding with family, making friends or fnding a
job. Although the claimed effect of Finnexia seems to be primarily
biological, that is to “activate specifc neuroreceptors involved with the
acquisition of Finno-Ugric languages”, thus (“reducing classroom hours
from 200 to 25, an 88% reduction of effort”),6 the advertisement
accentuates its potential social impact. That is, it seems to say that as soon
as the Finnish language is learned, other issues such as familial and social
relations, claims to certain rights and to citizenship. as well as fnancial
stability are readily resolved.
Inadequate Finnish language profciency is often presented as the
major hindrance for the path to integration, especially in terms of cultural
and labour market integration. For example, in their study which focuses
on labour market integration in Finland, Elli Heikkilä and Selene
Peltonen point out that “For the employment authorities, prejudices
among employers are the major impediment to the recruitment of
immigrants. … [T]he prejudices are caused by fears, language problems
and different customs, whereas the attitudes are not affected by religion,
colour of skin or the need for supervision” (2002, 6). This observation also
sheds light on the ways in which levels of language profciency can be
used to justify labour market discrimination. In other words, insofar as
the issue of language skills seems to be a practical and neutral one, the
structure of the labour market as well as employment practices are not
considered to be racialised and racialising. 
One can glean from the remedy of Finnexia three discrete but
interrelated components of the capacity of Finnish language learning. The
description reads: “The Finnexia formula offers a unique combination of
cognitive enhancement, anxiety reduction and speech therapy, all in one
medication”.7 The frst aspect hints at an ability to learn language
effciently, understood as for example the cognitive skills required for
6 Finnexia homepage, last accessed 28 June 2015, http://www.fnnexia.f/how-fnnexia-
works.html.
7 Finnexia homepage, http://www.fnnexia.f/how-fnnexia-works.html,  last accessed
28 June 2015.
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memorizing vocabularies (memory), understanding grammar
(comprehension skills) and making sense of others’ speech (listening
skills). As is made explicit in the product website, the cognitive
enhancement is achieved through stimulating “the neural pathways that
aid in cognitive processes, memory, and speech comprehension”.8 The
second component is an affective one. Anxiety is depicted as pathological,
a bad feeling that impedes the language learning process. Thus, language
learners should manage and convert bad feelings such as anxiety and dis-
ease into good ones. The last component concerns speech production.
Intelligible utterance is often considered as crucial for a meaningful
communication. The capacity for Finnish language therefore (though not
exclusively) ideally entails native-like pronunciation. The formula of
Finnexia also echoes the common perception that the process of learning
the Finnish language ultimately comes down to individual language
learners’ will to learn.  In other words, an individual’s ability to learn
effciently, to speak native-like Finnish and to manage anxiety is the
prime indicator for her or his capacity for integration. 
“Finnexia – Linguocitine 40mg, Fast-acting Finnish Language 
Enhancer”
The 40mg linguocitine is said to effectively enhance Finnish learning
practices. Just as the advertising campaign repeatedly emphasises,
Finnexia claims to be an “all in one medication”.  The linguocitine is said
to be primarily composed of an Alpha-7 nicotine acetylcholine receptor
agonist that modulates post-tic Alpha-7 receptors in the prefrontal cortex
thus stimulating the exchange of calcium ions (ca+) across neuron
membranes – in other words, it accelerates the traffc of the synaptic
communication between two neurons or between a neuron and a muscle.
The artist Lisa Erdman has worked as a graphic designer in the
pharmaceutical industry and is familiar with the ways in which the
structure, function and operation of neurobiology is visually presented to
lay viewers. The Finnexia commercial played during the advertising
campaign visualises – through mapping, localizing and identifying –  the
place of Finnish language acquisition.9 And yet, as Rose and Abi-Rached
8 Finnexia homepage, http://www.fnnexia.f/how-fnnexia-works.html, last accessed
28 June 2015.
9 The ways in which neurobiology has shifted from its association with science fction to
10
remind us, the possibility of rendering something visible, such as the
neurobiological workings of language acquisition, is conditioned upon
“the whole confguration by means of which a certain way of seeing
becomes possible and can be articulated” (2013, 55) . Such a confguration
is the epistemological framework that provides “bands of visibility and
felds of readability” (Deleuze [1986] 2006, 41). Presenting the fctitious
drug Finnexia as the remedy for ineffcient Finnish language acquisition
that is localizable and identifable in individual bodies, is not only
conditioned upon the visualization of neurobiology in academic and
popular presentations of neuroscience, as well as the development of, and
investment in, neurotechnologies, but also on the ways in which defcient
Finnish language skills of individual migrants is depicted as pathological
and causes trouble for the welfare state, for education policy, as well as
for the labour market. Importantly, the live commercial of Finnexia
performatively enacts the visual imagery of a form of sociality (in the
form of neurobiological communication) under the skin. In so doing, it
also renders the supposedly isolated individual language learning
process identifable as a shared social-neurobiological experience. In view
of this, the live commercial presentation of the fctitious drug Finnexia
effectively confounds the distinction between individual and social, fact
and fction. 
In an attempt to explore the relation between cultural integration
through language learning in Finnish society and contemporary pill-
popping culture, the artist Lisa Erdman (unpublished manuscript) stages
a series of product launching events through the utilization of visual
apparatuses such as an animated 3D image, a live commercial
performance (featuring both salespersons and a product display booth)
and other online advertising strategies (an offcial product website, a
Youtube video, and a product Facebook page). The public space for the
product launching theatrical performance includes the central train
station in Helsinki and the city library conference room for the
the real-ization of the “economies of the brain” (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013,16 ) in the
management of everyday life is highly interesting and could be read in line with the
more broader question of the how of realization, and the process of visualizing as
localizing. For example, Rose and Abi-Rached notes, “visual imaginary provided by
various technologies has been one pathway along which neuroscience has been able to
move out of the laboratory and into the territory of everyday life, and to play in the
role in the management of normal and problematic conduct”  (2013, 55).
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subsequent individual and group interviews. Together, these two spaces
compose what Erdman refers to as the discursive and refective place, in
which we function as both actors and audiences of the performance.
Moreover, this space also operates as a discursive space from which
ensues “dialogue concerning cultural integration … stories and
experiences as a foreigner living in Finland (through) displaying anxiety
towards the political policies that affect our lives” (Erdman unpublished
manuscript). 
Erdman states that her aim with the art work is two-fold. On the one
hand, in borrowing medical vocabularies and crafting a facade through
for example specifying “the drug’s mechanism of action developing an
animated visualization” (Erdman unpublished manuscript), the project
stages a simulacrum that infltrates the current over-medicalised social
norms, thus enabling refexivity and “questioning the validity of
knowledge and authority of our situation and in doing so, questioning
the validity of knowledge and authority presented to us through
advertising and medicine” (Erdman unpublished manuscript). On the
other hand, the public spaces used for the marketing and launch of the
product enable public conversations on issues related to Finnish language
learning, cultural integration and immigration in Finland. 
It is the second aim of the artistic project that is of particular relevance
to my concerns here. The enticement in the advertisement for “Finnexia”
lies in its suggestion that there is a correlation between effciency in
learning Finnish (read as a capacity) and one’s well-being in private and
public sphere. Implicitly, one’s insuffcient skill in the Finnish language is
confgured as the crux of “migration problems” either in the form of
communication breakdowns that threaten both intimate and social bonds,
or of linguistic incompetence that makes unattainable fnancial stability or
claims to citizenship. Moreover, this advertisement gains resonance
through the citation of some well-rehearsed discourses regarding the
(in)capacity of language learners to use the host country language in
public and political debates, policy making, academic writing or among
language learning and education practitioners. 
As the Finnish Immigration Service (“Muuttovirasto” in Finnish;
Migrationsverket” in Swedish)10 clearly states, language skills in Finnish
10 Among the Nordic countries, Sweden and Iceland are the only two countries that do
not have requirements for the language skills for application of Swedish and Icelandic
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or Finland Swedish is one of the major requirements for Finnish
citizenship application. One of the most common ways for one to prove
one’s language skill is to complete the National Certifcate of Language
Profciency at skill level 3 of any of the following subtests: (1) speaking
and writing; (2) listening comprehension and writing; (3) reading
comprehension and speaking. One cannot choose any other combinations
than these three subsets; for example, one could not combine speaking
and listening or writing and reading comprehension. If one has achieved
skill level 3 on any other combinations than the three mentioned here, the
certifcate “is not acceptable for proving language skill”.11
The focus on language training in Finnish integration law is also
embedded in the European framework of integration, wherein each
European member state is subjected to a general benchmarking (Sergio
2006). That is to say the integration programs in most European member
states have in common the focus on language training and labour market
oriented practices. Although the actual planning and implementation
varies from country to country, we see the ways in which European
member states compare with and take cues from each other’s integration
policies and practices. For example, the Finnish integration law enacted
on 01.09.2011 drew inspiration from Sweden’s 2009 Labor Market Act.
The “Nuvia Manifest” proposal put forth in 2010 by True Finns party
explicitly advocates the shift away from Swedish infuenced integration
and immigration policy to a Danish model, which involves for example a
points-based system for family reunion, in which explicitly high and
unrealistic language requirements are set on the part of the family
reunion sponsor.12 It should be noted note here in the passing, as this
relates to the ways in which the question of language is central to the
Finnish political landscape and is relevant to the general discussion here,
that in the case of the Finland Swedish language, the other offcial
language in Finland, in their manifesto the True Finns party propose to
end the compulsory tuition of Swedish and to cut down the Finnish
Broadcasting Company Ylesradio’s (Yle) broadcasts in Swedish.13 Given
citizenship respectively. 
11 http://www.migri.f/fnnish_citizenship/applying_for_citizenship/requirements/la
nguage_skills/national_foreign_language_certifcate, last accessed 20 January 2015. 
12 http://www.mipex.eu/blog/fnland-studies-neighbours-policies-to-limit-
familyreunions, last accessed 28 June 2015.
13 http://yle.f/uutiset/true_fnns_publish_election_manifesto/5087425, last accessed 28
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the limited space and the particular focus of the dissertation, although I
cannot provide a thorough analysis of the evolving Finnish and EU
political debates around language policy in relation to the problematics of
integration, I want to underscore the pivotal relevance of the current
political and economic climate in Europe, such as the EU’s austerity
measures and discourse on security, as the wider backdrop against which
this project takes place. 
“To speak is never neutral”, as feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray
(2002) reminds us. Language acquisition, and especially in this case, host
country language acquisition, is a phenomenon embedded in and
constitutes the racialised political economy of the postcolonial and
“global divisions of labour (economic, intellectual, and cultural
representational)” (Chow 2014, 17). An example is useful here. In Sally
Boyd’s and Leena Huss’ (2004) study on the history of national language
policy in Sweden, they point out the ways in which the mother tongue is
constructed in relation to the policy on home language education, the
economic climate, and the ultimate goal of reproducing Swedish-
speaking-abled bodies (even though this is not exactly the phrase they
used). Boyd’s and Huss’ observation is worth citing at length here.
The decision to provide home language instruction was based on the
belief, supported by research, that children who had a frm grounding
in their mother tongue were more successful in learning a second
language. The home language was mainly viewed as a means to an
end, the end being successful learning of Swedish as a second
language. ... At the beginning of the 1990’s, when there was a severe
economic downturn for Sweden, and the municipalities no longer
received special funds for home language instruction or for instruction
in Swedish as a second language, there was a general shift in emphasis
from the “home languages” to Swedish as a second language. There
seemed to be a general feeling that Sweden no longer could afford to
support both. The earlier argument of the mother tongue as a means to
successful bilingualism was no longer repeated. ...  In the late 1990’s,
home language instruction was renamed “mother tongue instruction”,
but this name change was accompanied by a further deterioration of
the condition of provision of the instruction: now the pupils had to
choose one mother tongue: Swedish or another language. (2004, 844-
845) 
June 2015.
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In the Finnish context, the integration training program, which
provides fnancial assistance to immigrants who are admitted to the
program of an equivalent value to the labour market subsidy for
unemployed workers,14 organises language training courses primarily if
not exclusively in Finnish.15 Another specifcity of the Finnish context in
terms of the requirement for Finnish language skill is the emphasis on its
urgency for integration. For example, in  Yle’s report in 2011 on the then
coming-into-force of the law on the integration training program, the
enactment of the new integration law is said to assist to “integrate
immigrants more quickly into Finnish society”. And the report quotes
Finnish Minister of Labour Lauri Ihalainen's comment: “It's time to aim
for a future in which immigrants who have lived in Finland for a long time
can show off their skills and contribute to the common good”.16 The
emphasis here is on the need for immigrants to fnd directions and modes
of living in Finland. Related to this assertion, Minister Lauri Ihalainen
also laid specifc emphasis on the need to focus on language training as
follows: “many immigrants have been caught in a vicious circle where
poor language skills have become an obstacle for gaining a foothold in
the job market. But the workplace is where such new language skills are
put to use.”17. It follows then that the lack of Finnish skill is conceived of
as the major hindrance that prevents (certain rather than other)
immigrants from contributing to the host society through participation in,
and thus integration into, the labour market in particular. And yet,
engaging in Finnish conversations at a workplace or working in Finnish is
14 http://www.amiedu.f/english/individual-customers/immigrant-integration-
training, last accessed 10 January 2015.
15 For example, in a recent news report in Huvudstadsbladet, a major Swedish language
newspaper in Finland, the issue regarding the diffculty in learning Swedish for
integration training in the capital region was highlighted. It was said that in the capital
region not only is it diffcult to acquire information regarding the integration program
in Swedish, but when a few immigrants' request to study Swedish rather than Finnish
as part of their integration training this was directly rejected. Through As a result of
media exposure, it seems like as if their request to study Swedish for the integration
program has fnally been met. However, we should note the political economy of
Finnish and Swedish, two offcial languages of Finland.  See the report in Swedish also
a t http://www.abounderrattelser.f/news/2014/09/hbl-invandrare-far-inte-lara-sig-
svenska.html, last accessed 28 June 2015.
16 http://yle.f/uutiset/news/2011/09/law_enacted_to_improve_immigrant_integratio
n_2838631.html, last accessed 28 June 2015. 
17 http://yle.f/uutiset/law_enacted_to_improve_immigrant_integration/5416694, last
accessed 28 June 2015.
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among the most effcient ways to practice the Finnish language.  In view
of this, it seems that many migrants are caught within the vicious circle of
poor language skills and unemployment. The link between language
skills and employment opportunities seems to comfortably elide other
issues at stake. Salla Tuori (2009) has also observed a similar circuitous
pattern in her study on the empowerment and integration project for
immigrant women in Finland. Tuori suggests that in the Finnish public
discussion, the language skill of migrants is addressed as both a problem
of, and a solution to integration. As such, it disguises the racialised and
gendered structuring of the Finnish labour market, “as if other issues only
become relevant once everybody who has migrated to Finland speaks
Finnish fuently” (2009, 106).
The dissertation project at hand, titled “‘Trilling Race: The Political
Economy of Racialised Visual-Aural Encounters’”, performs onto-
epistemological explorations of race and investigates the matter of race
(i.e. how race matters) in the context of Finnish language acquisition
among adult migrants in Finland. Before proceeding, a brief clarifcation
of what I mean by onto-epistemology is in order. Typically, ontology is
understood as the study of what is, whereas epistemology refers to how it
is known, that is a question of knowledge. By the term onto-epistemology
I mean to challenge the separation of ontology from epistemology. I
follow Vicki Kirby’s conceptualization that “Perception is … likened to an
ontological organ of conception. … The doubled sense of conception that
couples knowledge with birth, epistemology emerging as the
entanglement of ontology” (2011, 120, emphasis in original). 
Having clarifed this, I will proceed to lay bare the context of the
investigation at hand. Host country language acquisition is a highly
charged issue in debates on integration and immigration policy in
Finland in particular, and in Europe in general. For example, in October
2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that the attempt to build a
multicultural society in Germany had utterly failed. The German
multicultural approach, according to Merkel, was to live side by side and
be happy about each other. But that ideal was based on an expectation
that “they” (the migrant workers) would one day leave. “We lied to
ourselves”, said Merkel, “immigrants should be integrated rather than
accommodated and must learn German”.18. Two layers of meaning are
18 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-germany-
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embedded in the adverb “utterly”. One the one hand, “utterly” means
absolutely, and completely, stressing the unhappy and hopeless future of
multiculturalism, and thus the unthinkable and uninhabitable
multicultural society. On the other hand, the word “utterly” hints that
language defciency is at the crux of immigration problems, due to the
insuffcient requirements for immigrants to learn (“good enough”)
German.19 This declaration has been described as a “crisis” in happiness
through a narrative of disappointment (cf. Ahmed 2010), which was
evident in Merkel’s statement that “we lied to ourselves”. As an
alternative, the integration approach was hailed as the only promising
path to a harmonious society. The lack of language profciency on the part
of the immigrants was interpreted as an unwillingness to adapt to the
host society. The capacity to learn the host country language is often
conceived of in terms of linguistic capital that functions as criteria for
integration. The heightened saliency of language acquisition in the
integration and immigration context not only provides the backdrop
against which my meditation on the question of race is set, but also sheds
light on the transmogrifed re-appearance and re-ascendancy of
whiteness understood as “capacity for capacity” (cf. Puar 2007, 199). 
For Puar (2009), as for Chow (2006), the term “capacity for capacity”
hints at the regeneration of whiteness, or what Chow terms as “the
ascendency of whiteness” (2002, 3). Here whiteness is not simply the
visible phenotypical identifcations such as skin colour, but morphs into a
capacity, an exceptional condition that is capable of regeneration or
reproduction; it is “the capacity to give life, sustain life, promote life – the
registers of fertility, health, environmental sustainability, and the capacity
to risk” (Puar 2009, 200). In other words, whiteness is the hierarchical
power relations, a  patternment, that is capable of maintaining and
reproducing itself. In light of this, we could consider that for example the
ways in which Finnish language acquisition among would-be integrated
migrants is institutionally supported and required as opposed to its
Swedish counterpart is not only to generate certain language-abled
bodies and speaking subjects over others, but also to sustain the
asymmetrical power dynamics within the linguistic landscape of the
multiculturalism-failures, last accessed 28 June 2015.
19 The news is available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451,
last accessed 19 July 2015. 
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nation. Foregrounding the mechanism through which the capacity for
capacity is produced is the distinction drawn between life and death,
between continuity and discontinuity, wherein the future is understood
as an extension of the present (cf. Glezos 2012) that is a pre-emptive
paranoid futurity embedded in the risk economy (Puar 2007, xx). 
The distinction between continuity and discontinuity is a question that
will be examined from various perspectives throughout the whole
dissertation, because it informs the very question of race and the political
economy through which it takes shape. It suffces here to note that the
phrase in the title of the dissertation “trilling race” hints at the
problematic of the dis/continuity of race becoming (its other). The trill,
and more specifcally, the alveolar trill of the Finnish rolling r, is a
pronunciation that consists “a series of very rapid tap-like closures”
(Ashby and Maidment 2007, 59) between active articulators such as the
tongue and passive articulators such as the throat. The tapping of the
tongue tip, and closure between the active and the passive articulators,
also enables the vocal folds to vibrate, a phenomenon called voiced
articulation in phonetic terms. According to Ashby and Maidment, in
voiced articulation such as the alveolar trill, “[t]he rapid vibration of the
folds can be felt with fngertips to the neck on the outside of the larynx’”
(2007, 23). In passing, it would be helpful to take a brief look at the
workings of the trill, with a particular focus on  the closure between the
active and the passive articulators. 
In phonetic studies, the closure is considered to be enabled by the
coordination of the two vocal folds. The vocal folds are placed in the
cartilages and adjacent to each other. Constituted of epithelial tissues
with a few thyroartenoid muscles (that relaxes the vocal fold), they have
the appearance of the lips. When the vocal folds are open, which is
necessary for our breathing, a gap appears between the folds, called the
glottis. In order for the vocal folds to vibrate, the vocal folds are closed
together, and the gap/glottis disappears. Ashby’s and Maidment’s
description of such an operation provides a vivid illustration of the
operation of the vocal folds: 
The series of events for one complete cycle of vibration of the vocal
folds is as follows: First the vocal folds are together, and stop the
airfow; air from beneath pushes up between the folds, forcing them
apart near the middle; a burst of air fows through, but this begins to be
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cut off as the folds recoil back to the closed position; as the opening gets
smaller, the rapid airfow through the narrowing gap leads to suction
which helps to complete the closure rapidly and effectively; once the
folds are closed completely, the cycle of vibration begins again, and the
folds are once again forced open. (2007, 24)
The pronunciation of the alveolar trill is thus the process of closure
that blocks the air fow, of active tapping of the tongue tip and of making
the vocal folds vibrate, that is also the vibration of air. This blockage of air
probably explains the breathless feeling I get every time when I try to
pronounce the rolling r. Interestingly, the continuity of the pronunciation
of the trill, integral to the pronunciation of a word, a sentence, entails the
disruption of the smooth air fow, because of blockage and vibration. It
should be noted that this disruption of air fow and breathing does not
mean that breathing is simply originally continuous, that then becomes
disturbed and made discontinuous. This is because the air fow, essential
for the breathing practices, is generated through the complex network of
openings and closures in the process of inhaling and exhaling.
Furthermore, the continuity of a trill itself, that is, the complete circle of
the vibration of the vocal folds, consists of discontinuous taps of the
tongue, however minimal the interval of each tap and the vibration of the
vocal folds. It is in this sense that trilling is a phenomenon of
dis/continuity, in which not only the discontinuous vibration and
tapping are intrinsic to the continuity of the entirety of the trilling
pronunciation itself, but also the closure of vocal folds marks the cutting,
discontinuity at and of its inception. 
In view of this, I want to explain that the phrase “trilling race” is not
meant to simply join together the question of race and a study of the
phenomenon of host country language acquisition. The link between
these two concerns is not as obvious as it might seem. One might ask
whether trilling race is another way of saying the ways in which the
process of language learning is racialised. Although this certainly could
be one of my arguments, with the term trilling race, I mean to suggest a
dis/continuous rethinking – a trilling – of what one means by the notion
that the process of language learning is racialised. This has been a
question that has troubled me since the start of my dissertation project.
Does it mean that race, seen as a process of racialisation, involves a power
dynamic that exerts force from the outside on an otherwise neutral
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process of learning the host country language? Or does it mean that race,
as an identity category, presents as among the analytical perspectives,
along with gender and class for example, of the phenomenon of host
country language acquisition? If one concedes to the view that race is a
representation, a discursive effect, then does it mean that the language
learning process is itself the process through which race becomes?
Whereas the frst two questions assume that race and language learning
are two separate processes, affected by or analysed through each other,
the last question starts to muddle this separation and forge an emphasis
on and an investigation of the nature of language learning and race. And
yet, the phrase trilling race means to open up these concerns even more,
so much so that it might be possible to say yes to all these concerns at the
same time as their underlying premises are interrogated and
destabilised .
 Rather than simply asking how host country language acquisition is
racialised, I begin by rethinking the questions of race and ethnicity which
are often approached in terms of terminological or contextual
appropriateness, as in, for example, the European versus the American
context (cf. El-Tayeb 2011).  The task in the frst part of chapter two is thus
to examine and to linger over the ambiguities and contradictions of these
terms, in order to tease out the question of language (acquisition) that
plays a pivotal role in the debate about race and ethnicity. It begins with
an examination of Ferdinand de Saussure’s conceptualisation of
ethnisme/ethnicity in postcoloniality. In lingering over the tensions in
Saussure’s account of ethnisme/ethnicity, understood as linguistic
communities that are not determined by racial or biological differences,
this chapter sheds light on the complexity of the question of
identity/difference as well as the nature/culture conundrum. It thus
paves the way for the exploration of human race and racial differences in
the rest of the chapter. My main arguments in this chapter are the
following. First, the dis/continuity of race suggests that the view of race
as an essence is not simply opposed to, because fundamentally different
from a performative account of race. Rather, these propositions are more
paradoxical and complicitous than straightforwardly exclusive or
oppositional. Second, and consistent with the frst proposition, the
dis/continuity of race requires a reconsideration, rather than a simple
refutation or affrmation of the question of the human. Following Kirby’s
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(2011) theorisation of “originary humanicity”, I argue for a conception of
race that acknowledges the co-implicated and co-distinguished specifcity
and universality, discontinuity and continuity, difference and identity.
Chapter three extends the meditation on the dis/continuity of race to
consider its methodological implications. Two issues have often been
raised and discussed in research concerned with race and ethnicity. First,
where and when should the investigation begin, so that certain forms of
“racial thinking” (Gunaratnam 2003, 5) are not reproduced, and that new
modalities of subjection and transformation could be opened up and
improvised (Moten 2003; Weheliye 2014), rather than decided in advance,
and henceforth fxed and reifed. Second, how to reconcile the tension
between poststructuralist and social constructionist approaches that
understand race as a discursive effect and the need for the analysis to be
“grounded” (Gunaratnam 2003) and to acquire “weight” (Wright 2015) so
that it accounts for the ways in which social categories such as race are
experienced as lived realities. Chapter three attends to these concerns
through explicating the ways in which the conception of the onto-
epistemological dis/continuity of race informs the auto/ethno/graphic
(see Ahmed 1998) writing of the thesis, as well as how difference and
identity categories are conceived of and engaged with in this dissertation.
Closely tied to discussions in part one, part two turns the focus to the
racialised political economy of visual-aural encounters. It is generally
conceded that in everyday encounters, race is predominantly “translated
into visual phenomena” (Weheliye 2014, 5) enabled but constrained by
“historical-racial schema” (Fanon [1952]2008, 84). In this line of thinking,
the modalities of the visual perception of race is always and already a
mediated effect, embedded in the chain of signifcation. Puzzled over the
how of visual perception as racial signifcation, chapter four examines the
question of the visual within the parameters of the Saussurean sign.
Following from this, chapter fve situates the discussion in the context of
host country language acquisition with a particular focus on the means of
breaking open and moving beyond the confnement of the racialised
visual episteme in critical engagements with the question of race.
Drawing on and honing in on the practices of learning the Finnish trill,
chapter six is focused on the psychic life of the trilling tongue. Taken
together, part two argues for a notion of trilling race, that witnesses a
“corporeography” (Kirby 1997) wherein visuality as aurality as tactility is
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“utterly referential” (Kirby 2011, 124). In view of this, I argue that we
should not, and in fact cannot simply move beyond the visual, invested in
the hope of breaking the confnement of signifcation or racialised
epistemological knowing. Furthermore, the analysis of tonguing tongued
encounters and the psychic life of the trilling tongue suggests that bodies
racialise themselves, or that racialisation only happens by and through
the body. Such a “bodily complicity” (Hinton 2007, 225) as the general
process of valuation and weighing also means that difference is intrinsic
and change is constant. 
 Part three continues the engagement with the problematic of racial
transformation from two different, but inter-related themes. In chapter
seven, the transformative potential of polyglots’ accents and cyborgs’
noises are reconsidered, whereas in chapter eight, the setting of the
discussion shifts slightly from the bodily practices of speaking to singing
the Finnish national anthem in the host country languages – Finnish and
Swedish. Taken together, in accordance with the notion of onto-
epistemological dis/continuity of race, both chapters attend to different
aspects of the conundrum of identity/difference, whole/part,
universality/specifcity and the issue of normative anticipation and
transgression. The major arguments of this part are the following. First,
the apparent division between identity and difference, universality and
specifcity is not an inevitable impasse, but is symptomatic of the complex
nature of difference that incessantly punctuates itself despite and because of
its own breaking apart.20 This means that the polyvocalities and
multiplicities of polyglots’ accents and cyborgs’ noises need not, and
cannot, dispense with the wholeness of mother tongue, because each is
constituted through, with and as the other. This reconfguration assists to
navigate through some of dilemmas in critical engagements with for
example issues of identity politics. Second, and in a sense connected to all
20 Here I use the term “punctuate” deliberately, for it relates to a form of spacing and
cutting that is featured in various parts of the thesis. I take cues from Jacques Derrida's
contemplation on the word “punctuation”. For example, in Of Grammatology, Derrida
writes “The relationship between passivity and difference cannot be distinguished
from the relationship between the fundamental unconsciousness of language (as
rootedness within the language) and the spacing (pause, blank, punctuation, interval in
general, etc.) which constitutes the origin of signifcation. … Spacing (notice that this
word speaks the articulation of space and time, the becoming-space of time and the
becoming-time of space) is always the unperceived, the nonpresent, and the
nonconscious” ([1976] 1997, 68, emphasis in original).
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the arguments in the thesis, I suggest that the radical political and ethical
implications of the account of onto-epistemological dis/continuity of race
is that in the racialised political economy of visual-aural encounters, any
critical engagements and contestations, necessarily reinstall the
hierarchical racial positionings even as they bring forth the most
vehement assault. In other words, there is no simple overturning of and
moving beyond the problematics of race. Instead, taking into account
and giving an account of the how, where and when of the location of race
is the most pressing concern for a responsible feminist political and
ethical practice of knowledge production. 
Much of my discussion in the thesis concerns the question of
stereotypes as expressions of racial prejudice (see Appiah 1990).
Following Chow, I understand a stereotype “as a representational device
… [a] normative practice” (2002, 54). For Chow, approaching stereotypes
in terms of social and political norms that manifest as aesthetic
representations opens up the possibility to consider the ways in which
they fx racialised bodies in place, and to examine “the assumptions that
support such attributions” (2002, 67). Importantly however, Chow also
reminds us that stereotypes are inevitable. This is because any counter
argument that aims to correct or eliminate stereotypes, must make
recourse to, and thus re-substantiate, the very stereotypes one repudiates.
This attests to a “performative contradiction” (Butler 1999, 116) that
operates in modalities of racial formation that will be engaged with
further at a later point in the thesis. Following a notion of power as
productive, Chow notes that instead of being simply false, exaggerated
and reductive representations, stereotypes are also enabling.  My
engagement with stereotypes here, especially with the question of
accents, focuses on the problematics of how to break through and
transform the racialising epistemological confnement. Put simply, I am
interested in how to think about the question of race differently.
This thesis joins forces with postcolonial critiques of difference and
feminist (new) materialist framing of the nature/culture question. I am
aware of current discussions regarding the discrepancies, tensions, and
power dynamics between the two felds of study (it is in fact diffcult to
pin down clear-cut theoretical paradigms, but it should be mentioned that
the debates on the relation between feminist post-structuralism and
postcolonial theory as well as feminist post-structuralism and feminist
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(new) materialisms are integral to the discussions at hand).21 I want to
clarify here that the thesis does not simply add a postcolonial framework
to that of feminist (new) materialisms. Rather, I hope to contribute to this
debate by way of the specifc engagement with the matter of race through
an analysis of the racialised political economy of visual-aural encounters. 
21 For an interesting reading of the relation between poststructuralism and
postcoloniality, see Jane Hiddleston's (2010) analysis. In particular, I fnd Hiddleston's
reading regarding ethics and the anxiety of theory rather most informative. According
to Hiddleston , “The interaction between poststructualism and postcoloniality has at
its core the impetus to conceptualise the other of the West, to understand oppressed
cultural differences as they manifest themselves at the waning of old forms of empire
and as neo-imperialist discourses, structures and activities are nevertheless
perpetuated. Poststructuralism theorises the discursive traps and lures of Western
philosophy, and its development in the postcolonial arena leads to a  questioning of
our understanding of alterity and of the representation of subaltern subjects
dominated not only by Western discourse but also by associated material forces of
subjugation. … Poststructuralist postcolonial thinkers combine a refection  on cultural
difference in the postcolonial era … with the self-consciousness of deconstructive
practice, and as a result they perform the tense and irresolute dynamic between
postcolonial ethics and necessary introspection or anxiety” (2010, 17). Needless to say,
this anxiety between various theoretical paradigms are these anxieties about various
theoretical paradigms are an integral part of the discussion at hand. But I would also
argue that rather than considering the anxiety as positing “an ambivalence that rocks
the foundation of theory” (Hiddleston 2010, 17) and thus is in needs to be resolved,
these ambiguities, which are even perhaps even a form of neurosis, could and should
also be considered as what animates theories.
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Chapter Two 
Situating the Subject: The Matter of Race
Race and Ethnicity
In his essay “The Conservation of Races”, published in 1897, W. E. B. Du
Bois writes that race is “a vast family of human beings, generally of
common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and
impulses” (Du Bois [1897] 2014, 285). Interestingly, this formulation of
race encapsulates the nature/culture connotations found in current
theorisations of race and ethnicity. At a general level, the notion of race is
often associated with systems of human classifcation foregrounded in
biological features that are “present in every human being at birth and in
virtue of which groups of humans are distinguishable from one another”
(Spelman 1999, 202). Moreover, racial identifcations are said to determine
“the expectations of fxed social roles” (Osborne and Sandford 2002, 3) as
well as hierarchical subject positions. 
By comparison, the term ethnicity underscores the socially and
culturally constructed nature of race. As Peter Osborne and Stella
Sandford note, “the contemporary articulation of ethnicity – or ethnicities
– is coincident with a shift in attention from the ‘in-itself’ of the object of
study to the domain of representation, such that the construction of
ethnicities is encountered as an epistemological, rather than an
anthropological problem” (2002, 5). Based in the increasing emphasis on
the “broadly cultural (historico-political) and existential determinants of
identities and subjectivities” (Osborne and Sandford 2002, 5), the concept
of ethnicity has been used as a means to avoid the risk of “replicating the
residue biologism”, by placing the interrogation squarely “within culture
and representation” (Chow 2002, 24). This move is understandable, given
that the use of the term race often seems to evoke considerable anxiety.
As Linda Martín Alcoff points out, by virtue of “the practices of
racialising identity developed within the greatest period of colonialism
and genocide the world has ever known, anti-racists have been
understandably sceptical about the possibility of racial identity co-
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existing alongside equality and justice” (2002, 20). 
Nevertheless, the distinction between race and ethnicity is not as
straightforward as it might seem. Étinne Balibar, for one, argues that
while it may appear to be “the most natural of origins” (1991, 96),
ethnicity is just as fctive as the notion of race, and is produced or made
possible through “two great competing routes” (96), these being
“language acquisition (an open, inclusive process) and racial grouping (a
closed, exclusive process)” (Chow 2002, 24). Indeed, as many
commentators have pointed out, the relationship between race and
ethnicity is less a matter of terminological shift than of mutual
supplementation and complication. For example, following a Marxian
confguration of ethnicity (Chow 2002), Fatima El-Tayeb observes that in
the context of post-war labour migration in continental Europe, ethnicity
– a process of ethnicisation – does not displace race with “a neutral,
precise, and nonbinary terminology of largely objectifable regional
difference” (2011, xiii), but rather “closely interact[s] and overlap[s] with
longer-term, in part precapitalist processes of racialization” (xiv). In other
words, race morphs into ethnicity (see Koshy 2011; Chow 2002),
understood as “racialised culture difference” (El-Tayeb 2011, xv). As El-
Tayeb notes, it is through racialised cultural essence or difference that
“minority populations often originating in migrations from Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East continue to be differentiated from ‘real’ Europeans”,
a process which in turn “reference[s] supposedly innate, visible,
unchangeable differences from what the popular imagination considers
to be European” (2011, xv). Through such a morphing process, whiteness
as the norm transforms and (re)ascends (see Puar 2007; Chow 2006). For
El-Tayeb, then, the term ethnicity, defned against whiteness, comes to
stand both for and as (racial) difference, which functions to separate
insiders from outsiders within the European context.22 
22 It is interesting that Rey Chow also observes a shift in the deployment of the term
“ethnic” in its modern usage - from “boundary setting purposes” (2002, viii) to the
“universalist and inclusionary” (viii) terms. This means, as Chow makes clear,
everyone is now considered to be ethnic in the sense of belonging to one or another
grouping (viii). This universalist and inclusionist framing that Chow diagnoses is also
discernible in arguments of whiteness as a race. What interests me here is not so much
the use and abuse of terms and their underpinning of political investments, but the
historicity or arrival of concepts such as ethnicity and race and the ambiguities they
manifest. Such ambiguities are telling of the problematics of difference, a central
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Given the inherent ambiguity of these terms, the study at hand does
not attempt to provide more accurate defnitions or to map better
genealogies. As Osborne and Sandford assert, “there is no one conceptual
genealogy of ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’” (2002, 6, emphasis in original). Instead,
my intention is to linger on these ambiguities and contradictions, through
an exploration of the phenomenon of host country language acquisition
among adult immigrants in Finland. Conjoining the post-colonial
critiques of identity/difference with new materialist onto-epistemological
accounts of matter, this thesis closely engages with the political economy
of racialised visual-aural encounters instantiated in the process of Finnish
language learning. In refusing to simply negate the questions of biology,
nature and essence, found in the notion of race, this study asks how race
arrives and what race will(can)/not be. 
The framing of this question is inspired by the questions put forth by
Fred Moten (2003) and Arun Saldanha (2006). While Moten asks, “What
will blackness be?” (2003, 22), Saldanha encourages us to look at “what
race can be” (2006, 21, emphasis in original). As their questions make
clear, common to their projects is the insistence upon the inherent
dynamism of the materiality (of race) that is arrested by representation –
what Moten discusses in terms of improvisation, and Saldanha argues in
terms of viscosity – as well as a gesture of affrmation and radical
transformation. While my work on race echoes many aspects of their
theorisations, I want to complicate this gesture of affrmation by
contemplating the conditions of possibility and impossibility of racial
becomings by adding a “/” (solidus) and the word “not” to the question. 
It is interesting here to note that, for Ruth Benedict, “The frst necessity
in discussing race is to outline what race is not” (1943; 2000, 113, emphasis
in original).23 In clearly distinguishing race from language and culture,
Benedict argues for the specifcity of race, understood as “classifcation
based on hereditary traits” (2000, 115); thus, as historical and biological,
as opposed to as a universalist conception that “account[s] for all human
theme of this entire dissertation. 
23 The original text was published in 1943 as a chapter in Benedict's book Race: Science
and Politics.
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achievements” (118).24 Benedict’s argument could be read as suggesting
that racial differences, as relatively constant biological facts, do not
correspond to, or provide justifcation for, the fxity of racial hierarchies,
based on values of cultural achievements. 
While we may differ, most notably on the idea of “cultural-racial
separateness” (Benedict 2000, 117), I fnd Benedict’s interrogation of the
specifcity of race through a chain of differentiation (for example, race is
not language, race is not culture) to be an interesting dialogue with the
question of what race will/can be. This is because the latter question
leads to a theorisation of being/becoming that may often be associated
with the problematic of universality. In the question “what race will
(can)/not be?”, the slash between “will”, “(can)”, and not “represents the
constitutive inclusions as well as exclusions that cannot be subtracted
from the process of” (Hinton forthcoming; see also Barad 2012) race’s
arrival. Such a complication is also in accordance with my general
contemplation of the ascendancy of whiteness, which pivots on questions
of capacity, ability, and generativity, central to the discourse of host
country language acquisition.
My aim in the following pages of the introduction is to examine the
question of race and ethnicity through two interrelated aspects: frst, the
relation between the conception of language (acquisition) and
race/ethnisme (or what Chow calls “postcolonized race and ethnicity”
[2002, vii]); and second, the conundrum of human race and racial
differences. I will argue that the problematics of the nature/culture
question is what lies at the crux of the question of race. 
Ethnisme/Ethnicity
This meditation begins with an examination of the Swiss linguist
Ferdinand de Saussure’s conception of ethnisme. Saussure’s seminal
work on langue,25 a system of difference that functions without positive
24 For “human achievements” read language and culture.
25  Saussure distinguishes langue from parole, or the system of language from speech. As
Vicki Kirby observes, “Saussure considered speech to be the executive side of
language where meanings are actively designed and negotiated by an individual will.
… Parole is therefore the instantiation of langue as individual selection. However
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terms, has been central to anti-essentialist and anti-biologist theorisations
of race and gender. The unit of the sign – the essential unit of the system
of langue – consists of signifer and signifed. Whereas the signifer is the
sound-image, the signifed refers to a more abstract form, what Saussure
refers to as concept. The term “sound-image” indicates a psychological
imprint/representation, a “patternment”, as opposed to “‘the material
sound, a purely physical thing’” (Saussure quoted in Kirby 1997, 54–55).
Saussure’s following clarifcation of physiological phonetics patently
demonstrates this point: 
It is true that if no language existed the movements of the vocal
apparatus would be pointless. None the less, these movements are not
part of any language, and an exhaustive analysis of the process of
phonation required to produce every auditory impression tells us
nothing about what a language is. A language is a system based upon
psychological contrasts between these auditory impressions, just as a
tapestry is a work of art based upon the visual contrast between
strands of different colours. What is important for an analysis is the
effect of these contrasts, and not the process by which the colours were
obtained in the frst place. ([1983] 2013, 56) 
Saussure distinguishes between the linguistic structure and speech.
Whereas the former is understood as social and essential, the latter is
individual, “ancillary and more or less accidental” (Saussure [1983] 2013,
30). For Saussure, the linguistic faculty of man is psychological in essence,
and is characterised by the capacity to divide – cut and differentiate –
“the chain of speech into syllables” ([1983] 2013, 26) or “the chain of
meanings into meaningful units” (26). While linguistic structure is
considered a part of language, rather than language in its entirety, it
determines “over and above the functioning of the various organs”
([1983] 2013, 27). As Kirby observes, “Saussure’s active repression of the
body of the signifer reiterates the somatophobia (phallocentrism) of
Western metaphysics” (1997, 54–55). That is, the mind/body split that
excludes the feminine, the bodily and the material from the scene of
Saussure regarded the heterogenous and contingent nature of speech acts and their
contextual realization as far too messy for linguistics” (1997, 40-41). 
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production. This informs and is articulated by the langue (linguistic
system) and parole (speech) distinction in Saussurean framework. In the
Course in General Linguistics,26 not only does the linguistic system provide
the structuring principle of the entirety of language, but it also renders
exterior and redundant the materiality of phonation and sound.  Related
to the confguration of signifer as immaterial, the referent is for Saussure
something of a theoretical abstraction that is mediated and engendered in
language a posteriori.27 Put differently, within the parameters of
Saussurean framework, the referent is not the real object that pre-exists its
perception/representation/interpretation. Rather, the real object is
rendered inaccessible. Clearly, this confguration foreshadows the logic of
performativity, and affords a critical manoeuvre against essentialism and
biological determinism.  
For example, Judith Butler’s formulation of the nature/culture
question takes leverage from the Saussurean conception of the sign. We
see this manifested in her following assertion regarding the relationship
between gender and sex: “[G]ender is not to culture as sex is to nature;
gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which ‘sexed nature’ or ‘a
natural sex’ is produced and established as ‘prediscursive,’ prior to
culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts” (1999, 11,
26 Interestingly, according to Roy Harris (2013), in Saussure's notes published in 2002, the
autonomy and invariability of the linguistic system is called into question. In these
notes, Saussure observes the constant and perpetual recontextualisation of words in
everyday exchanges between speakers. In light of this, it seems the the structuring
dominance of the linguistic system (langue) proposed in the Course is qualifed.
Instead, speech (parole) takes on a pivotal role. 
27 Where and how to locate to the referent has been a major problematic in discussions of
the sign. See, for example, Kirby’s reading of the objection posed to Saussurean
linguistics by Marie-Laure Ryan and Vincent Descombes. As Kirby writes, “Their
respective arguments, however different, both focus on the way that Saussure
dispenses with reality/the referent. For Ryan, Saussure willfully abandons the world
for language. For Descombes, the opposite is the case. Despite Saussure’s claims that
reality’s substantive presence does not witness the truth or distortion of the sign’s
representation, Descombes argues that referent is nevertheless ubiquitous: it is an
unacknowledged third term that is merely disavowed by Saussure’s misguided
disclaimer” (1997, 14). I want to suggest that the dilemma of the referent has profound
implications for the analysis of the materiality of race, and the question of
transformation vis-à-vis the political economy of racialised visual-aural encounters. 
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emphasis in original). In other words, what is understood as nature – the
substance of reality – is in fact a cultural inscription.
 In a similar vein, important critical interventions into the question of
race and racism have lead to the argument that race is constructed, or that
it is a discursive effect or an illusion, given that there are no positive
terms of reference for race as such. Within this line of thought, the
presumed biological determinants of racial differences – be they
genotypes or phenotypes – are always already mediated and enacted by
discourses of biology (or biology as a discourse), which means that racial
hierarchies or divisions cannot be justifed by, or anchored in, any natural
facts, but are instead arbitrary. I want to quote, here, two of Donna
Haraway’s meditations on the question of biology and matter, as they
speak to the attempt to denaturalise nature and to “undo the political
knot of the nature/culture opposition” (Kirby 1997, 147):
[B]iology is not the body itself, but a discourse. When you say that my
biology is such-and-such – or, I am a biological female and so therefore
I have the following physiological structure – it sounds like you're
talking about the thing itself. But, if we are committed to remembering
that biology is a logos, is literally a gathering into knowledge, we are
not fooled into giving up the contestation for the discourse. (1990, 5)
I am using “matter” in the way suggested by Judith Butler in … Bodies
That Matter. … The marked bodies and subjects theorized by Trinh,
Butler, and Wittig evacuate precisely the heterosexist and racist
idealism-materialism binary that has ruled in the generic Western
philosophical tradition. (2004, 61)
While both Butler’s and Haraway’s respective projects will be engaged
in a more detailed fashion in relation to the question of the visual and the
aural of the political economy of race, they are briefy mentioned here to
underscore the profound implications of the Saussurean conception of the
sign for the examination of the matter of race.
Butler’s and Haraway’s above assertions help to demonstrate why
Saussure’s non-essentialist account of language, race, and ethnisme, so
tightly bound up with and informed by the nature/culture conundrum
and the question of essence, is of particular interest to the discussion at
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hand. So what does Saussure actually mean by the term ethnisme? And
why is it important for Saussure to introduce this neologism? Using
Robert J. C. Young’s reading of the two Saussure brothers’ – Ferdinand de
Saussure and Léopold de Saussure – differing understanding of race and
language as our guide, we will see the ways in which Saussure’s study of
the system of semiology/langue is embedded in, and informs, the politics
of language and race in the context of coloniality.28 While many
commentators have found critical purchase in precisely the ways in
which Saussure deliberately distances himself from the messiness of
parole, of speech and the material substance of sound (cf. Moten 2003;
Cavarero 2005), I want to stay with the contradictions and dilemmas that
appear in the exclusion of materiality present in Saussure’s attempt to
distinguish language and race and in his account of ethnisme. I am
particularly inspired by Kirby’s critical yet patient engagement with
Saussure’s work in an endeavour to explore “how the question of
language can render substance and corporeality entirely problematic”
(1997, 4).
Ethnisme/Ethnicity and the Linguistic Community
The last two chapters of part fve of the book Course in General Linguistics,
“Questions of Retrospectives of Diachronic Linguistics”, often attributed
to Saussure,29 deals with questions of language, race and ethnicity. At the
28 Throughout my dissertation, I emphasise the importance of attending to the historicity
of concepts, that is the how of the arrival, which I argue is a shared critical rigour of
both postcolonial and new materialist theorisations. For related discussions on the
politics of concepts see for example Ahmed (2008), van der Tuin (2009), Hemmings
(2011), Irni (2013), and Sullivan (2012). 
29 An important detail to be noted here: the Course, frst published in 1916, was actually
not written by Saussure. As Vicki Kirby says of this, “the Course … was a compilation
of students’ notes that was posthumously conceived – born from the efforts of two
colleagues who had not themselves attended Saussure’s classes. … Even though some
brief preparatory jottings and other desultory fragments of writing provided evidence
of the general direction of Saussure’s endeavours, the editors were mainly left to rely
on a few student records, gleaned from three quite separate courses spanning a period
of six years” (1997, 7–8). This is not a trivial matter, however, but one that makes
manifest the problematic of writing and difference itself. As Kirby writes, “there is
something curiously ftting about this equivocal beginning that sees the Master
animated by the ventriloquism of his disciples …. For the question of how to secure a
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outset of chapter four, “Linguistic Evidence in Anthropology, and
Prehistory”, Saussure frmly refutes the possibility of language to reveal
or provide evidence of the nature of the people or the communities of
peoples who speak them – “their race, their social structure, their
customs, their institutions, etc.” ([1983] 2013, 304). As Saussure makes
clear:
It would be a mistake to believe that one can argue from a common
language to consanguinity, or equate linguistic families with
anthropological families. … There is, for example, a Germanic race with
very distinct anthropological features: fair hair, elongated skull, tall
stature, etc. … But it is far from being the case that every population
speaking one of the Germanic languages answers to this description.  ...
[C]onsanguinity and common language appear to have no necessary
connexion. It is impossible to argue from one to the other. ([1983] 2013,
304-305) 
The use of the word “consanguinity”, meaning “of the same blood”,
clearly echoes Du Bois’s description of race quoted earlier.30 Within this
line of thinking, race is understood as a biological fact that is somehow
carried in blood, suggesting generational continuity and coherence.
Moreover, this signature or mark of racial identity and difference
encrypted in, and carried by, blood is understood to take visible
expressions in phenotypical differences, or what Saussure calls
“anthropological features”, such as “fair hair, elongated skull, tall
stature”. As is made clear from above quote, Saussure is not against the
biological and physiological conception of race, as such. In fact, as Young
beginning, an origin or entity that will guarantee the proper point of departure for
interpretation, is the essential problematic that Saussure’s work explores and that its
diffculties enact” (1997, 8). The questions of origin, authenticity, and where and how
to begin have signifcant implications for the study at hand, as will become clear. 
30 The association of blood and race will be elaborated on in later chapters. However, it is
important to note here that whereas blood, as carrier of racial identity, designates
patrilineal inheritance, the tongue (read language) symbolises maternal, feminine
continuity. Furthermore, as commentators have pointed out, blood, or the quality of
the blood that defned race, was not only a theological concept (cf. Feerick 2010), but
also one tightly bounded up with notions of kinship (cf. Franklin and Mckinnon 2001;
Feeley-Harnik 2001). 
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also points out, Saussure “fully subscribes” (2002, 63) to the concept of
race, “on exclusively scientifc physiological grounds” (66), that is, “the
fndings of physiognomy with respect to corporeal differences” (74). 
What Saussure is adamantly rejecting is the association of language
with race and nation in the nineteenth century. This particular backdrop
needs to be attended to as, to a certain degree, it not only provides a
better picture of the ways in which Saussure strived to formulate an
independent system of language but also contextualises it. In so doing,
terms such as signifer and signifed, difference, arbitrariness, and value
can be broached through (re)contextualisation and the mapping of their
routes of arrival, that is, the coloniality in which they are embedded..31 In
addition to his work as a semiologist, Saussure was also a scholar of
Sanskrit and an Indo-European philologist. According to Young, in a
sense the colonial encounter with Sanskrit enabled and strengthened the
idea of an Indo-European language family as well as that of Indo-
Europeans as a superior race. The linguistic metaphors of family32 and
“tree” that connote kinship, reproduction, generation and lineage are
telling of the association of racial and linguistic identity.33 One of
31 I want to note here briefy that, in their different feld of investigations, Saussure and
his some of his contemporaries – Marx, Nietzsche, Freud – all strived to set into
motion “the revaluation of value” (Moten 2003, 7). As Moten observes, “they open the
possibility of a critique of the valuation of meaning over content and the reduction of
phonic matter and syntactic ‘degeneracy’ in the early modern search for a universal
language and the late modern search for a universal science of language. This
disruption of the Enlightenment linguistic project is of fundamental importance since
it allows a rearrangement of the relationship between notions of human freedom and
notions of human essence” (2003, 7). Saussure’s introduction of the term “valeur” –
value, weight – into the system of the sign is a signifcant endeavour in this regard.
The notion of value, the process of re-/trans-/valuation will be engaged with in
different parts of the thesis. 
32  Regarding the term “family”, Donna Haraway provides an important summation of
the question of lineage and kinship that is central to discourses of race. As Haraway
notes, “Four major discursive streams poured into the cauldron in which racial
discourse simmered well into the early decades of the twentieth century, including the
ethnological, Lamarckian, polygenist, and evolutionist traditions. For each approach,
the essential idea was the linkages of lineage and kinship. No great distinction could be
maintained between linguistic, national, familial and physical resonances implied by the term
kinship and race” (2004, 251, my emphasis).
33 Throughout the thesis, I argue for the need to read sexuality and race not as two
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Saussure’s contemporaries, the philologist Friedrich Max Müller, was
among the most vocal advocates of the race, language and nation
affliation, and “used language to reconstruct a whole racial history”
(Young 2002, 68). 
For Saussure, however, such an association is a mistake, because race,
understood in biological terms, is conceived of as extra-linguistic reality,
that is, radically distinct from language proper. In other words, the
identity of the sign and the linguistic system is not anchored in a self-
present biological, racial essence. Commenting on the diversity of
languages, Saussure notes that if approached in terms of social
convention, a language could be said to evince the individual
characteristic of a community, as the notion “idiom” implies. However,
Saussure frmly states that such a notion “easily turns into error when it is
taken so far that a language is seen as the attribute not of a nation but of a
race, on a par with the colour of the skin or the shape of the head” ([1983]
2013, 261). Rather, the development of a linguistic system is driven by the
“systematicity” of language itself. The term “systematicity” normally
gives the impression of the consistent operation of a system, as a self-
contained unity, that unfailingly sustains itself and maintains its
boundary. This seems to illustrate Saussure's conception of the linguistic
system. And yet, the question arises as to how the linguistic system that
functions through pure difference – the nature of arbitrariness – is also
governed by a seemingly self-same systematicity. What does it mean if
the law and method of the system – its systematicity – is arbitrary?34 
separate grids of intelligibility, or felds of analysis that somehow intersect or add
together, but in terms of copulation or sexual/racial diffraction. Many commentators
have emphasised the importance of such a reading, though not always within the
same terms of debate. For this note, it suffces to mention Chow’s argument that
“[r]ace and ethnicity are … coterminous with sexuality, just as sexuality is implicated
in race and ethnicity. To that extent, any analytical effort to keep these categories apart
from one another may turn out to be counterproductive, for it is their categorical
enmeshment – their categorical miscegenation, so to speak – that needs to be
foregrounded” (2002, 7). 
34 For an excellent reading of systematicity that brings into dialogue Jacques Derrida's
and Niklas Luhmann's theorisations, see Wolfe (2009). The upshot of Cary Wolfe's
observation is that both Derrida's conception of writing in general and Luhmann's
formulation of systems theory are concerned with the problematic of difference. 
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In fact, in advocating the science of language – a “resolutely anti-
biological, anti-historical, anti-psychological” (Young 2002, 69) account of
a homogenous linguistic system, that is, la langue, Saussure goes so far as
to argue that as a self-enclosed institution, the system of language
operates radically independent of its environments. This is a direct
response to nineteenth-century claims of psychological and physical
racial determinants, such as those of his brother Léopold de Saussure,
who argues that “the physical construction of the throat and larynx of the
different races determined their ability to speak in certain ways” and puts
forward the idea of “different mental capacities of different races for
different levels of linguistic development” (Young 2002, 74). As
Saussure35 argues:
It is said that racial predisposition determines the direction of sound
changes. There is a question of comparative anthropology involved.
But does the vocal apparatus vary from one race to another? No.
Hardly more than from one individual to another. A negro brought to
France at birth speaks French as well as any Frenchman. Furthermore,
to speak of “the Italian vocal apparatus” or to say “the German mouth
does not allow this” is to risk presenting as a permanent characteristic
what is merely a historical fact. … [T]here is no question of any
physiological incapacity, but simply of a change of articulatory habits.
… It is indeed possible to recognise a general tendency in phonetic
changes at a given period in a given community. … But one could fnd
similar general movements in political history, without being led on
that account to question their purely historical nature or to suspect the
operation of some underlying racial factor. ([1983] 2013, 202–203)
I want to consider here what is actually at stake in Saussure’s
engagement with the race and language question. What seems to lie at
the core of Saussure’s argument, its inherent conundrum, is a question of
distinction (difference as opposition: A is A because it is not B) (read
racial differences) and (human and linguistic) unity/identity. In order to
lay bare these conundrums, we need to go back a bit over the ground
covered thus far. 
35 In this discussion “Saussure” will refer specifcally to Ferdinand de Saussure.
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First, Saussure’s rejection of the equation between race and language,
and his advocation of the linguistic system are consistent with his general
emphasis on difference as performative and his theorisation of the
arbitrary. The arbitrariness of the sign means that change in the linguistic
system just happens, and is not based on any stable extra-linguistic
referent or historical facts. As Young makes clear, this account of
randomness (chance as opposed to necessity) “demonstrates the
infuences of a Darwinist evolutionary perspective: language is a self-
enclosed institution, whose processes involve arbitrary, not organic,
changes and in which characteristics endure by ‘sheer luck’” (2002, 66).36
Indeed, nineteenth-century developments in racial science, corporeal
ethnology and comparative anatomy (cf. Anderson 2014), coupled with
the rise of Darwinism have contributed to the debate between
monogenist and polygenist accounts of race that have rendered
increasingly problematic the philologist argument for the kinship of
language, race and nation. Seeing as both the nineteenth-century turn to
racial science and Darwinism’s challenge of human uniqueness will
feature prominently in the following section on racial differences and the
dis/continuity of the human race(s), I will briefy outline a non/linear
transition of these positions to support the present discussion.
The “biologisation” of race supports the view that “the relations of
superiority/inferiority between western and non-western people were
based not on culture or religion but were physical: that difference was
fxed in the bodies of individuals and their member races, as was
hierarchy among the races” (Anderson 2007, 23). This biological turn thus
witnessed and intensifed the shift from the Enlightenment monogenist
model of race as kin, “characterised by a notion of shared human origins
in the creation and Adam and Eve and a human unity in which apparent
36 In her book The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution and the Untimely, Elizabeth Grosz also
comments on the connection between Saussure’s model of linguistic systems and
Darwin’s evolutionist theorisations. She writes, “The link with Saussure’s work is
closer than it may seem; indeed, it would be surprising if Saussure wasn’t in some way
affected by the transformation in scientifc models Darwin’s work accomplished. In
particular, at the origin or heart of both biological and linguistic models is pure
difference, a difference without positive terms, an indeterminacy that replaces origin
and that substitutes for the only identity of the units analyzed” (Grosz 2004, 29). 
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(rather than fundamental) differences were thought to distinguish human
groups” to “a ‘polygenist’ notion of separately constituted and
biologically determined race” (Anderson 2007, 23, emphasis in original).
And yet, Darwinism’s emphasis on the human-nature continuity through
the discourse of evolution brought not only radical challenge to the
polygenist notion of absolute separation of races, but also mounting
anxiety to humanism itself. 
This anxiety seems to also inform Saussure’s dilemma discussed here.
As noted earlier, Saussure accepts racial differences understood as
corporeal differences. Interestingly, this notion of difference measured by
purportedly unchanging and fxed biological facts clearly contradicts
Saussure’s conceptualisation of the arbitrariness of the linguistic system.
What is it about corporeality that makes it indicative of the fxation and
the separation of races? What is assumed of and invested in the racialised
bodies’ empirical obviousness? Related to his rejection of Müller’s idea of
the universal family or kinship of language – that is, racial and linguistic
identifcation, Saussure perceives race as a biological fact that is present
to itself, thus radically distinct, because it is separate from the realm of
the linguistic system. Such a confguration of race echoes Saussure’s
exclusion of the materiality of phonation and speech sound, as well as the
referent in his study of language. 
Nevertheless, Saussure’s notion of difference and arbitrariness does
not resolve the vexed issue here. We are yet to witness the third dilemma
of Saussure’s thinking, that is, his assimilationist politics of language in
the context of colonialism. Given his argument regarding the arbitrary
nature of the sign, it is not diffcult to comprehend his vehement
contestation of the colonial language policy that foregrounds the fxation
of innate differences between races, as the psychological and physical
determinants of linguistic differences. As discussed earlier, this is a major
subject of contention between Saussure and his brother, Léopold. Young’s
reading of the paradox within French colonial language policy is
instructive for understanding the brothers’ opposing stances and could
further assist in interrogating the dilemmas in Saussure’s thinking. As
Young makes explicit, 
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[O]n the one hand, it was the most progressive, to the extent that it
assumed the fundamental equality of all human beings, their common
humanity as part of a single species, and assumed that however
‘natural’ or ‘backward’ their state, all native peoples could immediately
beneft from the uniform imposition of French culture in its most
advanced contemporary manifestation. On the other hand, such an
assumption meant that this model had the least respect and sympathy
for the culture, language and institutions of the people being colonised
– it saw difference, and sought to make it the same – what we might
call the paradox of ethnocentric egalitarianism. (2002, 70–71)
For Léopold de Saussure, however, the hierarchical differences among
races and languages are unbridgeable. The postulation of absolute
difference foreshadows a model of colonial policy, which, for Young,
anticipates current multiculturalist assumptions. Young notes that
Léopold de Saussure, “an offcer in the French navy who by then had
taken on French nationality,” was the person who had a major impact on
and shifted French colonial policy to a model of association, driven by
calculations of what was most proftable in managing the colonised, that
is, “to leave as much their native culture intact as possible” (Young 2002,
72). Léopold de Saussure’s theories of language and race are predicated
on the view of the determination of anatomical structures as well as the
hierarchical differences in racial mentalities. In other words, racial
differences are conceived of as proportional to, and as determining,
differences in linguistic capacity and the hierarchies among languages.
Furthermore, mental and physical propensities orient the direction of
linguistic development. For example, Léopold de Saussure argues that 
[T]he different linguistic forms of agglutination and infexion
correspond to a hierarchy that refects the increasing mental powers
and subtlety of reasoning of the people whose language it is. The
imposition of French on a native people whose own language, and
therefore mental capacity, has not developed further than, say, analogy
will cause French to degenerate and regress into a bastardised creole,
rather than develop the mental capacities of the natives to the level of
the Aryan French. (Saussure quoted in Young 2002, 71). 
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The founding gesture of Léopold de Saussure’s theoretical
argumentations and political propositions is in stark contrast to that of
Saussure’s. For Léopold de Saussure, the identity of languages, and the
differences between them, is predicated on extra-linguistic positive
factors, be they biological or psychological. By comparison, Ferdinand de
Saussure’s thesis of difference without positive terms argues that
corporeal and psychological racial differences are radically distinct from,
and in opposition to, the system of langue. He argues that there is an in-
between – the arbitrary – which separates, perhaps engulfs, these two
realms. This is what Saussure means by his claim that there are only
differences in the linguistic system.37 Saussure’s argument supports the
assimilationist policy of language, in which the colonised are forced to
learn the language of the coloniser, in this case French, and to
subordinate their native languages. Nevertheless, he encounters the
following two problematics. First, Saussure needs to be able to account
for variations within, and the over-time stability of linguistic
communities, vis-à-vis their geographical locations and demographical
compositions, all the while contesting the notion of race and language
affliation. Second, and related to the frst question, the discrepancies
between racial distinctions and the notion of the continuity of the human
race which foregrounds assimilationist policy needs to be negotiated. 
The diffculty faced by Saussure is palpable. How could he navigate
through the knotted problematics within the terms of the debate? Seeing
as he holds a frm position vis-à-vis language as an independent system
and the immutable facts of racial differences, as well as their opposition,
it seems that Saussure would perhaps have to take sides. Or would he? It
is here that he introduces the third term – ethnisme – variously translated,
according to Young, as “ethnic” or “ethnic community”. With this
concept, which connotes in general terms a linguistic community that is
37 This question of the arbitrary is crucial for setting into motion the chain of
signifcation, the play of signifer, and the revaluation of value as form, which both
enables and traps critical endeavour for transformation. In fact, as I see it, the question
of the arbitrary, together with Saussure’s engagement with the dynamism of
valeur/value, proves central to, and indeed animates, the scene of debate among
poststructuralist, postcolonial and (new) materialist paradigms. 
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not grounded in racial identities or differences, Saussure is able to shift
the debate from a biological discussion of race (because he concedes to its
de facto status) to one involving questions of culture and “the social
bond” (Young 2002, 68). To highlight what is at stake here, then, with the
notion of ethnisme, the question of race – its natural status both conceded
and elided – is now one of social, cultural, and political form, that
subscribes to the human subject and becomes a concern for the linguist
(Saussure himself) or the linguistic system. This shift from nature to
culture, enabled by the theorisation of ethnisme, once again makes visible
the logic of mind/body split that informs Saussure's framework. 
However, before moving on to an examination of ethnisme, I want to
pause and carefully unpack some important details regarding Saussure’s
manoeuvre. The frst detail that needs to be reiterated is that even when
Saussure carefully and deliberately excludes racial corporeal differences
from the study of the linguistic system, he entirely acknowledges their
existence as racial markers manifested on the body. This is the same logic
through which Saussure relegates dialects, accents, or the sound of
speech itself to a position outside of linguistic system, that is, rendering
them inaccessible for the human subject who is always already confned
within the structure of the sign.
Secondly, in Saussure’s assimilationist framework, both the human,
now rendered cultural through the notion ethnisme, and the language
system acquire an organism-like character, becoming like species that
evolve, which is clearly a Darwinian gesture. Yet, already here we
witness the nature/culture conundrum. If, as Saussure’s frst move – the
repression of the material body/sound – makes clear, the term of the
debate has shifted from the relationship between race (understood in
biological and natural terms) and language (understood as radically
distinct from nature, as a system with only difference without positive
terms), to the question of the social, the cultural and the political, then the
second manoeuvre, with its clear Darwinian references to natural
selection leaves us in something of a quandary. To lay bare the
nature/culture issue, here, I will quickly turn to Ruth Benedict’s reading
of the language and race question. 
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Benedict’s argument is precisely that race is not language. This is the
frst distinction she makes in responding to her own question: “what race
is not”. In arguing for the radical distinction between race and language,
Benedict stresses the necessity of “culture-racial separateness” (2000, 117).
For Benedict, race, understood as “biologically transmitted” (2000, 115)
“is not a touchstone by which civilized people can be separated from
uncivilized” (117). By comparison, language, as “learned behaviour”
(Benedict 2000, 115) signifes the capacity for civilisation, because “This
non-biological transmission is a great advantage in that it allows for
much greater adaptability to circumstances but it progressively lessens
the importance of biologically transmitted behaviour” (115). To explicate,
Benedict supports her argument with reference to the following example: 
“[T]he leopard cannot change his spots” means that the leopard,
because he belongs to a certain species, will always be found stalking
the jungle for his prey. But in man the great aggressors of yesterday
become the mild peace-lovers of today. In the ninth century
Scandinavians were the feared aggressive Vikings of the sea; in the
present generations they are the peaceful non-aggressive exponents of
co-operatives and the “middle way”. (2000, 115)
Even though it is clear that Benedict’s intention is to contest racial
prejudice, by arguing that race, as a biological given, has nothing to do
with civilisation itself, her above chosen example inadvertently
recuperates a racist logic that also characterises the exceptionalist status
of the human condition. I will engage with this point in the next part of
this chapter. For my examination of Saussure’s notion of ethnisme, I am
interested in the Darwinian framework that both Benedict and Saussure
clearly follow, as well as the nature/culture separation that can be found
echoing in their respective projects. 
Despite their similarities, I would like to draw attention to an
interesting and important difference between their arguments. While, for
Benedict, language is a cultural process and remains a human endeavour,
for Saussure, the linguistic system occupies an almost ontological status,
in that the study of semiology is generalised and generalisable to the
question of being. The latter is something that Jacques Derrida’s
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reformulation of grammatology, which extends from Saussure’s work,
attests to. As Saussure mediates on the scope and content of semiology,
A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable … I shall
call it semiology. … Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say
what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in
advance. Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology;
the law discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics.
(Saussure quoted in Kirby 1997, 53, emphasis in original) 
The question is whether Saussure’s second move – his assimilationist
politics of language, which contests the essentialist assertions of racial
differences as deterministic of linguistic capacities as well as his elevation
of the linguistic system resembling the evolutionary dynamism of the
organisms (perhaps it should be highlighted here that these include  the
human species) – actually undoes his frst move, by returning to a more
generalised discussion of Nature and being, reconceived in terms of
systematicity. I will further suggest that perhaps both nature and culture
are reconceived in the systematicity of language.38 Keeping this in mind, I
want to return to the question of ethnisme. It might be more informative
to try and approach ethnisme in terms of the Saussurean notion of
difference. Having justifed the exclusion of the racial differences for the
study of language, and henceforth their dissociation, Saussure could now
engage with the variations within a linguistic community. The
problematics of homogeneity and heterogeneity, whole and part, are
central to my exploration in part three, but for now it is important for me
to underscore the ways in which Saussure’s deployment of the term
ethnisme enables both the proposition of homogeneity of a linguistic
community and its internal diversity, in a relation of non/contradiction.
As Kirby remarks on Saussure’s conundrums with respect to the question
of noncontradiction:
[S]uch is the complexity of his thesis that we can interpret this same
contradiction as faithfully consistent with the very paradox he sought
to explore and articulate. According to the principle of
38 My examination of the question of race/ethnisme in Saussure is greatly inspired by
Kirby’s reading of “the matter of the sign” (1997, 7) in Telling Flesh.
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noncontradiction that underpins Western metaphysics, Saussure is
unable both to refute and to embrace the tenets of nomenclaturism: he
must come down on either one side or the other. (1997, 19) 
I want to emphasise here that by proposing the term
non/contradiction, I mean to further complicate the performative
contradictions at the heart of any essence and identity. I argue that,
inasmuch as performative contradictions mean that for example in order
for a racialised subject to assert claims and negotiate conditions of rights,
he or she must submit and conform to the norms and normative practices
that he or she is denied access to and ownership of, and which operate by
excluding racialised bodies in the frst place, then it should be possible  to
imagine that such a contradiction (one that substantiates, even as it
challenges, oppositional terms), must also contradict itself, even as it
never contradicts itself. This is the self-encounter, the onto-
epistemological dis/continuity that I put forth throughout my thesis.
Further discussions on performative contradictions in relation to the
question of norms are detailed in the chapter eight. 
While the term ethnisme seems to be suffcient in accounting for the
multiplicities (communities of language) within a unity (linguistic
system), the question remains as to how to account for the changes and
variations within a linguistic community? As we have seen, within the
linguistic system, differentiation as a chain of signifcation is set in motion
by the exclusion of the actual object, the reality. However, this repression
of the materiality needs to be supplemented by another important factor –
that is, Saussure’s notion of valeur/value. Kirby’s meditation on the
workings of value is instructive here:
Value is produced along two interconnecting axes of equivalence. One
axis involves a relationship of dissimilarity and contrast, while the
other expresses similarity through comparison and association. … But
what exactly is being compared and contrasted within this system of
exchange? Does this model quietly return us to the comfortable
wisdom of nomenclaturism in a different guise? (1997, 28)
Nomenclaturism is a form of essentialism that Saussure’s
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conceptualisation of the system of the sign is set to contest. In a
nomenclatural account of language, the sign functions “as a surrogate for
something else, a name that represents the meaning of the thing for
which it ‘stands in’” (Kirby 1997, 10). It follows, then, that if the value is
actually the comparison between, and measurement of, the sign or the
language system with its external referent, then we will, as Kirby’s last
question indicates, return to the conventional notion of representation in
which the referent, the glassy Nature, is mirrored by the sign. Clearly,
Saussure would want to avoid such an understanding. As he explains,
value, and the process of measurement, “is actually generated from
within the system of language itself (langue)” (Kirby 1997, 28). 
Nevertheless, in Saussure’s elaboration on the changes of sound and
the diversities within the linguistic community, his struggle with the
anchorage point for valuation is discernible. That is, the how and what
are being compared in order to measure difference and change. For
example, while Saussure “denies that linguistic changes have any relation
to other historical events,” he “allows that the effects of discontinuity
produced by historical acts such as colonisation can play a role in
accounting for linguistic differences” (Young 2002, 66). Saussure himself
acknowledges the complexity and diffculties involved in engaging with
the assumption and perception of linguistic differences, such as accents
and dialects, as marking racial and geographical differences (see Young
2006, 67). At a certain point in his discussion regarding the differing
relation between language and race, and between language and ethnisme,
he seems to relax his guard against the messiness of the biological and the
racial, and to acknowledge a certain connection between language and
race, even in terms of the limits of such an association, which obviously
contradicts his thesis of difference as founded on absence and opposition.
For example, although Saussure argues against the affliation of
consanguinity and common language, he acknowledges that “Racial
unity in itself can only be a secondary factor and not a necessary
condition  where community of language is concerned” ([1983] 2013, 305).
As Young observes, for Saussure, “Language only operates as a
characteristic of race … when it persists through time. It is the condition
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of variation or non-variation through time that Saussure identifes with
an ‘ethnic’ identity” (2002, 67–68). Of course, the question that might
immediately follow, and for which Saussure would probably have to
scratch his head and make another revaluation, is then how to measure
time. Such a measurement might prove diffcult, especially given
Saussure’s earlier rejection of historical events as determinants of
linguistic change, because the claim of historical events as such is also a
form of essentialising. 
It seems, then, that the question of essence, the outside of the langue,
continues to haunt, and is perhaps reproduced in, the seemingly endless
chain of valuation and signifcation. Even the notion of ethnisme itself, a
term introduced to exclude the essence of race, is rendered problematic in
the dynamism of valuation. Young makes a similar point:
The linguistic community frst of all can be multi-racial, and can occur
in the absence of any political bond: what is signifcant is that is should
have a common civilisation and religion. However, the word
civilisation begs a lot of questions – what defnes a civilisation has
never been easy to specify. The requirement of a common religion also
seems problematic – does this exclude the French Protestants from the
French linguistic community? And if 'ethnisme' requires a common
defence, this sounds like a version of a nation, but the possibility of the
absence of any political bond also makes this equation unlikely.  …
Saussure's arguments about language and ethnicity, however, are
equally based on an assumption of ethnic and cultural uniformity that
leads them back to the “positive fact” of the communal bonds of the
social – on which Saussure’s logic ultimately depends even though his
fundamental argument consists of the attempt to exclude it. (2002, 68–
78)
Whereas Young argues for an even more generalised notion of
difference to unsettle the boundaries of ethnicity, I want instead to
consider Saussure’s dilemma regarding how to identify or mark the
contours of language as a system, and where to anchor the arbitrary in
terms of the problematics of essentialism. Interestingly, although
generally considered as designating the idea of the existence of fxed
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attributes as unchanging truth, the term essentialism itself, as Grosz
notes, is “rarely defned or explained explicitly in feminist contexts”
(2002, 334). According to Grosz, the term essentialism is often associated,
or used interchangeably, with terms such as biologism, naturalism and
universalism.  Upon closer inspection, however, the essence of essence
itself becomes diffcult to pin down. That is, it becomes unclear, if not
impossible, as to how, where and when to locate essence. Is the essence of
essence biological, natural or cultural? 
In her discussion of the writing of the body in terms of corporeal
habits, Kirby draws on Grosz’s description of the four categories –
essentialism, biologism, naturalism and universalism – to shed light on
the ambiguities of the nature/culture division:
Biologism—women’s essence is defned in terms of their biological
capacities. … In so far as biology is assumed to constitute an
unalterable bedrock of identity, the attribution of biologistic
characteristics amounts to a permanent form of social containment for
women. 
Naturalism—may be asserted on theological or on ontological rather
than biological on grounds … it may be claimed that women’s nature is
derived from God-given attributes which are not explicable or
observable simply in biological terms. … More commonly however,
naturalism presumes the equivalence of biological and natural
properties. 
Universalism—the attributions of invariant social categories, functions
and activities to which all women in all cultures are assigned. (Grosz
quoted in Kirby 1997, 171) 
As is made clear in above excerpt, the location of essence confounds
and defes the nature/culture division, for the “nature of things” (Kirby
1997, 69) could also be found in what is understood as cultural, often
considered as fuid and plastic
For example, as Kirby writes, “cross-cultural data that show women
consigned to invariant social categories and roles in the sexual division of
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labour can be offered as proof of essential and therefore unarguable
human requirements” (1997, 69). Although Grosz’s and Kirby’s
discussions of essentialism concern mainly the question of woman, it is
highly relevant for the question of race. It echoes something of the elusive
nature of essence betrayed by Saussure’s struggle to distance la langue
from materiality and the problematics of race, while defning the identity
of linguistic communities and their developments. As having been noted,
Saussure’s argument of the contingency (of the sign), the difference,
arbitrariness and operation of value inadvertently, and perhaps
necessarily, recuperates a point of anchorage and entails a return to forms
of essence as positive facts. Even the purportedly and radically distinct
and separate systems – race and language – acquire certain connections
with the measurement of time. However, the self-contradiction or
perhaps non-contradiction found in Saussure’s thesis complicates the
very notion of measurement that conventionally underpins critical
engagements. What I fnd fascinating in addressing Saussure’s
engagement with race and language is that it opens up the possibility of
rethinking the questions of essence and nature that are crucial to the
understanding of language (acquisition policy) and the dis/continuities
of the human race(s), as detailed below. 
Dis/Continuities of Human Race(s) 
‘Race’ meant the ‘accumulated cultural differences carried somehow in
the blood’ (Stocking 1993: 6). The emphasis was on ‘somehow,’ for blood
proved a very expansible and inclusive fuid. (Haraway 2004, 251, my
emphasis) 
The above defnition opens Donna Haraway’s story of race, “Universal
Donors in a Vampire Culture. It’s All in the Family: Biological Kinship
Categories in the Twentieth-Century United States”, and is consistent
with her confguration of fact and fction as cohabiting and “made in
world-changing technoscientifc practices by particular collective actors
in particular times and spaces” (2004, 65). It should be noted  that the
term “vampire culture” in the title of Haraway’s story is not only an
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indication of her focus on blood as emblematic of the nature/culture
continuum, but is also a reference to the Human Genome Diversity
project, which was dubbed the “Vampire Project” by some indigenous
organisations (2004, 272). I want to underscore here the arrival of the term
“Vampire Project”. In her book Race to the Finish: Identity and Governance
in an Age of Genomics, Jenny Reardon (2005) notes that the name “Vampire
Project” was given to the 1992 initiative of the Human Genome Diversity
Project by the World Congress of Indigenous Peoples. According to
Reardon, the central motivation of and the urgency for the Human
Genome Diversity Project resides in the idea that “Social changes that
facilitated the mixing of populations … threatened the identity of groups
of greatest importance for understanding human evolutionary history –
‘isolated indigenous populations’ … To unravel the mysteries of human
origins and migrations, these valuable gene pools would need to be
sampled before they ‘vanished’” (2005, 1). At its outset, the Diversity
project was criticised for having colonialist and racist tendencies. For
example, as Reardon notes: “In May 1993 some physical anthropologists
accused the initiative of using twenty-frst-century technology to
propagate the concepts of nineteenth-century racist biology” (2005, 2).
What I fnd particularly inspiring about Reardon’s account of the Human
Genome Diversity initiative is that it reveals a narrative that is not simply
about the condemnation of the powerful Western and Scientifc
communities who exploit and render powerless racialised others. Rather,
Reardon argues that what is needed is a rethinking of the nature of power
and knowledge production through an excavation of the history of race,
against the oppositional conception of power and knowledge, truth and
ideology. For Reardon then, “Claims that the Project would lead to the
end of racism by producing reliable scientifc knowledge were just as
unconvincing as some of the critics’ claims that the Project would
propagate racism and colonialism by exploiting the genes of indigenous
peoples” (2005, 3). Whereas Reardon urges for a probing of the
“conceptual order” and “social interests” (2005, 7) as two symmetrical
and inseparable domains, the study at hand pushes still further the
questions of perception and conception, epistemology and ontology,
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identity categories and questions of being, through the notion of onto-
epistemological dis/continuity.
Returning to the opening quote of this section, I recall that when
reading Haraway’s emphasis on the word “somehow”, I was drawn to
the sense of intrigue and wonder it evoked. How do cultural differences
get carried in blood? Somehow. The word somehow, provides an answer
that is affrmative (yes, blood does carry cultural difference), yet strangely
indeterminate (some … how?) – it is differing, questioning and
threatening to annihilate its own affrmation and promise. How?
Somehow! Some … how?39
The idea that racial identity – a signature that marks culturally and/or
biologically distinguished features – is transmitted and reproduced
through kinship relations, persists despite the changing discourses of
race. As Balibar puts it, “The symbolic kernel of the idea of race … is the
schema of genealogy, that is, quite simply the idea that the fliation of
individuals transmits from generation to generation a substance both
biological and spiritual and thereby inscribes them in a temporal
community known as ‘kinship’” (1991, 100). It needs to be mentioned
here that it can already be gleaned from Balibar’s description that the idea
of race involves the question of part (read fliation of individuals) and
whole (read fliation of race), which will be discussed at length in chapter
eight.
Pondering over the condition of possibility of transmission and
reproduction, Haraway draws attention to the inherent ambiguity of the
carrier blood. As she writes, “Blood ties were the proteinaceous threads
extruded by the physical and historical passage of substance from one
generation to the next, forming the great nested organic collectives of the
human family” (2004, 251, my emphasis). It follows, then, that although
the fuidity of blood40 seems to support its function as a medium of a
39 Here we could add the question of where. As the following discussion shows, the
location of racial difference animates and articulates the question of race itself. 
40 The racial discourse of blood is interesting, in that its seemingly arbitrary
representation of kinship and race is strangely ubiquitous and “shared” across various
cultures, and persistent (I’m thinking here, for example, of the Chinese tradition of di
xue ren qin, which is an ancient model of parental testing, with the understanding that
relations of fliation could be proved in seeing two drops of blood from the child and
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“diachronic identity” (Kirby 1997, 16), in fowing from one individual to
the next in a relation of genesis, it is also “expansive and inclusive”
(Haraway 2004, 251), thus potentially compromising the integrity of race.
It may be worth highlighting here that the etymology of blood connotes
swelling (gestation), springing forth (both in to and out from) in the form
of a stream, as well as the action of bursting open.41 In other words,
bloodlines both promise and threaten the lineage and reproduction of
race. Given this, as an opening process of genesis, the (re)production of
race through blood ties – relations of fliation – necessitates containment
in order to secure its integrity against contamination from its
outside/other. 
Continuity and Discontinuity
To underscore what is at stake here, we can come at the problem by
one parent respectively conglomerate in a bowl of water). Though the study at hand
does not provide a thorough analysis of the genealogy of blood and race, I want to
mention here the idea of the “one-drop rule” in the American context.  As I have tried
to elaborate in the main text, what is at stake in the various depictions of blood ties
and racial identities is the question of (dis)continuity. And with the following
description of the one-drop rule, I want to emphasise that the question of continuity is
in noway neutral. Rather, the conception of continuity is informed by and materialises
power, as well as politics of difference. But in my thesis, the identity of power,
following Vicki Kirby’s theorisations is itself called into question. That is, it is not
simply understood in terms of repression and domination. Jared Sexton provides an
instructive reading of the one-drop rule. He writes: “The one-drop rule or
hypodescent rule refers to the (sometimes codifed) convention of defning a person as
racially black if he or she has any known African ancestry or at least ‘one-drop of black
blood.’ Under this rule, people of mixed race with some discernible African ancestry
would thereby be designated as black. As Daniel (2001) notes, ‘Most people are
unaware that one-drop rule is unique to the United States and applies specifcally to
Americans of African descent’(xi). … I hasten to add, again, that hypodescent is not
reducible to the one-drop rule (not even for the defnition of racial blackness in the
historic instance), since one can be defned by hypodescent according to
proportionally higher minimum criteria (‘one quarter’ or ‘one half’ rather than ‘one
drop’). That multiracialism takes aim at the one-drop rule in particular – the only form
of hypodescent applied exclusively to racial blackness – is further evidence that it is
singularly interested in contesting the terms of black identity as they have developed
under the regimes of racial slavery and Jim Crow segregation” (2008, 272).
41 See, for example, the etymological defnition of the word provided by
www.etymonline.com.
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beginning with the question of continuity (of race). The term continuity is
often understood as a lineal transition of a “substance” (a term both
Haraway and Balibar deploy in their respective quoted assertion) – as the
fgure of bloodline vividly demonstrates - deriving from an origin and
transmitted through the passage of time. Before proceeding to the
question of continuity and discontinuity, I want to hasten to clarify that
my interest in discussions related to bloodline is more about its function
as the medium of carrying (more discussion on this question vis-à-vis
signifer/signifed in chapter four). 
In relation to this, and in accordance with my emphasis on the need to
read sexual difference and racial difference, not as two separate grids of
intelligibility, or felds of analysis that somehow intersect or add together,
but in terms of copulation, sexual/racial diffraction. I want to note in
passing here the masculine and paternal connotation of the word fliation,
exemplifed in its root fli (us) son.42 And yet, rather than rejecting the
idea of fliation and blood, I suggest to stay longer and mull over the
ways in which such conceptions may be reconfgured so that questions of
the maternal and femininity are not cast the oppositional or simply
excluded. For example, even if we concede to the paternal connotations of
the concept of fliation, we could consider that the father-son lineage
must nevertheless pass through the mother – through linking of the blood
of the maternal and the child’s bodies through the umbilical cord. We can
think with Luce Irigaray’s reading of divinity and the patriarchal
Christian tradition. As Irigaray notes, the idea of divinity lays accent on
“the conditions of engendering, by the masculine gender, of the divine
child as son” (2004, 162).  And yet, Irigaray importantly argues that such
a divinity, however masculine in its designations, necessitates, and one
may say, is dependant upon “two women, a mother and a daughter … in
order to bring a divine child into the world” (2004, 162). It follows then,
that for Irigaray “a woman is divine from birth” (2004, 162). As Irigaray
continues:
For the woman, it is thus a question of not losing the divinity received
with life. But it is further a question, for her, of making this divinity of
42  http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fliate, last accessed 14 July 2015.
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her own, of accepting the responsibility for it, of incarnating actively in
herself the divinity received at birth. … To remain faithful to herself, to
turn back to herself, within herself, to be born again free … And to
speak of woman's liberation, without such a course, such a autonomy,
is not possible. (2004, 166)
I am particularly inspired by Peta Hinton’s reading of Irigaray’s notion
of “Divine Women”. She explores this idea in order to rethink the tension
between the specifcity of embodied and situated feminine subjects on the
one hand, and a universal identity of the feminine required for a feminist
politics of difference on the other. Rethinking the nature of specifcity and
universality with and through Irigaray’s reading of the divine, and
especially of the role of the mother as both “a threshold” (2013, 442) and
an opening, who is thus “always and already inhabited by the divine”
(442), Hinton argues that feminist political community does not imply a
suppression of embodied and situated feminine subjectivities and
differences. As Hinton makes clear, “Instead, in the same moment that
she invokes women’s need to ‘share a little,’ Irigaray points to the
inherent complexity of what it means to be woman in the frst place, a
move that both enables and complicates political community, and a
feminist politics of difference more generally”  (2013, 450, emphasis in
original). Having said this, I want to return to my major focus on the
question of race. My discussion of the fguring of blood here is primarily
concerned with the notion of dis/continuity. The enduring substance of
racial identity is understood as an object or an attribute that presents
itself to and is perceived by, a subject. The temporal and spatial
confguration requires some elaboration here. The continuous temporal
succession – past, present, future – is organised by as well as takes the
shape of the unfolding of historical events, as discrete moments in time.
Given that each moment derives from the origin – o n e that could
presumably be retrieved or traced back in time – and reproduces the
origin’s substance, a notion of continuity underpins this deterministic
model of causality, and the primacy of the human calculus. Karen Barad’s
reading is instructive here: 
Prediction and retrodiction are Man's for the asking, the price is but a
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slim investment in what is happening in an instant, any instant. Each
bit of matter, whether the size of a planet or an atom, traces out its
designated trajectory specifed at the beginning of time. Effects follow
their causes end on end and each particle takes its preordained place
with each tick of the clock.  The world unfolds without a hitch. Strict
determinism operates like a well-oiled machine. Nature is clockwork, a
windup toy the Omniscient One started up at time t=0 and then even
He lost interest in the abandoned (or perhaps remembers now and
again and drops in to do a little tuning up). … The presumed radical
disjuncture between continuity and discontinuity was the gateway to
Man's stewardship, giving him full knowability and control over
nature. … Individuals with inherent properties there for the knowing,
there for the taking. Matter is discrete but time is continuous. Nature
and culture are split by this continuity and objectivity is secured as
externality. (2007, 233) 
Barad’s account subjects the humanist trope of continuity to scrutiny.
Both time and space are rendered as exterior referents for the human
subject, who is capable of anticipation and calculation – that is intellection
and reason – based on these locatable relations of causality and essence,
as well as their determining and continuous operations. 
Such a conception of continuity is illustrated in Léopold de Saussure’s
association theory. Recall that Léopold de Saussure argues against French
colonial policies of assimilation, hinged upon the idea that the racially
inferior others may resolve their racial differences through education and
become evolué. Opposing and judging as futile assimilationist doctrine,
he argues for absolute hierarchical racial differences especially in terms of
“innate intellectual competence and achievement” (Young 2002, 14). In
line with polygenist postulations, Léopold de Saussure’s associationist
model conceives of different races as different species, thus radically
discontinuous.  It follows then that native others’ inferiority – such as the
purported lack of mental power evidenced in the lack of abstraction or
analogy in the language of the colonised for which  Léopold de Saussure
argues – functions as both the cause and effect of their subordination. 
Importantly, Barad’s reading sheds light on the ambiguous relation
between continuity and discontinuity, as well as its implications for the
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nature/culture problem that exercises my attention throughout the thesis.
On a closer examination, continuity or succession (through time) is
identifed through spatial markers of change from one distinct
moment/event to the next, from here to there, from now to then. This
means that the subjective perception of time’s passing depends on the
recognition of different moments that take, to quote Barad, “preordained
space” (2007, 234) in time. Likewise, the discontinuous spaces and
moments could be read as what constitute time, understood as “a
succession of evenly spaced intervals” (Barad 2007, 234), and condition
subjectivity. In other words, the process of subjectifcation is the process
of spacing and temporalising. The relation between subjectivity and
objectivity will be developed further later in the thesis. But for now, I
want to underscore the implicated, co-dependant and co-distinguished
relationality43  (or what Elizabeth A. Wilson [2004, 22] calls the relation of
“obligation”)44 of continuity and discontinuity  that is, dis/continuity. Its
vexed nature compromises any simple discrimination of space from time,
nature from culture, and by extension identity from difference,45 hence
43 For an excellent examination of the question of time and spatiality, see Johncock
(2014). 
44 Elizabeth A.Wilson (2004, 22) draws on Freud’s deployment of the term obligation in
his argument that ‘neurons are “obliged” by the psyche to give up their excitation’ to
discuss the relation between soma and psyche. The obligatory/obliged nature of
relationality Wilson describes echoes the sense of dependancy I am trying to elaborate
on here, as it also displaces the self-present subjects as the centre of intentionality. As
Wilson writes, “Freud’s use of the term here implies no such human or conscious
action. This is not a metaphorical use of obligation, if metaphorical is taken in the
narrow sense of bringing the meaning of obligation to bear on psychosomatic action
when it is properly applicable to another domain (social relations). Freud’s use of
obligation at the level of neuropsychic interchange denatures the human- and
conscious-centric sense with which obligation is used elsewhere. The effect is not to
render neurological action knowable via obligation, but to make obligation curious via
its association with the microbiological” (2004, 22).
45 Throughout the thesis, the notion of difference as a gap separating two entities is
contested. Instead, difference is itself a “torsional becoming” other (cf. Kirby 2006).
The identity of race, its measurement and scaling, is itself a manifestation of difference
that exemplifes identity itself. For example, the relation between differences in colour
and bloodlines – both as taxonomic orderings of race – is interesting in this regard. In
her book Strangers in Blood: Relocating Race in the Renaissance, Jean E. Feerick reads
plays like “Othello, Titus Andronicus … Lust’s Domination … The Lascivious Queen”
55
unsettles the exceptional status of the human condition.
Dis/Continuity of Race
Having briefy laid out the relation between continuity and discontinuity,
we can turn to the question of human race and racial differences.
According to Kay Anderson (2007, 22), the use of the term “race” referred
to similarities rather than differences in physical traits since the 1600s.
This model proposes the community of human race in terms of tribe and
kinship. “Humanity has constituted itself as a race” (Colebrook 2013, 35),
with the white man of right and reason as the fgure of and for “life in
general” (36). As mentioned in the previous section, this is a monogenist
account of the single human species, evinced in the conception of the
“Chain of Being” (Anderson 2007; Livingstone 2008). The idea of the great
chain of being, often attributed to Plato and Aristotle,46 posits that all
living beings – including animals and plants – are connected together in a
vertical and hierarchical form. What interests me here is the logic of the
chain that entails continuity and hierarchy and implies a comprehensive
system that orders the whole of being into fxed places within a common
measure or scale. It consists of three elements. First, systems of taxonomic
and notes that “differences of colour emerge, as it were, in dialectical relations to social
rank, allowing social tensions originating with the difference of rank to be resolved,
mitigated, or exploited with reference to colour. As such, they expose with uncanny
similarities of representational strategy, the social dynamics that enable colour to
accrue value as a cultural marker of difference, revealing how its emergence is
predicated on and entangled with the decline of a deeply established system of
difference that places the metaphysical value on bloodline independent of colour,
complexion, or culture. As such, these plays depict the processes that enable
disparities of social power to be actively rechannelled into the emerging modes of
difference. They dramatize the collision of competing systems of difference and
suggest that need for thicker accounts of race for this period – studies, that is, that will
question not only the singular attachment of this category to taxonomies of colour but
its axiomatic connections to ethnos as well” (2010, 4-5).
46 Interestingly, as Anderson notes, though already articulated in Plato and Aristotle, the
idea of chain of being gained its ‘“belated fruition” in the eighteenth century,
paradoxically when “faith in speculative a priori metaphysics was waning … and a
spirit of patient empirical enquiry continued its triumphant march in science”’ (2007,
37). I fnd this highly relevant for the two culture problems, the question of ontology
and epistemology as discussed in chapter two. 
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classifcation makes intelligible – with presumed accessibility and
knowability – the nature of and relations among species. Second,
teleological ordering explains the hierarchical positioning of different
species. Last but not least, it specifes the bridges between groups of
species that will secure the continuity of the chain. These elements taken
together form the vertical imagery of the chain and position the human
above all other beings. In its Christian articulations, the chain of being is
embedded in the idea of biblical time.47 According to Anderson, “the idea
of biblical time … assumed a 6000 year time span for the rise and spread
of human life over the globe” (2007, 113). It posits the human as the
descendant of Adam created (one day) after animals by God, and thus
bridging the gap between the angels and beasts (Anderson 2007). In this
account, all humans are of the same origin and family. It should be noted
here in passing that the question of the origin of language is tightly
bound up with the nature of the human race (cf. Frank 2008; Livingstone
2002). For example, in the monogenist account, human language
(together with the use of tools and agriculture all of which are often seen
to represent the uniqueness of the human) is said to be given by God to
“man” kind, so that all languages, just as the diversities of humans, could
be traced back to the same origin.48 This question will be engaged further
47 It is worth noting that in the notion of biblical times, the conception of the human as
deriving from the original pair of Adam and Eve created by God is set against the
naturalistic view proposed by the ancients such as Plato and Aristotle (the pioneer of
natural philosophy), “the frst humans had spontaneously generated from the natural
world and early humans had existed as mere brutes” (Anderson 2007, 113). In so
doing, as Anderson observes, the teleological conception of human (whose destiny is
upward and onward toward salvation) and the affnity with God is secured. 
48 There is much variation in Christian interpretations of the human pre-history and of
the origin of language merits some attention here. Moreover, as commentators have
pointed, the distinction between monogenism and polygenism was not a simple one
between Christian and non-Christian thought (cf. Frank 2008; Anderson 2007). As
Anderson makes clear, “Such was the lively, and sometimes contradictory, mix of
arguments in circulation regarding human diversity,  that some polygenists in
America attempted to defend the biblical account of origins by advocating that before
Adam, who was the frst Caucasian, the other races were already in place (Bernasconi
2002, 3). Other less literalist Christian polygenists maintained the role of Creator in the
development of life on earth, regardless of the question of human origins” (2007, 137).
In his book Adam’s Ancestors: Race, Religion and the Politics of Human Origin, David
Livingstone observes the lingering, if marginal, thought of pre-Adamites, which
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in relation to the problem of origin/copy that is inherent to the
phenomenon of host country language acquisition.
The idea of human race is foregrounded in “the universal unity to the
human” as well as “human potentiality … realised in a movement out of
nature” (Anderson 2007, 35). Importantly, as Anderson points out, the
location of nature is conceived of as both within and outside of the human.
As she writes, “In humanist thought – and especially since its Christian
strand became intricated with modernity during western Europe’s
Enlightenment – humanness has been presumed to entail a transcendence
of nature conceived as: frst, a non-human sphere of animals and
environment that is ‘external’ to people; and/or second, a corporeal
nature that is thought of as animal-like which resides within human
beings” (Anderson 2007, 8). At stake in this description of human
transcendence of nature is the idea of discipline and improvement. In
other words, the idea of the human separation from nature is validated
through the injunction to cultivate and improve upon the state of nature
provided “an alternative world chronology”. The basic premise of pre-Adamites is the
existence of human beings before Adam. For my purpose here, I want to draw
attention to the ways in which pre-Adamite premises pose a challenge to the
conception of the origin of language, which also fags the complexity of the nature of
origin itself. As already mentioned, in marking the origin of human kind as the
creation of Adam, the affnity between human and God is secured, henceforth the
upward and onward destiny of human in the chain of being. And yet, in this strand of
thought, the genesis of the human is in fact a form of degeneration, because it is
conditioned upon the Fall, the corruption of the pure, and the shameful and
disobedient act of intercourse. In other words, the affnity of man with God that
secures human exceptionalism is paradoxically conditioned upon the degenerated and
corrupted essence of man’s genesis. In naturalistic world views, however, the origin is
understood as something more primitive. Livingstone’s reading of pre-Adamite
theory sheds light on the origin of language. As Livingstone writes, “The pre-Adamite
theory … was also profoundly implicated in speculations about the origins and
development of language and whether human speech had generated from a pristine
past or progressed from primitive antecedents. By proposing the existence of humans,
and therefore language, before Adam, it was profoundly troubling to those for whom
Adam’s speech was the foundation of all human speech. … The ‘search for the perfect
language,’… was a long obsession with language thinkers. The passion to recover the
lost perfection of speech in paradise, where there was … a ‘primordial affnity
between words and objects,’ took many forms” (2008, 48).
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that is situated both outside of, and within and as the human body.49  This
is understood as a capacity of and for capacity, which constitutes and
articulates the essence of culture rather than the nature of human. The
etymological connotations of culture (cultura) illustrates this point. It
means cultivation, agriculture, as well as care and honour. It should be
noted that it shares with the word “colony” the same stem colere meaning
“to inhabit, cultivate, frequent, practice, tend, guard, respect”.50 The
dialectic of passivity and activity is evident here in the distinction
between nature and culture. Whereas nature is confgured as waiting to
be tended and cultivated, culture, as the agency of human intention (in –
tendere, a stretching out, extending toward) acts upon and functions as
the steward of nature. As Rachel Slocum and Arun Saldanha write in
their discussion of the biopolitics and geographies of race and food,
agriculture, as the most systematic strategy to “gain energy from the
earth more effciently and abundantly”, has “not only turned our
ancestors into humans” (2012, 1), but also has profound implication for
all of life.
Central to the conception of the human race as a unity in a continuous
teleological chain of being – in either naturalist or Christian theological
monogenism – is thus the capacity for culture to draw upon, regulate and
ultimately transcend nature within (in other words, embodied in the fesh
and animality of Man) and without (which refers to the environment that
49  The notion of cultivation merits more attention. Some critics have taken up with the
discussion of race and cultivation in John Locke and Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy
(cf. Uzgalis 2002; Conway 2002). For example, Daniel W. Conway observes the
association of “racial cultivation” and “animal husbandry” in Nietzsche's thinking.
Observing “Nietzsche's habit of referring to the process of cultural advancement as a
series of exercises in breeding” (2002, 180), Conway writes “Although it may be
tempting to treat ‘breeding’ as merely a careless synonym for ‘cultivation’ or
‘acculturation,’ there are larger problems with this terminology” (108). And Conway
continues to make clear, “If races are fashioned through the implementation of
techniques borrowed from the practice of animal husbandry, then it becomes all-too-
easy to view (and to treat) the recipients of cultivation as mere animals” (2002, 108).
Conway's assertion certainly calls into question the line drawing practices that
distinguish human from the racialised as well as  non-human others. On a slightly
different register, and for an interesting reading of the problematics of the simple
association of racialised others with animals, see Weheliye (2014). 
50  See etymonline.com.
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surrounds the body). Through the cultivation of reason and speech,
human beings are said to fnally transcend discontinuous, and thus fnite
nature, as well as to move upward and onward toward salvation and
spirituality that is immortal and infnite. Recall that in our earlier
discussion of dis/continuity, we noted the relation of obligation and the
involved complexity of space and time, nature and culture. Such is the
complexity inherent in the logic of the vertical chain. Commenting on the
ambiguity of the Chain-of-being concept, Anderson contends, “on the one
hand, the Chain implied there were no breaks with each species moving
imperceptibly into the next. On the other hand, it postulated a clear
hierarchy of creation with the human well above all other animals” (2007,
37, my emphasis). Curiously then, the transcendence of the human race is
at once enabled by the preordained and hierarchical locations – thus
discontinuously – occupied by inorganic and organic life forms with
attributed essence, and threatened by the linkages implicated in the very
continuity and unity of the Chain structured by the “divine workings of a
universe” (that is, a naturalistic conception) or by “God’s design” (that is,
theological belief) (Anderson 2007, 38).
Furthermore, we could consider the ambiguity of the transcendence of
the human race through the transitive and intransitive connotations of
the verb “transcend” itself. In its transitive form, transcendence
necessitates an object, which would be nature in this case, which is acted
upon and from which the subject is then released. In the light of this, the
transcendence of the human race, defned by the subjective capacity for
agency, intention and calculus, cannot take place without its objects –
namely external nature and internal animality and corporeality.
Intransitively, the transcendence of the human race has no object, but is
itself the outcome, or what Kirby describes as a form of “self-possession”
(2006, 125). It follows then that the human race that transcends, and
distinguishes itself from non-human others, is itself the object of
transcendence, whose identity can never be fnally achieved, but only, we
would venture to argue, materialise performatively, but yet, objectively.
 The puzzle of the human is further evidenced in the turn to innatism
or the biologisation of race in the nineteenth century as well as the
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lingering dispute between the monogenist and polygenist conception of
race (and language); that is between the postulation of race as human
unity, or race as racial differences among humans. Whereas the
monogenist account of race conceives of the unity of the human race in
cultural terms – reason, speech, intention, agency – the polygenists argue
that racial differences are originary and permanent, and the hierarchies
among races are determined primarily by physiological features.
Nevertheless, despite its contestation of the idea of the shared origin of
human beings, polygenism is similarly conditioned upon and driven by
the idea of the exceptional status of the human condition. 
This is clearly attested to in the effort to locate the innate capacity of
races for civilisation as a distinct human condition in the practices of
craniology and phrenology. For example, Robert Knox, who presents as
amongst the most infuential secular polygenists (cf. Livingstone 2002;
Anderson 2007; Anderson and Perrin 2008), drew largely on the studies
of the skull by craniologists and phrenologists to explain “the
unimproved and unimprovable condition of certain peoples....” He
argued that “the size and the shape of their skull” should be taken “to
refect on the capacity of the mind in its power of reasoning or ‘ideality’”
(Anderson and Perrin 2008, 17). Importantly, as Anderson stresses, the
practices of craniology did not simply provide measurements supportive
of a belief in racial hierarchies, but also set these against the inferior status
of the animal. Although specifcally indexing racial differences in terms of
capacity for cultivation, culture, or civilisation, the racist practices of
“head readings” (Anderson 2007, 140) were ultimately served an interest
in the nature of nature and of the human. Related to this, in her reading
of French zoologist Georges Cuvier’s work on comparative anatomy,
Anderson observes that:
Cuvier was not … just claiming that those groups of people with “a
depressed forehead and prominent jaws” are inferior. In the
disparaging terms of colonial stereotypes they were already “known”
to be inferior. It is, rather, the supposed fact of this inferiority that
Cuvier is mobilizing in order to try to demonstrate a general anatomical
link between head shape and intelligence – one that, taken from race,
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could be generalized across human and ape. (2014, 10, emphasis in
original)
The signifcance of the visual for this turn towards the biologisation of
race should be noted in passing. For example, visual imagery, supported
by and coupled with “statistical measurement” and “moral cartography”
(Livingstone 2002, 173), is featured prominently in the feld of American
polygenist anthropology, which marked a departure from theology and
the beginning of scientifc polygenism. David Livingstone observes two
forms of the visual representation. The frst is the “illustration of head
forms and crania … that performed the rhetorical task of essentialising
race images in the minds of readers and of conveying a sense of the
empirical seriousness of their enlightened inquiry by deploying the
techniques of the scientifc illustrator” (2002, 176). The second form is a
racial mapping, which according to Livingstone is also a moral one.51
Livingstone’s observation of George Gliddon’s (an English-Born
American Egyptologist, who followed Samuel George Morton's
craniometry and polygenist theory) construction of a racial chart, is
telling in this regard:
His self-named “monkey chart” of the “Geographical Distribution of
the Simiæ in Relation to That of Some Inferior Types of Men” sprang
from his interest in the zoo-geography of Louis Agassiz, who had
remarked in several places on the parallels between the distributions of
black Orangutans and black humans. Gliddon’s aim was to translate
the polygenist theory of centres of zoological creation into the visual
language of cartography. Encompassing ffty-four monkeys and six
humans, the map's purpose was crystal clear: to provide a visual
display of the claim that “within the black circumvallating line which
surrounds the zone occupied by the simiæ, no ‘civilization’ … has ever
been spontaneously developed since historical times” and, second, that
“the most superior of Monkeys are found to be indigenous exactly
where we encounter races of some of the most inferior types of Men”.
(2002, 176-177) 
51 Related to my earlier discussion of bloodlines, it is important to note that, according to
Livingstone (2002), the concerns regarding the purity of racial lineage informs racial
mapping. 
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Interestingly, the above account shows that even in the polygenist
attempt to map, and thus to locate, the radically separate and
hierarchically fxed races among human,52 the parallel between human
and animal necessitated in this visual cartography reinstalls the unity and
identity of Man. Moreover, linked to our earlier discussion of the
identifcation of nature and culture in various confgurations of
essentialism, biologism and universalism, we could further note the
intricacy of the nature/culture question manifested in the monogenist
and polygenist accounts of human and racial differences. For even
though scientifc polygenism is a biologism that essentialises racial
differences, the practices of craniology and phrenology sought to locate
the quality of mind, intelligence, and culture through the visual
techniques of the measurement of skull. In light of this, the biologisation
of race is not set against the cultural defnition of the human race. Rather,
as Anderson’s study on the colonial encounter with the indigenous
population (and environment) cogently shows, it is precisely in the
context of a certain crisis in the defnition and location of the human in
the context of British colonialism that the conception of race took a radical
turn in nineteenth century. Given that the monogenist account of human
unity relies on  the clearly marked locations of and distinctions between
inorganic and organic forms, as well as the general capacity of the human
race to improve and cultivate, and thus separate from and rise above
nature, the encounter with the New World’s indigenous people troubled
the place of the human. 
Importantly, we should note that the argument here is not a matter of
conventional causality which presumes the self-presence of subjectivity
and identity, in which the encounter with indigenous people is
considered to be the cause of the problem of the human. Rather, as I have
already discussed through the reading of the idea of transcendence itself,
the identity and unity of the human race is only performatively
52 In her study on the process of racialisation and speciation in the thought of human
evolution, Megan Glick  makes a similar argument for a double movement, through
which not only “race became a mitigating force in the taxonomic ordering of species,
so too did the speciation of higher-order primates provide a framework for
reimagining the contours of race” (2012, 99).
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manifested and is internally incoherent. Further to this, we could note
that the idea of savagery (represented in how New World’s indigenous
people are fgured) has always and already been integral to the
conception of the human. As Anderson notes, “savagery has been
conceived in western myth and commentary running back many
centuries as a mode of life that exists ‘closer to nature’.... The
enlightenment/colonial idea of the New World’s indigenous people
reiterated these diverse constructs of savagery that we have seen attached
themselves to the fguration of civilisation’s counter-condition. Such
people, as ‘savages’, were either virtuous ‘children of nature’ or bestial
subhumans” (2007, 13).
Returning to the question of the biologisation of race, it is interesting
that corporeality, understood in terms of interior nature or animality, is
reconceived in the turn to innatism or scientifc polygenism. Instead of
simply referring to the organic matter in which animals are trapped, but
which is transcended by a separate quality called human mind, it is now
bound up with a certain conception of intelligence and culture itself. As
Anderson notes, “it was in the attempt to correlate supposed knowledge
about the inferiority of certain peoples with their physical – and, above
all, cranial – features, that an anatomical notion of intelligence came to
displace an earlier, immaterialist, conception of mind” (2014, 13). We
could follow Anderson’s argument and consider the corporealised or
materialised mind in terms of embodied subjectivity. And, from a
different perspective, we might also elicit a notion of nature (as well as its
associated terms such as corporeality and animality) that is itself
intelligent and cultural. Interestingly, the attempt to fx racial hierarchies
through locating mind in the body actually brings biological determinism
the most signifcant assault. For if corporeality – the nature within – is
cultural, which reads, writes, articulates, and produces, then it is subject
to and of constant rewriting and rearticulation. Anti-essentialist and anti-
racist scholars have taken up with and forcefully argued against the
biological determinism of racial differences. For example, it has been
argued that the visual representations and measurements are always and
already informed by certain racialising conception of intelligence, so that
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the observed anatomical features are not self-present natural truths that
determine racial superiority/inferiority, but are in fact the representation
and discourse of biology. This line of argumentation will be engaged in
detail in the following chapter on the racialised political economy of the
visual. 
It needs to be emphasised that my intention here is by no means to
dispute the implications that the biologisation of race or the turn to
innatism has for the politics of slavery and colonialism.  Rather, my
argument is that the understanding that the identity of the human, the
natural, and the cultural is never self-present or fnally achieved. At stake
then, is the how of essence. That is, how do certain features of the
anatomy, such as the shape of the skull, come to defne the essence, the
“as such” of racial superiority? Moreover, as Anderson (2014, 3) queries,
how it was the essence of race that came to foreground a specifc modern
strand of humanism, and in turn, how it congealed into a corporeal
reality (Kirby 1997, 72). Kirby’s assertion of essentialism is instructive, as
she writes: 
We may assume that when we locate essentialism we identify it and
corral its dangers, thereby securing the virtue of our own practice. But
we have merely embraced another essentialism’s many mutations and
one that fnds us right inside the belly of the beast. The stuff of
essentialism is not an entity that can be identifed and dissolved by
merely saying yes or no to it. … [I]f we grant that essentialism is
unarguably wrong – morally, politically, and even logically – we still
haven't addressed the ways in which its errors work; that is, how
essentialism's scriptures “come to matter,” how they come to
write/right themselves. (1997, 72)
As we have seen, the slippery nature of essentialism and the instability
of the nature/culture division confounds the very identity of human race
and racial differences. The turn to innatism cannot, as is often thought,
easily divide culture from nature, but dis/continuously reconceives and
rewrites the nature of nature and culture itself. In historicising and
interrogating the dis/continuity of the notion of race and nature, we
could gain a glimpse of the condition of possibility of “human nature”
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(Kirby 1999) and its becoming (other).  
Keeping in mind the dis/continuity of the notion of race, I want to
briefy return to Saussure’s conception of ethnisme/ethnicity. As noted,
with the notion of ethnisme, understood in terms of social bond/force
that provides the most and “only essential” (Saussure [1983] 2013, 306)
condition of a community of language, Saussure forwards an account of
linguistic and social continuity that is not based on racial unity or an
essentialist conception of linguistic origin that is coupled with a causal,
teleologic notion of development. As Saussure writes, “within limits
indicated, a language can be considered a piece of historical
documentation. For example, the fact that the Indo-European languages
constitute a family forces us to infer an original ethnicity, of which all the
nations speaking those languages today are, by social descent, the more or
less direct heirs” ([1983] 2013, 306, my emphasis).
For Saussure, the weight of the linguistic collectivity through time,
intrinsic to the formation of ethnisme, provides the qualifcation for the
radical arbitrariness and “blind evolution” (Saussure [1983] 2013, 316) of
language on the one hand, and the “quasi-immutability” (316) of features
in “language families” (313) on the other. In other words, the insight that
language is an expression of social convention and constraint, rather than
of a determined organic being with a fxed essence, paradoxically reveals
and explains its arbitrary nature. And yet it seems that Saussure tries to
avoid essentialising the social convention as the infuence that determines
change. In his conclusion to the Course in General Linguistics, Saussure
points out that the idea of an essentialist and deterministic notion of
organic language persists in different guises, “inasmuch as the genius of a
race or ethnic group tends constantly to direct its language along certain
fxed paths” ([1983] 2013, 317). Though considering both the weight of
collectivity and time as two inseparable factors that contribute to the
arbitrary and systematic, mutable and immutable, discontinuous and
continuous nature of language, it seems that Saussure ultimately
privileges the force of random change in time over necessity as social
determination. For as Saussure asserts, “To proclaim the immutability of
roots is to say they have undergone no phonetic changes, nothing more:
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and there is no guarantee that such changes will never occur. In general,
anything time can do, time can also undo or change” ([1983] 2013, 316–
317).
The relevance of this to the discussion here lies in the intricate nature of
dis/continuity and the question of essence, origin and nature pivotal to
our earlier discussion of human race and racial differences. More
specifcally, we should note that the most radical purchase of
Saussure’s semiotics lies in its paradoxical nature, which blurs the
difference between continuity and discontinuity that also troubles the
self-presence of the speaking subject as the centre of intention.53 In other
words, a language “is not directly subject to the control of the minds of
its speakers” (Saussure [1983] 2013, 313). Kirby’s reading of Saussure’s
metaphor of a deck of cards elaborates this point: 
Within the random play of possibilities that the card presents,
Saussure discovers the play of language and the infnite potential of its
expression. And yet, just as there are obvious restrictions – in the rules of
a specifc card game, the inevitable limitations in any one deal, the
measured timing through which the play unfolds, and so on – we might
assume that a similar feld of constraints must also qualify the speaker’s
degree of agency. Saussure’s point here is that although the speaking
subject may feel entirely possessed of free and individual choice
regarding language decisions, this apparent agency is the determined
articulation of language itself. (1997, 37-38)
This has signifcant implications for the idea of language as human
property and as an indicator of the capacity for civilisation. Two related
conceptions of language are relevant here. First, it is understood as
53 It needs to be noted however, that even though Saussure’s analogy of the deck of card
constrains individual agency because it is determined by the stacked cards and the
rules of the game, “he retained an unqualifed investment in agency and intention
nevertheless” (Kirby 1997, 48). Saussure’s desire to defne and preserve the unity of
language for the linguist and the discipline of linguistics, as Kirby contends, following
Derrida, returns ultimately to the self-presence of identity. In extending Saussure’s
conception of the sign and the “force feld of ‘value’”, Kirby provocatively asks, “how
is the autonomy of the language system dissected out from the operations of other
social systems? … [H]ow does the unity of “the social,” or “the cultural,” secure its
particular identity against “an outside,” namely, the natural order?”  (1997, 49)
67
distinguishing the human from the non-human others. Second, the
valuation of certain languages as grammatically more superior to others
is said to refect the differential mental power of separate races (for
example in Léopold de Saussure’s language policy). In the place of a self-
present human subject of language, Saussure’s thesis presents a notion of
a speaking subject that is called or interpellated into being, and is thus
constrained by the force feld of the game that also substantiates language
itself. The idea of civilisation, understood as a specifc type of labour in
which interior and exterior nature is cultivated  through the development
of language and by the hand of man (cf. Derrida 2005b; Anderson 2008),
is radically called into question. 
Signifcantly, Saussure’s anti-essentialist confguration of language
that displaces any self-present unity also challenges a deterministic
notion of civilisation. This is all the more conspicuous in Saussure’s
specifc engagement with the study of “linguistic paleontology”. This
strand of work postulates that language evidences the determining
features of “Aryan” civilisation.54 For example, Saussure ([1983] 2013, 307)
reads the work of Adolphe Pictet, an infuential Celtic studies scholar and
pioneer in the feld of “linguistic paleontology”. It is said that language
provides evidence for the determining features of civilisation – “its
material equipment (tools, arms, domestic animals), social life (nomadic
or agricultural?), family structure, and government” ([1983] 2013, 306).
This understanding of civilisation as a development that continues in
time and space is most tellingly manifested in the attempt to locate the
bacterial – the fora and fauna populations in a specifc area – as the
54 Instead of providing a general account of civilisation whose meaning is vague (see
Young), I follow Kay Anderson’s argument which contextualises the interpretation of
civilisation. As Anderson notes, “the interpretation of civilisation as a condition
existing in opposition to savagery, grew in interaction with European exploration and,
in particular, contact with the Americas in the 1600s. This was when plural forms of
human association had to be seriously acknowledged. ‘Discovery’ forced an acute
tension internal to the concept of civilisation between on the one hand, a tendency to
offer universalistic trajectories of the human race as a whole, and the recognition of
alternative societies and cultures” (2007, 69).
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origin of the civilisation (Saussure [1983] 2013, 306). Such an investigation
not only calls into question the exceptional status of the human as the
producer of civilisation, but more specifcally to Saussure’s concern, it
also threatens the integrity of linguistics as an independent unity in the
argument of the continuity and natural connections of various spheres of
life. 
Given Saussure’s insistence on the unity of the linguistic system and
his vehement refutation of the affliation between race and language, it
should not be surprising that Saussure counters the claim of the
apparently deterministic and comparative approach to language and
civilisation of linguistic paleontology on the following two grounds: the
frst is that of “the uncertainty of etymologies” ([1983] 2013, 307); and the
second, that of “the possibility of borrowing words” (308). Saussure
rejects the theory that words have defnite and traceable origin, which
refects and is manifested in the reality of a civilisation. For example,
Saussure argues that “Asiatic languages have no verb for ‘to plough’, but
this does not prove that ploughing was originally unknown there. It may
have been abandoned or replaced by other techniques, called by other
terms” ([1983] 2013, 208). Likewise, the possibility of borrowing words,
for example in the case where a word is introduced into a language later
on, defes the genetic theory of language wherein a comparative
conclusion, such as social traditions and material, geo-ecological
conditions as the origin of civilisation can be drawn from the presence of
a word in several languages. As Saussure explicitly states, such an
impossibility is by virtue of the “lack of extralinguistic evidence” ([1983]
2013, 308). 
Saussure’s rejection is in line with his conception of difference as well
as his deliberate exclusion of the biological, the natural, and hence the
originary. The earlier quote on ethnisme and social descent shows that
even though Saussure is “forced to infer an original ethnicity”, this
original ethnicity is however not grounded in any origin, but is
contingent. Interestingly, in his contestation against the essentialist
account of language that is equated with and grounded in extralinguistic
facts,  such as social or cultural factors, or those to do with the level of
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civilisation, the question of essence surreptitiously reinstates itself.  That
is, although Saussure asserts that there is no extralinguistic fact, the basis
of his counter-argument about the absence of the word “plough” and the
phenomenon of borrowing words is unclear. This is also a problem of
translation. Words from different languages can, for example, indicate the
same object, such as hemp. In fact, both the essentialist postulations of
linguistic paleontology and Saussure’s anti-essentialist endeavours
situate their evidence in “something” that is either present or absent. As
Kirby contends, “Surely the ‘place’ from which both essentialism and
anti-essentialism make their claims is ‘something’ of a ‘shared
accommodation,’ a strange abode which their contradictions cohabit”
(1997, 72).
This could be further read in relation to the problem of the referent
and Saussure’s dilemma in accounting for the identity and continuity of
linguistic unities. That is, how to reject any sense of origin, be it natural,
material, historical or psychological, that can be said to ground the
identity of linguistic unity, all the while making sense of the apparent
generational and familial continuity of a linguistic community. What does
Saussure mean by “social descent” if there is absolutely no origin to begin
with? Moreover, as we recall, for Saussure language is founded
negatively, and thus it is contingent and arbitrary. As Saussure notes, “to
postulate permanent features unaffected by time or space is to run
counter to the basic principles of evolutionary linguistics. No feature is
permanent as of right: it survives only by chance” ([1983] 2013, 313).
Given this arbitrary rather than causal confguration of the linguistic
system, what can notions of inheritance which presume the origin and
continuity of a substance mean? 
This set of questions all point to the problematic of continuity and
discontinuity, which is central to conceptions of the politics of racial
subjectivities, identities, and their corollary notions such as kinship and
generation. Understandably, given the anti-essentialist theorisation of
race that subjects any recourse to biological determinism to scrutiny, the
association of race with the question of continuity and its attendant
questions such as kinship, reproduction and inheritance, is considered
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somewhat counter-intuitive, if not an essentialist manoeuvre. For
example, commenting on the reproduction of whiteness that is attributed
as if it were a property of bodies, Sara Ahmed gives the following
explanatory caveat: “It should, of course, be diffcult to think of race and
inheritance together, partly because the concept of inheritance has been
so central to biological models of race, where racial hierarchy is seen as a
natural product of a difference in kind” (2006, 121). For Ahmed, the
question of inheritance should be detached from the “race/reproduction”
(2006, 121) bind. Instead, racial inheritance and the reproduction of
whiteness are rendered performative. That is, what is inherited is the
contingency (read as the possibility of contact, or touch) and historicity
that conditions the arrival of race and man. And yet, in her book Culture
and Performance – The Challenge of Ethics, Politics and Feminist Theory, Vikki
Bell voices her misgivings about such a performative approach, especially
in relation to identity politics:
In many ways the concept of performativity is set, in principle, against
a conception of lineage or generational connection. … For the notion of
performativity insists that any apparent continuity across time and
space be treated suspiciously, that it be, analytically speaking,
punctuated and fragmented, understood as a fragile accomplishment
achieved through processes of citation and repetition. … To seek to
comprehend the subject as genealogically delivered, therefore, is
seemingly to revert to a mode of thinking cast off by this
understanding, one akin to the assertion of interiority: apolitical,
naturalistic, naive and ultimately dangerous. The historical association
of such modes of thought with racist, xenophobic and fascistic
enterprise stands as stark warning. … [However], there might be a
danger of moving too quickly to a position whereby the desire to
refgure identity politics in non-essentialist ways means a refusal or
denial of the connectedness, the multiplicity of existing, that is
generational or genealogical attachment...[or] carnal connection. (2007,
29-37) 
Formulated in terms of the performative/emergent/fragmented and
the generational/genealogical, Bell’s description above captures what is
at stake in thinking about continuity and discontinuity in political and
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ethical considerations of race. For Bell, it is politically urgent and ethically
salient to consider the possibility of a thesis of performativity that does
not exclude a conception of generation. That is, a confguration of
discontinuity that is not opposed to but has a space for accounting for the
multiplicity of embodied attachments. 
To further underscore this disconcerting complicity of continuity and
discontinuity, we could pose the following paradox: if we concede that
events are only discontinuous and performative, such an affrmation is
itself strangely continuous. If we argue for a continuous event or
substance that derives from an origin, such a continuity is nevertheless
measured against the discontinuous moments with clearly marked
beginning and endings. As Karen Barad provocatively asks, “What is a
discontinuous discontinuity? – should we understand this discontinuity
to contain the trace of its own disruption/undoing? In a sense the
troubled naming seems quiet [sic] apt since a discontinuity that queers
our presumptions of continuity cannot be the opposite of the continuous,
nor continuous with it” (2007, 182). Our reading of Saussure’s meditation
of ethnisme and his struggle with arbitrariness and systematicity, with
mutability and immutability, also illustrates this conundrum. That is, the
relation between continuity and discontinuity, and their associated terms
such as “original” and “performative”, “multiplicities” and “partialities”
(cf. Bell 2007), is more paradoxical and complicitous than
straightforwardly exclusive or oppositional. 
This is what I mean by the notion dis/continuity. In our discussions of
the dis/continuity of race, we see that human separateness and human
unity are not two separate levels of analysis. But the complexity of the
relation between these terms is itself a site of dispute in the genealogy of
race,55 and has posed considerable challenges to humanism as well as to
the Eurocentric and Anthropocentric ideals in which it is embedded. The
55 In Anderson’s work, the term genealogy refers “to an interest in the discursive
conditions that make possible the intelligibility of the idea of racial difference and
hierarchy”(2007,  22, emphasis in original). In many ways, my analysis of the question
of race could be said to be in line with the method that conjoins phenomenological and
genealogical approaches developed in Sara Ahmed's work (2006, 2014). Central to this
method is the attention to the temporality and spatiality – the how – of “conjuring of a
behind” (Ahmed 2014, 25). 
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tension between human race and racial differences, and more
importantly, the question as to how and where to place the human in
relation to its others, is not only discernible in, but also animates the
transition from the theorisation of race “as tribe-nation-kin to race as
innate – immutable – biological” (Anderson 2007, 191).
Although biological essentialism is condemned for providing the
ground for racism and sexism, and rightly so, the dis/continuities within
the thought about race itself bear further consideration as they reveal the
performative arrival of race– the internal incoherence that race is.56  As
Anderson argues, “There is no straight line back … through the Nazis
and the eugenics movement of the twentieth century, to the racial
scientists of the nineteenth century, to the theoreticians of stadial human
development and hierarchy of the eighteenth century, to the associations
of blackness with the devil and dangers and sexuality of night in the
sixteenth century” (2007, 191). For Anderson, such a linear and
generalised account of race, even in the context of an anti-racist
argument, runs the risk of recuperating the separation of nature from
culture that undergirds various forms of racism in the frst place. 
Importantly, in historicising the question of race and the human that
neither begins with an a priori separation of nature and culture, nor
presumes a naturalisation of human race (cf. Colebrook 2012), we see
that, with Anderson, the turn to innatism or biologism in the nineteenth
56 Indeed, as my thesis shows, the performative approach to race needs not separate
nature from culture. Both Reardon (2005) and Anderson (2007) provide important
readings of the arrival of the concept of race. Related to my discussion here of the
nineteenth century turn to biologic essentialism, Reardon provides a convincing
argument for the need to critically engage with scientifc discourse about race. As
Reardon writes, “Although adept at bringing to light the constructed character of
claims about race when they perceive them to have social origins, critical theorists of
race to date have not called into question the constructed nature of claims about race
when they deem them the product of legitimate science. Perhaps the most striking and
important case of this oversight is their embrace of the claim that gained media
prominence in the mid-1990s: ‘scientists say race has no biological basis’ (Hotz 1995,
Flint 1995, Alvarado 1995). Rather than interrogating how such claims about the
biological meaninglessness of race are made, and how they shape and are shaped by
broader social, political, and technical contexts, many critical race theorists draw upon
these claims to bolster their argument that race is mere ideology (Gates 1986, Appiah
1992;  Higgimbotham 1992; Fields 1990;  Gilroy 2000)’” (2005,18).
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century should be read as not simply in the service of colonialism and the
politics of slavery, but also and crucially, as the expression of the crisis
and anxiety of the fragile condition of the human and of humanism
itself.57 Moreover, in contrast to the commonly held view of the
determination of nature over culture in the biologisation of race, our
reading of the debate between monogenism and polygenism makes
visible the slippery nature of essentialism and the dynamic
involvement/entanglement of the nature/culture question. 
As is captured by Haraway’s emphasis of the “somehow” of the
transmission and reproduction of the signature of racial identity as a set
of inherited properties that set a race apart from others, the anxiety and
crisis of humanism is also an im/possibile separation of the human from
its others. Whereas for Anderson the colonial encounters with
non-/human others present the limit of and evoke a crisis for the
exceptional status of the human condition, Jacques Derrida broaches such
an  anxiety in terms of the decentering of the human subject, understood
as a sequence of traumas, in the following aspects:  
[T]he psychological trauma (the power of the unconscious over the
conscious ego, discovered by psychoanalysis), after the biological
trauma (the animal descent of man discovered by Darwin …), after the
cosmological trauma (the Copernican Earth is no longer the centre of the
universe, and this is more and more the case one could say so as to
draw from it many consequences concerning the limits of geopolitics).
([1994]2006, 122, emphasis in original)
The decentering and displacement of the location of the anthropos is
57 Similarly, drawing on Foucault’s theorisation of the Western systems of organising
knowledge since the Renaissance, Robyn Wiegman contends that there was “no single
route to the emergence” (1998, 27)  of what she considered as the “most damaging
racial question” (27), i.e. “How many species comprised the feld generally known as
‘man’?” (27). Importantly, as Wiegman reminds us the emergence of such forms of
question that (hierarchically) differentiates among human beings “seems to demand
(and has elicited) deeply racist answers, we would be wrong to assume that the
motivating force of natural history was to establish scientifc proof for white
supremacy in a theory of multiple creations” (1998, 27). Both Anderson's and
Wiegman's arguments could be read as articulating a form of power/knowledge that
is not straightforwardly oppressive. This will be expanded on in following chapters. 
74
central to anti-humanist and post-humanist endeavours to question
“what counts as human” (Braidotti 2013, 16). Importantly, in calling into
question humanism, conceived of “as a doctrine that combines the
biological, discursive and moral expansion of human capabilities into an
idea of teleologically ordained, rational progress” (Braidotti 2013, 13),
anti-humanist and post-humanist projects also challenge the ideal of
Europe as the exemplary/exceptional with universalising powers (see
also Derrida 1992). And yet, as we have seen, an anti-essentialist project
such as Saussure’s thesis of language and ethnisme must also rely upon
and recuperate a positive fact, an essence. Derrida broaches this
problematic in terms of the work of mourning of the human. As Derrida
writes, “Mourning always follows a trauma. … This trauma is endlessly
denied by the very movement through which one tries to cushion it, to
assimilate it, to interiorize and incorporate it. In this mourning work in
process, in this interminable task, the ghost remains that which gives one
the most to think out – and to do” ([1994]2006, 121–122). Worded
differently, the decentering of the human subject is never simply the
absolute loss of centre, just as anti-essentialism cannot exclude or fnally
sever itself from its avowed opposite – the positive fact of reality. Instead,
the centre is always and already dispersed, disseminated, and yet
objectively manifested. In the following chapters, the question of the
human is approached in terms of an “originary humanicity” – through, as
and with the trilling tongue and the idea of a dis/continuous race – that
will “affrm anthropomorphism, refute anthropomorphism, and entirely
redefne what we mean by ‘anthropomorphism’” (Kirby 2011, 20). This is,
following Kirby, to acknowledge the co-implicated and co-distinguished
specifcity and universality, discontinuity and continuity, difference and
identity, that opens up the question of the human race and racial
differences “as if for the frst time” (2011, 21). 
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Chapter Three
Auto/Ethno/Graphy as Onto-Epistemology
 
Readers have noted that my dissertation work presents a tension between
the ways in which my theoretical framework takes shape on the one
hand, and the place of the empirical analysis on the other. Two
alternatives structures were proposed: (1) Given that the thesis is theory
driven, the empirical data could be used to support my theoretical
ambitions and arguments; (2) The empirical analysis uses theories,
because theoretical tools are needed to make sense of the empirical data.
The concern is that the thesis seems to run on two different levels. It
seems implausible that these levels could be bridged, by any means other
than incorporating one into the other – that is to say, the thesis would be
either a theoretical work or an empirical study. I open this methodology
chapter with this dilemma because I think the importance of these
concerns is not limited to the structure of the dissertation, but is related to
some of the central issues I am trying to address through a notion of an
onto-epistemological dis/continuity. 
In fact, it is not until recently, while I am completing the dissertation,
that I have started to realise the questions which underpin these concerns.
The frst of these concerns the relation between feminist theoretical and
empirical studies, in which the latter are considered to be attentive to and
foregrounded in lived realities and every day practicalities. In the second
place, and tightly bound to the frst question, is the risk that my work will
make universalizing and generalizing gestures. That is, my engagement
with the nature of race is nevertheless grounded in the context of Finnish
language acquisition among adult immigrants in Finland, as well as in
my participation in the process of learning Finnish language as an
immigrant woman. How then is it possible to provide a general theory of
race that is obviously embedded in a specifc context? Surely the
experiences of language learning among immigrants might be radically
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different in Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, China etc?
Haraway's theorisation of situated knowledge would, perhaps, enable me
to mitigate the generalizing gesture in my theoretical arguments by
noting from the start the locatedness of my engagement. But this was not
a satisfying solution to me, for this manoeuvre appears to be a confession
of sort. It acknowledges a certain violence of the universalizing and
generalizing gesture of theory, and concedes to the specifcities of its own
identity, only to move over and beyond it quickly. 
The relation between theoretical work and empirical study, and the
conundrum of universality and specifcity have been continuously
debated within feminist theory and have profound political and ethical
implications. These tensions are productive in that they enable the feld of
feminist theory to transform itself. Consistent with my proposed concept
of an onto-epistemological dis/continuity as a way forward, rather than
accepting a choice between the suggested two structures – theoretical or
empirical, I think it is methodologically and ethically salient to open up
these questions further. In her book Differences that Matter: Feminist Theory
and Postmodernism, Sara Ahmed draws attention to the question of theory
at the outset. As Ahmed writes, “a feminist response to the relation
between theory and authorisation need not be a suspicion of theory as
such, but rather a sustained refection of the institutional politics of ‘doing
theory’, and a sensitive articulation of the complexities of the relation
between theory and practice”  (1998, 18). Agreeing with Ahmed’s
suggestion, I want to make recourse to Haraway’s discussion of situated
knowledge mentioned earlier. For Haraway, the conception of
situatedness means that the embodied and material specifcities are
inherent in any knowledge production and abstraction practices.
Importantly, not only does this notion destabilise the boundary that
separates subjectivity and objectivity, as well as the subject and the object
of study, but also, and particularly relevant for my following discussions,
the situated nature of any knowledge production/abstraction practices
means that the problem with the ways in which a general conclusion
about race is achieved through the specifc engagement in the Finnish
context is not about its purported failure to account for, or violently elides
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its difference from other particular contexts (I am thinking here of the
question that language learning practices among adult migrants in other
countries could be totally different from the context that informs the
study at hand). Is not the assumption that there are differences among
these locations, itself a form of making sense, a form of theorisation and
abstraction? In other words, is there a certain commitment to and
investment in what constitutes the identities of embodied subjectivities,
the contextual specifcities, and their effect on theoretical readings and
writings? And what theorisation of “difference” underpins such a
reading? In my understanding, situated knowledge production is not
about humbling theoretical manoeuvres based on the truth of our
embodied being and existential experiences. Rather, it radically opens up
the question of subject formation, as well as, and importantly, “the
apparatus of bodily production” (Haraway 1988, 591). As Haraway
writes, 
Situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured
as an actor and agent, not as a screen or a ground or a resource, never
fnally as slave to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique
agency and his authorship of “objective” knowledge. … I wish to
translate the ideological dimensions of “facticity” and “the organic”
into a cumbersome entity called a “material-semiotic actor.” This
unwieldy term is intended to portray the object of knowledge as an
active, meaning-generating part of apparatus of bodily production,
without ever implying the immediate presence of such objects or, what
is the same thing, their fnal or unique determination of what can count
as objective knowledge at a particular historical juncture. (1988, 592-
594)
Signifcantly, through the “cumbersome” combination, and true to her
insistent linking and blurring of fact and fction, as well as the practice of
irony that is attentive to partiality without forfeiting the possibility for
collective political practices, Haraway encourages us to consider the
contingency and the conditions through which both the theorising subject
and the context or its object of study co-emerge. It follows then, that not
only the question of agency – the knowing, intending, calculating subject
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who produces knowledge – is reconfgured as material-semiotic, but also,
the facticity, or the truth of contextual differences or our embodied
specifcities as well as the premises of what theoretical work consists of
are rendered not readily available. But this does not mean the validity
and objectivity of our engagement is made impossible, or that our
political interventions would be paralysed due to such an impossibility.
Rather, this is a productive tension that lies at the core of feminist ethical
and political practices. As Vicki Kirby writes, the contingency and the
always problematic emergence of any identity – be it the identity of the
subject or object of research – “does not mean that we can remove
ourselves from the politics of identifying processes” (1997, 172; see also
Hinton 2014, 110). The dis/continuity of trilling race proposed here
echoes precisely such a feminist ethical and political engagement, for it
insistently poses as a question the nature of race, even while such a
necessarily delimited, because identifed, perception and conception of
race re-emerges. 
The aim of thesis is not simply to provide a reading of the different
theoretical approaches to the question of race; even though certain
scholars’ work will be featured and engaged with more extensively than
others, it is their commonly shared logic of argumentation, a strand of
thought that is at stake here. In terms of the role of my
auto/ethno/graphic (Ahmed 1998, 134) account, it is not analysed by
applying theories of race, because in so doing, my auto/ethno/graphic
discussions about the Finnish for foreigner classes and my encounters
with the art installations is confgured as exemplar of, and the analytical
fodder for, this or that conceptual framework. Neither is my aim to
reverse the direction of the analysis/explanation/insertion, by deploying
the empirical material, understood as lived and embodied experiences, as
corrective to theorisations of race. Both of these positions are enabled by
the very same logic that presumes initial separation of the theory engaged
with and the facticity of reality discussed. My position however is a more
involved and implicated one, and it is best captured by the term
auto/ethno/graphic method.
The specifc engagement taking shape in the thesis is itself an
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entangled phenomenon emerged through “webs of differential
positioning” (Haraway 1985, 590). My reading of theoretical discussions
is articulated through my auto/ethno/graphic account, which includes my
reading/encountering of for example the art pieces and online
discussions. The term auto/ethno/graphy takes cues from Ahmed’s
formulation of women’s writing that both affrms the identity of the
author, and at the same time displaces the notions of “authorial and
sexual identity” (1998, 134). For Ahmed auto-biography is the process of
“individuation [which] never quite takes place” (1998, 135), for it is a
movement “outward and across from any individuated fantasy … that
traces how a writing of the self cannot simply exist as such, how the self
is always implicated in relations with other” (136). It follows then, that
auto-biography and ethnography are never separated or separable realms
of writing, where the former engages with the self, and the latter concerns
the other. Instead, each marks the limits of, thus inhabits with and in the
other. Such is the entangled phenomena which echoes the work of Vicki
Kirby and Karen Barad, who present as key voices in feminist
inter-/trans-disciplinary preoccupation with materiality. 
I want to stress here that in my reading, Kirby’s and Barad’s
formulation of onto-epistemology does not radically depart from, nor is
defned against, but is consistent with and furthers the implications of
feminist theorizations of embodied subjectivity as specifcity as well as
processes of differentiation as a political economy (see Kirby 1997). I am
thinking here of for example Haraway’s nature/culture approach to
situated knowledge production, Chandra Mohanty’s (2003) and Rosi
Braidotti’s (2011) call for a politics of location that reconfgures
differences in positive terms, Elizabeth Grosz’s (1994) corporeal feminism
that renders knowledge production as always already embodied and
corporeal and Judith Butler’s (1993a) analytical rigour applied to the
process of materialization, to name but a few. 
Onto-epistemological entanglements conceived in Kirby’s and Barad’s
work extend further the aforementioned lines of theorization with the
view that, as Florence Chiew puts it in her reading of Barad’s work,
“there is no reason why the view that knowledge is a product of socio-
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historical construction is incommensurable with the view that knowledge
claims are natural expressions of the world” (2012, 168). Despite their
differences, one may risk adding, with a somewhat generalizing gesture,
that there is a discernible alignment of spirit in these feminist scholarly
works. That is, they are all invested in rendering visible and calling into
question the workings of economies of hierarchisation that justify
modalities of exclusion and denigration, with the hope that in so doing
“life can be lived more robustly, more equitably” (Kirby 2006, 107). 
Such a conviction that drives these intellectual endeavours has been a
formative infuence for my engagement in this thesis, which is itself
understood as an onto-epistemologically entangled phenomenon. Kirby's
reading of the notion “phenomena” is instructive here. As she notes, the
term phenomena “equates with ontological entanglement” (Kirby 2011,
149) and “is preferable to particularism – ‘the view that the world is
composed of individuals and that each individual has its own roster of
non-relational properties’” (149). Moreover, the assertion that phenomena
as onto-epistemological entanglements “suggests that the very ontology
of the entities emerges through relationality: the entities do not preexist
their involvement” (Kirby 2011, 76, emphasis in original). Such an onto-
epistemologically entangled phenomenon may appear to be more ftting
with quantum mechanics than with race. Let me explain why, and specify
why the phenomenon also fnds resonance in the study of host country
language acquisition by migrants.  
The “double slit experiment” and “which-slit experiment” (Barad 2007,
2013) clearly show that the ontology of the electron (i.e., what the electron
is), is inseparable from how it is measured (i.e., how an electron is
known). Given the centrality of the perplexing two-slit experiment and
the which-slit experiment for Barad’s thesis on onto-epistemological
entanglements (as well as Kirby’s reading of it in Quantum
Anthropologies), I now briefy turn to Barad’s interpretation of the wave-
particle duality paradox.
Electrons are usually considered as particles, which are fundamentally
different from waves. This is because particles are “localized entities that
occupy a particular place in space and time” (Barad 2013, 60), which
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waves by defnition cannot. However, when tested with a two-slit
apparatus, which is originally devised to understand the nature of light,
that is whether it is a wave or particle, electrons exhibit wave
pattern/diffraction pattern. How is this possible? 
Things get even more interesting in the which-slit experiment. In this
experiment, the two-slit apparatus is modifed so that the top slit is
replaced with a slit on a spring. The amount of displacement of the slit,
by dint of the forward momentum of a beam of rubidium atoms, is set to
test whether the atoms pass through the top slit. Here, electrons in the
inner orbit of rubidium atoms get charged from a laser beam, and reaches
what Barad describes as an “excited state” (Barad 2013, 64). The atom
then passes through the which-slit detector, which is constituted of
micromaster cavities. Meanwhile the charged/excited electron in the
atom emits a photon, as its energy drops back down from its charged
state, and leaves a telltale/trace that can be detected by the micromaster
cavities. Then the atoms would go through the two slits. 
This experiment shows that the tested entity, such as the rubidium
atom in this case, is not disturbed, as Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle
would have it. As Barad explains, “because you can show that by getting
the rubidium atom into an excited stated and having it come back down,
it does nothing to affect the atom’s forward momentum” (2013, 64). Still
more intriguingly, when involving measuring apparatus such as the laser
beam and micromaster cavities intended to examine which slit the
electron goes through, the resulting scatter pattern illustrates that the
electrons exhibit particle-like behaviour.
The nature of an electron is how it is measured. Kirby’s usage of the
word “quantum ‘weirdness’” (2011, 76) that depicts quantum mechanics
succinctly captures the confounded onto-epistemological entanglements.
But what exactly does this quantum expression say (if anything) about
auto/ethno/graphic discussions, about the context of Finnish language
learning among adult migrants in this thesis that at frst glance seems to
b e all too human? Surely, to answer this question is no easy task. The
relation between the feld of study of the humanities and the sciences –
whether they are radically incommensurable with an insurmountable gap
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between them – has spurred much heated debates. Charles Percy Snow’s
1959 acclaimed essay The Two Cultures and the Scientifc Revolution has
informed and marked the beginning of the debate revolving around “the
impasse between constructionist arguments that underline the cultural
value of knowledge vs scientifc research that requires objectivity and
proof” (Kirby 2008, 14). 
The reservations and received misgivings about quantum theory’s
relevance and implications for the humanities is a good example. As
Kirby’s gloss on the relation between quantum theory and deconstructive
criticism in the humanities makes clear:
Although we may believe, as quantum science indicates, that the nature
of physical reality exceeds our everyday perceptions in quite fantastic
ways, we tend to rationalise the discrepancy by attributing complexity
to a particular arena of research and scholarship, as if the arcane nature
of these fndings is quite irrelevant to the stuff of the quotidian. …
Another argument that discourages curiosity about the possible
relationship between everyday life and quantum relations is the
received wisdom that the minute scale of quantum behaviour can have
no application in the macro-scopic world of human affairs. … Given an
apparent need to quarantine the ordinary fabric of life, and
importantly, how we think about it, from any troublesome
complication, it is not surprising that the compass of deconstructive
criticism is also quite small, confned to only a few disciplinary
locations within the humanities and even there, appearing more like a
historical curiosity than a viable contemporary challenge. (2011, 4)
Recent debates in feminist theory regarding the nature of matter and
the matter of nature (cf. Kirby and Wilson 2011; Hird and Roberts 2011;
Hird 2004; Ahmed 2008; Irni 2013), and in particular feminist
post-/in-/non-human inter-/trans-disciplinary studies (cf. Åsberg and
Lykke 2010) can be seen as in line with the “two cultures problem” (Kirby
2008). Not only has the most enduring theme of feminist theory – the
nature/culture division – and its corollaries undergone sustained
investigation in these debates, but the specifc focus on the human, is
brought to the forefront of these exuberant reconsiderations. At the centre
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of contention in writings about the posthuman condition (cf. Braidotti
2013; Hayles 1999; 2005; Haraway 1988, 2004, 2008), and inhuman
epistemology (cf. Hird and Roberts 2011; Hird and Giffney 2008; Hird
2009, 2012), is how the line is drawn that materialises and distinguishes
the human from its others, such as the nonhuman or animals or the
environment. Related to this, another heated strand of debate in these
discussions has to do with whether the issues of power inequalities and
social and political injustices that have been so central to critical
engagements with questions of race, gender and class for example have
become redundant in the current turn to affect and matter (cf. Hemmings
2005; Leys 2011).
My arguments in this thesis are situated within this nature/culture
debate. I engage with the question of the human squarely, without
evading it. Following Kirby’s reworking of anthropocentrism in terms of
“originary humanicity” (2011, 20), which is aligned with onto-
epistemological views, I will show that the question of the human lies at
the heart of the onto-epistemology of race. But this is not simply to refute
the human, or to expand its scope, leaving intact the process of its
materialisation. Rather, posing anew the question of the human in terms
of originary humanicity entails “unsettling sedimented wisdoms about
location, about what constitutes embodiment, and asking why a single
perspective might prove more comprehensive and entangled than seems
possible” (Kirby 2011, 20).
Quantum Implications for the Question of Race and Research 
Methods
To be more explicit, my task in the following pages is to dilate on the
ways in which aforementioned contemplations both shape the overall
organisation of the thesis and necessitate a particular methodology. At
stake here is the quantum implications for the question of race
materialised in the political economy of racialised visual-aural encounters
in the context of Finnish language learning among adult migrants. The
question of race here is understood as an onto-epistemologically
entangled phenomenon. It is emergent and (re)articulated in its
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differential reconfgurations and becomings. To put it differently, rather
than applying the category of race to the auto/ethno/graphic account of
Finnish language learning practices, presuming that it has a set of fxed
attributes, race is kept as an open question throughout the thesis.
 In a similar vein, the starting point of the analysis in the thesis also
shifts from a presumed set of categories, such as the classic triad or “triple
oppression” – race, class and gender.58 Linking to my earlier meditation
on the relation between Kirby’s and Barad’s assertion of onto-
epistemology and feminist theorizations of embodied subjectivity as
specifcity as well as the process of differentiation as a political economy,
I want to further this reading here through the question of race. 
An onto-epistemological view of race resonates with scholarly work
that explores the materialisation of race as an entangled phenomenon. For
example, situated in the debate about intersectionality, Nira Yuval-Davis
(2012) argues against the well-rehearsed triple oppression – gender, race
and class – because such an additive intersectional model remains on the
level of the experiential, and risks leaving intact the ways in which social
categories co-constitute one another. Instead, Yuval-Davis (2012)
proposes an intersectional approach that combines intra-categorical and
inter-categorical analysis.  
Importantly, Yuval-Davis points out what she sees as different levels
of intersectional analysis. The confation of different analytical levels,
according to Yuval-Davis, lies at the heart of the debate between an
additive and a constitutive intersectional approach. As Yuval-Davis
dilates on this detail,
Social divisions are about macro axes of social power but also involve
actual, concrete people. Social divisions have organizational,
intersubjective, experiential and representational forms … [and] they
are expressed in specifc institutions and organizations, such as state
laws and state agencies, trade unions, voluntary organizations and the
family. In addition, they involve specifc power and affective
relationships between actual people, acting informally and/or in their
roles as agents of specifc social institutions and organizations. (2006, 6)
58 See the discussion on this issue in relation to the usage of intersectionality in, for
example, Lykke (2012) and Yuval-Davis (2006).
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Yuval-Davis' assertion about the different analytical levels and the
relations between and within social categories such as race can be linked
with a performative rendering of the materialization – meaning both to
matter and to real-ise –  of social categories. Until its recent appearance in
the work of Nina Lykke (2012), for example, or in Evelien Geerts’s and
Iris van der Tuin’s (2013) review of the debate on intersectionality, Judith
Butler’s (1993b) conceptualization of social categories has rarely been
engaged with in intersectional terms. Given the focus of the thesis on the
question of race, I want to quote a passage at length where Butler teases
out the convoluted workings of the social categories of race, sexual
difference, and sexuality in Bodies that Matter:
[H]ow might we understand homosexuality and miscegenation to
converge at and as the constitutive outside of a normative
heterosexuality that is at once the regulation of a racially pure
reproduction? ... Let us remember that the reproduction of the species
will be articulated as the reproduction of relations of reproduction, that
is, as the cathected site of a racialized version of the species in pursuit
of hegemony through perpetuity, that requires and produces a
normative heterosexuality in its service. Conversely, the reproduction
of heterosexuality will take different forms depending on how race and
the reproduction of race are understood. And though there are clearly
good historical reasons for keeping “race” and “sexuality” and “sexual
difference” as separate analytical spheres, there are also quite pressing
and signifcant historical reasons for asking how and where we might
read not only their convergence, but the site at which the one cannot be
constituted save through the other. This is something other than
juxtaposing spheres of power, subordination, agency, historicity, and
something other than a list of attributes separated by those proverbial
commas (gender, sexuality, race, class), that usually mean we have not
yet fgured out how to think the relations we seek to mark.  (1993b, 167-
168, emphasis in original)
The gravity of Butler’s point here has profound implications for
thinking about the question of race. In this passage, Butler makes explicit
the relational nature of difference – “the site at which the one cannot be
constituted save through the other”. If sexual difference is always already
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racialised, and vice versa, Butler argues that it becomes untenable as the
prioritization of gender (in others' and her own earlier work) or sexual
difference in much feminist thinking.59 For Butler, at issue is not only the
prioritization, but also that it lends itself to and anchors itself in the
assumption that sexual difference is radically separated from and
unmarked by racial difference. This means, as Butler argues further, that
sexual difference is implicitly (un)marked as white. Such a whiteness of
sexual difference, by dint of its quarantined and privileged position
amongst all differences, cannot then be a category of racial difference.
Signifcantly, by showing how race, sexuality and sexual difference are
inhabited within and constitute each other, Butler effectively casts doubt
on both the privileging of certain difference and the simple juxtaposition
and inclusion of differences in “romantic, insidious, and all-consuming
humanism” (1993b, 116). This is because both positions must presume a
priori, and reinstate and circumscribe, differences with fxed attributes,
despite their intention to challenge the hierarchisation of differences in
the frst place.  
Butler’s meticulous analytical rigour on how differences are
(re)produced and become intelligible is exemplary of one of the
important political and analytical purchases of feminist theory, namely,
the invested attention to the process of differentiation. This is also evident
in metaphors deployed in feminist theory. One thinks here about for
instance the diffraction pattern discussed in Haraway’s (1997) and
Barad’s (2007) work, that is also attributed to feminist postcolonial
theoretician and artist Trinh Minh-ha’s stated hope “for a way to fgure
‘difference’ as a ‘critical difference within,’ and not a special taxonomic
mark grounding difference as apartheid” (Haraway quoted in Barad
2010, 147). For Haraway and Barad then “diffraction attends to the
relational nature of difference; it does not fgure difference as matter of
essence or as inconsequential” (Barad 2007, 72). Stemming from the onto-
59 Luce Irigaray's much quoted assertion “sexual difference is one of the major
philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age” (1993, 5) , at the very beginning of  An
Ethics of Sexual dDifference, could be seen as the commencing of “a generation of
feminist thought interested to elaborate the nature of sexual difference and the
political structures it reveals” (Hinton 2007, 1).
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epistemological conceptual paradigm, Barad’s formulation of “diffractive
methodology” attends to boundary drawing practices that “illuminate
differences as they emerge: how difference gets made, what gets
excluded, and how those exclusions matter” (2007, 29-30). The fgure of
skin in Ahmed’s (2000) account is also in line with this way of thinking.
Following Butler’s theorisation of the logic of performativity, Ahmed
directs our attention to the skin as the site of boundary-formation. For
Ahmed, the skin is materialised in and materialises the difference
between inside and outside. As such, it functions as a social mechanism
of differentiation, which “guards” the integrity of both the individual and
the collective social bodies. 
Given their shared concern about the process of differentiation,
feminist theorists who draw on the Deleuzian concept of difference and
becoming (cf. Grosz 2010, 2011) propose to interrogate the “topological
ontogenesis” (Puar 2007; Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2013) that gives rise
to the emergence of categorical differences. Despite their disparate
conceptual lineages, these commentaries echo the advice to eschew the a
priori invocation and fxation of differences, as the starting point of
analysis. This is explicitly expressed in Elizabeth Grosz’s  assertion, “I
believe that race, class, gender, and sexuality, although they appear static
categories and are of course capable of conceptually freezing themselves
through various defnitions for various purpose, are precisely such
differences that cannot be determined in advance” (2010, 107). Similarly,
Jasbir Puar takes her inspiration from the Deleuzian notion of
assemblage, and arguing for a moving away from taxonomical
representations and towards a “dispersed but mutually implicated and
messy network” (2007, 211). 
Given the varying approaches in feminist theory that all have
profound implications for how to understand race, I want to elaborate on
how and why the onto-epistemological approach and the diffractive
methodology is crucial for the study at hand. We can recall here that,
according to the notion of quantum weirdness, the nature of an electron is
how it is measured. Through the analysis of racialised visual-aural
economy, this thesis will argue that the consubstantiality means that the
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matter of race is not circumscribed by either the epistemological (for
example in Butlerian interpretation) or the ontological (for example in
Deleuzian argumentations) sphere. Nor is it simply a way of adding these
two realms together, as different levels of analysis of race and
racialisation – such as those of the lived embodied experience and the
macro axes of power – featured in Yuval-Davis’ analysis. 
At stake here is more than a simple refutation of the negation of matter
in certain analytical paradigms (cf. Puar 2007; Saldanha 2006), or the need
to diagnose and overcome the exclusion of animal others   (cf. Deckha
2008) or other exclusivism in debates on intersectionality (cf. van der Tuin
and Geerts 2013). Such an oppositional logic, or as Butler reminds us, the
logic of non-contradiction, often serves to achieve cultural viability
(violently, because of the erasure and negation), “by which one
identifcation is always and only purchased at the expense of another”
(1993b, 118). This logic of opposition/noncontradiction, exercised in
claiming identity, or better, in assertions of specifcity, informs much
feminist theory. The opposing of the specifcity of embodied subjectivity
against the transcendent masculine universalism forwarded by most
sexual difference feminist scholars, or of the specifcity of racialised and
sexualised others against the unmarked whiteness that occupies a
privileged position, would be examples of this type of thinking.
Nevertheless, such a logic must necessarily set into motion an economy of
difference, as Butler (1993b) cautions, where the postulation of any
identity and specifcity must involve a reiterative process that
simultaneously (re)installs and (re)repudiates its constitutive exclusions. 
Butler’s point is that since it is incumbent to politically mobilise and to
insist upon those specifcities to reveal the workings of “the fctions of an
imperialist humanism” (1993b, 118), the oppositional logic is inevitable,
because it enables “the exclusions that each articulation is forced to make
in order to proceed” (118). Can we then readily assume that opposition
fnally rests on repression, prohibition and exclusion? To answer this
question, I want to briefy consider the dialectic that underpins the logic
of negation and opposition. As Butler makes clear, negation in the
dialectic does not mean “nothingness”(1987, 41), but “as a differentiating
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relation that mediates the terms that initially counter each other,
negation, understood in the sense of Aufhebung, cancels, preserves, and
transcends the transparent and apparent differences it interrelates. …
[N]egation is a principle of absolute mediation, an infnite capable subject
that is its interrelations with all apparently different phenomena” (41,
emphasis in original; see also Kirby 2006). And yet, its very logical
purchase, that is the consistency of opposition’s operation, faces a radical
assault, just as its inevitability is conceded. Kirby observes this as the
convoluted and vexed working of negation, and argues “Instead of two
separate forces then, each one pitted against the other, the dialectic is
perhaps better understood as the torsional energies within a system that
makes it ‘work’ or move” (2006, 10). This is an important observation,
because the logic of opposition/non-contradiction also lies at the root of
styles of critique,60 a problem that must be feshed out and addressed here
as it informs the overarching style of engagement in the thesis.
Given the import of Butler’s and Kirby’s reading, I want to reconsider
the possibility that a critique does not present as a corrective that is
defned against another argument. Could we consider the possibility of
holding seemingly contradictory arguments together in order to draw
leverage from such a tension (Puar 2007)? Or, could we perhaps push go
further, and to draw inspiration from the insistent feminist engagement
with the question of difference, and to open up the presumed identity of
difference between the specifc and the unmarked universal and
transcendent? Can we entertain the possibility that a critique is “a labour
of love” (2008: 30), as Ahmed encourages us to do? Can we learn from
Luce Irigaray’s fundamental contribution to feminist theory, in which she
challenges the phallic economy of the subject from within, to reconfgure
“the critical tools of psychoanalysis in an enabling way” (Hinton 2007,
168)? That is, Irigaray’s reading is situated within “the very contours of
60 See Bruno Latour's (2004) discussion of social critique in “Why Has Critique Run out
of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern”. Latour explicitly expresses his
concern about the “knee-jerk disbelief, punctilious demands for proofs” (2004, 230) of
a style of “sore-scratching” (232) social critique. Instead, Latour urges to shift
attention from “matters of fact” (2004, 232) to “matters of concern” (232) and in so
doing cultivating a more generous form of critique that does not serve to “debunk but
… to protect and … to care” (232). 
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philosophy’s phallocentric self-defnition” (Kirby quoted in Hinton 2007,
168-169).
Diffractive Methodology
With these considerations in mind, I again turn to the “diffractive
methodology” to further explicate on my reading here. A good example
of this type of reading is Barad’s development of the notion
“posthumanist performativity”. As Barad notes, the deployment of
diffractive methodology means her reading does not pit “physics and
poststructuralist theory against each other, positioning one in a static
geometrical relation to the other, or setting one up as the other’s
unmovable and unyielding foil” (2007, 92). The notion “posthumanist
performativity” is itself an entangled phenomenon that is enabled by a
diffractive reading “of the insights of Bohr and Butler and Foucault
through one another” (2007, 442). This will be important for the
engagement in my thesis, because the “diffractive methodology”,
embedded in an onto-epistemological framework, affords an entangled
reading that gleans critical insights from and reconfgures
argumentations circumscribed in the seemingly incommensurable realms
of “those called ‘technoscientifc’, those identifed as ‘social’, and those
identifed as ‘natural’” (Barad 2007, 442). Henceforth, onto-epistemology
“reframes questions of ontology, epistemology, ethics, and science by
radically recasting the anthropological” (Kirby  2011, 136). 
In light of this, my auto/ethno/graphic account may be better
described as “anecdotalization” (Michael 2012). As Mike Michael
suggests, though akin to auto-ethnography, anecdote sheds light on “how
the auto-ethnographic moment is itself performative of researcher and
researched” (2012, 26). Anecdotalization is “a form of telling that gathers
into itself previous tellings and performs critical refections upon the
mutualities of such tellings and retellings and the analytical resources
that made such tellings tellable” (Michael 2012, 33). At a general level, the
notion of anecdotalization accords with conceptual frameworks that
conceive research methods as enacting and performative (see for example
Barad 2007; Kirby 2011; Law and Urry 2004; Mol, 2002). The questions
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raised in the thesis are informed by both my participation in the “Finnish
for foreigners” classes, my reading of the online discussions, my
encounter with the art pieces, as well as a range of scholarly works in the
feld of feminist theory, critical race theory, feminist science studies,
phonetic science, sound studies, sociological writings on issues of
migration and multiculturalism, and second language acquisition studies
etc. In what follows, I will detail the empirical data.
The data in this dissertation consists of the following sets of materials:
(1) auto/ethno/graphic accounts of speaking and learning to speaking
the Finnish language. These mostly involve participant-observation in
Finnish classes held for foreigners during 2011-2012 in the cities of Turku
and Espoo; (2) discussions on learning the Finnish language on the online
community kina.cc, which is widely used among Chinese who live or
plan to move to Finland; (3) two pieces of art work – a. Finnexia, the
fctitious drug for more effcient Finnish language acquisition; b.
Mamme/Vårt land, a video installation featuring non-native Finnish
citizens singing the Finnish national anthem in Finnish and in Swedish.
The choice of these sets of materials, especially the ways in which they
are discussed and analysed, is consistent with my concern with the
question of fact and fction. In studies on the questions of race and
ethnicity, the fact/fction divide informs much of disputation on the
tension between, and the often hierarchised positioning of, abstract
theoretical investigations on the one hand, and empirical studies that
acquire weight in foregrounding in every day lived realities, on the other
hand. I am inspired by the ways in which Frantz Fanon navigates the
question of fact and fction, the specifc and the universal. In his foreword
to Black Skin, White Masks, Homi Bhabha remarks on this point: 
There is no master narrative or realist perspective that provide a
background for social and historical facts against which emerge the
problems of the individual or collective psyche. … The colonial subject
is always “overdetermined from without,” Fanon writes. It is through
image and fantasy – those orders that fgure transgressively on the
borders of history and the unconscious – that Fanon most profoundly
evokes the colonial condition. ([1952] 2008, xxiv - xxvi)
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The foregoing discussion of auto/ethno/graphy is an endeavour to
problematise the clear distinction between fact and fction in suggesting
that the authority of voice, the sovereign subject, is not readily available.
In addition, in beginning and ending with discussions of art installations
and weaving together auto/ethno/graphic account with readings of
anecdotes, poems and online forum discussions, the thesis troubles the
clear defnition of what counts as solid ground/proof/truth for
representation and argumentation. 
The feldwork was carried out at Finnish for foreigner classes during
two periods – from January to April 2011 and from November 2011 to
March 2012 in the cities of Turku and Espoo. I wrote my feld diary
(amounting to around 100 pages feld notes consisting of both notes from
the course content and observation of conversations and other
happenings) during and after most of the classes I took part in.
Auto/ethno/graphy in the feld of Finnish for foreigner classes is messy.
I came to understand things about learning Finnish while doing it.
Though I did not use a checklist for the data collection at the
ethnographic feld, most of the notes could be sorted under the rubric of:
conversations in Finnish among students, conversations in English
among students, conversations in Finnish between teacher(s) and
students, conversations in Finnish among students, silent awkward
periods, funny or embarrassing moments etc. In the courses I took part in
during the initial period of the study, I frst went to talk with the course
supervisor about my dissertation project and my interest in doing
participant observation at their class. With their permission, I then
presented myself and briefy my research topic in front of the whole class.
During the second feldwork period, I discussed my research interests
with the course convenor over the phone, and asked for permission to do
participant observation in the class before actually enrolling in the
Finnish for immigrant women class. However, I did not, as I did with the
earlier courses, present myself in front of the whole class, but only to a
few students whom I studied with closely in group work. This was
suggested by the course supervisor. Unlike the classes in which I
participated during the frst period of the study, which only had one
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teacher in each class, this Finnish for immigrant women class normally
had four teachers in each lesson. This was an interesting and important
detail that affected my decision about how to present myself. 
In the classes in which I participated, the initial number of students in
each class was almost double that of the Finnish for immigrant women
course. Thus, these classes resembled formal lectures with the teacher
lecturing in front of the whole class and at times arranging group work.
By comparison, due to the smaller amount of students and better teaching
resources, the Finnish for immigrant women class consisted mostly of
group works. Students were divided into small groups based on their
Finnish level. In some cases, the respective teacher’s level of English was
also taken into consideration when they were designated to particular
groups, for example,in cases where students in the group had only a basic
level of Finnish but were capable of speaking English. In this course, I
was mostly sitting with a few other fellow participants who were also
beginners in Finnish, and had very few direct contacts and conversations
with other participants. 
The courses were organised for different purposes in mind, such as, in
terms of intensity of the course, the goal of the course (if it aimed to
quickly improve students’ Finnish skills in order for students to pass the
national Finnish exam for fnding work in Finland or if it tried to assist
the everyday practices that ft home staying mothers and elderly
immigrants' needs), and the Finnish level of the students upon enrolment.
Due to the various methods of organisation and the diverse teaching
practices in these classes, the feld work has been rather diffcult. 
During the frst feld work period (January to April 2011), I
participated in two Finnish for foreigner classes in Turku. One was an
intensive course (composed of two levels) organised by the adult
education centre Työväenopisto (its Finnish name) or Arbis (its Swedish
name). It took place on Wednesdays and Fridays between 12.30 pm to
14.30 pm. The other course was Finnish for foreigners class level 1 and 2,
hosted by the evening school (this is a literal translation from its Finnish
name) Turun Iltalukio. This course took place every Tuesday and
Thursday for one hour each time. During the second period of my feld
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work (November 2011 to April 2012), I participated in a Finnish for
foreigners class specifcally targeting immigrant women at the public
library in the city of Espoo. This course was organised by a NGO group
of retired female teachers. And it was the only class among those that I
participated in that provided space for immigrant home staying mothers
(i.e., mothers were encouraged to bring their children to the class). For
this reason, the course supervisors always brought with them a box of
toys for participants’ children. 
The two courses I participated in during the frst feld work period
were both located in the city centre, and were thus relatively easy to
access. Finnish for foreigners classes held in the adult education centre
Arbis/Työväenopisto normally started at 12.30 pm. Most students in this
class did not have full time jobs, with one exception who worked at night
time. The Finnish for foreigners class at the evening school started at
19.00 pm, thus attracting students who needed to go to school or worked
during the day time. 
Practices for bettering Finnish pronunciation were the major
components of all the Finnish courses that I attended. Through these
practices I was afforded insights into the bodily and affective workings of
Finnish language learning. The class dynamics, as a relevant issue is
addressed in relation to the observed situations of speech production.
This is not only because the classroom setting is to a certain extent a
replica of the multicultural and multilingual Finnish context, but is also
by virtue of my commitments to feminist postcolonial theory that attends
to power dynamics, as well as of my understanding of the notion of
context, in a new materialist framework, as a performative enactment.
That is, it does not connote “separability as a starting point” (Barad 2007,
459) which “presumes there is an object that exists apart from its
environment or surroundings and that this environmental context
matters in some way” (459). Rather, context as contextuality is
materialised in and materialises the “knowledge-making practices [that]
are social-material enactments” (Barad 2007, 26). 
During the course of the feldwork, I have conducted two recorded
interviews. One interview is with three classmates at a cafe after a Finnish
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class; the other interview is with two other classmates, also at a cafe. Both
interviews lasted for more than one hour, and both were conducted in the
city centre of Turku. Since I was myself a migrant language learner in
these classes, and had informed fellow classmates and teachers about my
research plan and my participation in the courses as both a researcher
and a student from the start (either during the frst or the second session)
of the course, I was personally quite involved with the topic of Finnish
language learning and discussed this often with classmates.  
I did not conduct further interviews for two reasons. First of all, I
noticed that it was diffcult, especially in the interview setting, for
participants to describe how they practice Finnish pronunciations, which
is crucial to my analysis of the matter of race, that is, the how of racialised
and embodied differences materialised in the process of Finnish language
learning. Second, my participant observation during the class and the
discussions in online forums better supported my research interest in
broaching the bodily and affective practices of Finnish language learning,
especially the how of speech production. Even though my research
questions are situated in and arise from the Finnish context of
immigration and integration, they do not weigh heavily on the analysis of
one’s perception of what counts as successful integration, neither do they
pose criteria or provide explanation for the failure or success of
individual Finnish language learning practices.
The second set of materials includes discussions regarding Finnish
language learning in online forums, especially from kina.cc. This forum is
among the biggest virtual Chinese communities in Europe. It was
established in 2000. I became a member of this virtual community already
in 2004 when I was interested in pursuing studies in Europe. Most
members of the forum are Chinese living in Europe, or are interested in
moving to Europe for reasons such as studying or working. The section
that I am most interested in for the purpose of this study is where
members discuss issues related to Finnish language learning. The topics
range from diffculties with pronunciations to issues in learning Finnish
grammar. All the discussions are anonymous. 
Two artworks function as supplementary materials. The frst one is the
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art installation project “Finnexia” by Lisa Erdman. As discussed in
chapter one, the installation was about a fctitious drug, advertised as
enhancing Finnish language learning process with “a unique combination
of cognitive enhancement, anxiety reduction, and speech therapy”
(Erdman, forthcoming dissertation). The second one is the art installation
“Mamme/Vårt land”.61 In the Mamme video installation, artists Minna
Rainio and Mark Robert presented the screening of non-native Finnish
citizens singing the Finnish National Anthem. The gathering of various
people that forms a united choir out of disparate parts, calls into question
the identity of Finnishness. Whereas the frst installation accentuates the
implication of bodily practices of Finnish language learning against the
backdrop of integration and immigration in the Finnish context, the latter
encapsulates the political economy of racialised visual-aural encounters
articulated through notions of national ownership as properties of
belonging. 
Conclusion: Part One
Opening with an analysis of the art installation Finnexia, the frst chapter
of this dissertation foregrounds the context of Finnish language
acquisition among adult migrants in Finland. This is also meant to raise
questions about the division between fact and fction that informs much
debates in critical engagements with questions of race and ethnicity. In
lingering over Saussure’s dilemma in his theorisation of
ethnisme/ethnicity, the second section of part one addresses the ways in
which the phenomenon of host country language acquisition and the
materialization of race are not two separate realms of studies that are
somehow intertwined. Furthermore, in examining the tensions in the
conception of human race and racial differences, I have argued for an
account of the onto-epistemological dis/continuity of race, that does not
shun away from questions of nature, essence, generation, but
reconfgures them within the parameters of a notion of originary
humanicity. 
This reconsideration of race/ethnicity question through the lens of the
61 http://rainioroberts.com/maamme/, last accessed 29 June 2015.
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nature/culture divide has signifcant methodological implications. For
example, one of the major issues in research concerned with race is that it
is as if we already know what race is even before a research question can
be posed (cf. Gunaratnam 2003). Part of the concern is that the
confnement of epistemological knowing – where race is understood as a
grid of intelligibility – not only renders research results predictable, but
also runs the risk of reproducing certain confgurations of asymmetrical
power relations. In the methodological chapter, which is the third section
of part one, this problematic is addressed through the notion of onto-
epistemological dis/continuity, with a focus on the question of difference.
I argue that the convoluted nature of difference also means that
theoretical engagements of and empirical studies on race should not be
considered as two radically different and competing forms of studies.
Following Haraway (1988) and Kirby (1997), I suggest that the
contingency and the always problematic re-emergence of any identity –
be it the identity of the subject or object of research – means that a
feminist ethical and political engagement with race must insistently and
repeatedly pose questions about the nature of race.
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Part Two
Chapter Four
The Racialised Political Economy of Visual-Aural 
Encounters
An episode that took place during a Finnish for foreigners lecture may
serve to illustrate the complexity of the racialised political economy of the
visual. The teacher wrote the following words on the whiteboard: 
A major task of today’s lesson is learning Finnish words for different
colours.” She then pronounced them slowly, and occasionally pointed to
objects in the classroom to give visual examples, such as projector’s metal
surface to show the colour grey (harmaa) and some other objects for
colours like green (vihreä), red (punainen) and so on and so forth. After
writing the word “musta” meaning “black” on the whiteboard, she
turned around towards us, and pronounced it without providing any
visual examples. Instead, she  showed us how the word would be used in
association with other words. For example, she notes that “musta” is used
as the spoken version of the Finnish word “minusta”, meaning “I”, as in,
for instance, the phrase “musta tuntuu” (I feel). Just as she was about to
proceed to teach the names of other colours, a voice behind me
announced, loudly and clearly, “musta mies”, meaning “black man”.  The
speaker laughed immediately after making this statement. The teacher
moved the corners of her lips upwards slightly in an awkward smile as a
response to this comment, and turned her back against the class to write
down the names of the other colours. The rest of the class fell quiet. No
one addressed the utterance. No one laughed. This silence expressed the
uneasy atmosphere. Based on the proximity and the deepness of the
voice, I could tell that the speaker was H, a male student from Ivory
Coast, who was sitting right behind me. As if echoing the silence in the
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classroom, my back felt stiff. H’s laughter suggested that his remark was
jocose. But the laughter did not change the sticky situation; if anything, it
added further perplexity.62 The strangeness of the sound of the word m-u-
s-t-a-m-i-e-s for my foreign ears seemed to contradict its weight.
Disturbed by and wanting to think further about this event, I wrote it
down in my feld notes. The lecture continued. But H’s voice, the
laughter, the silence in the classroom, the teacher’s awkward smile, and
my stiff back all become condensed in and articulated through the
utterance “musta mies”. 
At frst glance, the scene above might not seem to ft the task of
exploring the question of the visual-aural encounters which is the concern
of this chapter as it appears to refect a form of naming that is vocal rather
than visual. That is, unlike the other colours that were demonstrated in
visible objects in the classroom, H’s utterance seems to be perceived
solely in audible forms. And yet, the palpable weight of the signifer
“musta mies” (black man), in a sound pattern that is still strange to my
foreign ears begs the crucial question of the how and why of its force.
Clearly, the representational weight of the word “musta mies” (black
man) lies in the historicity63 of the conception of race in visual terms –
especially racialised meanings attributed to skin colours. Robyn Wiegman
points out that this represents a sort of violent epistemological equation
between “the idea of ‘race’ and the ‘black’ body” (1995, 21) that renders
the body and its epidermis the locus of difference; a difference, to quote
Sara Ahmed (1998), that matters. This hierarchical specifcity needs to be
underscored, especially against a mere celebration of the diversity of
62 I use the word “sticky” deliberately here, for it connotes a sense of the diffculty of
movement. It indicates a palpable viscosity, a glue-like quality (as weight), most
vividly felt on the skin.  This also relates to my later engagement with Sara Ahmed’s
(2004) conception of race as sticky sign in this chapter, as well as the question of
weight/value in the last chapter. 
63 I want to hasten to note that historicity is not a history that once was and is now
absent (see Ahmed 2000). But as Judith Butler dilates upon in Excitable Speech, it refers
to “the history which has become internal to a name, has come to constitute the
contemporary meaning of a name: the sedimentation of its usages as they have
become part of the very name, a sedimentation, a repetition that congeals, that gives
the name its force.” (1997a, 36)
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colours (cf. Tuori 2007; Fortier 2008)64 that sees racial differences as
equally different,65 as well as the rhetoric of colour blindness (cf. El-Tayeb
2011; Eng 2010) that “refuses to recognize the ways in which race, gender,
sexuality, class, and nation continue to be articulated and constituted in
relation to one another in the ongoing struggles for equality and social
belonging” (Eng 2010, x).66 In fact, the celebration of racial diversity and
the denial of its presence are essentially the same, as both positions fxate
on racial differences as visible differences marked, for example, on the
skin. But the image or the idea of race signifed by the utterance “musta
mies” appears to be different from the conventional sense of the visual
perception, understood as seeing with eyes. What is the nature of the
imagery of “musta mies”? From a different perspective, we could also ask
what the utterance/signifer “musta mies” consists of? How would an
examination of the process of signifcation in visual-aural terms, such as
in the case presented here, assist a reconsideration of the racialised visual
64 For example, in her study of a three-year-long project called the Kitchen that aims to
assist the labour market integration and participation of migrant women in Finland,
Salla Tuori (2007) notes the commodifcation, or what Ahmed calls fetishisation, of
otherness fgured in terms of “spices” that add colour to Finland and to Finnishness.
65 Anne-Marie Fortier’s reading of Tony Blair’s advocacy of diversity as integral to the
project of “‘modernizing’” Britain is especially telling in this regard: “At the turn of the
millennium, the Labour government declared its commitment to creating ‘One
Nation’, a country where ‘every colour is a good colour’ and where ‘racial diversity is
celebrated’”(2008, 16). 
66 Importantly, David Eng accentuates the importance of acknowledging the “coevalness
of sexual and racial discrimination”, and argues against “historicist violence by casting
them as radically discontinuous” (2010, x). By way of footnote, I want to highlight the
question of discontinuity as it relates to the discussion of dis/continuity put forth in
part one that addresses the question of continuity and discontinuity, sameness and
difference. For example, focusing on the ways in which the political rhetoric of colour-
blindness takes shape (especially in kinship relations), Eng subjects to scrutiny the
analogical rather than intersectional formulation of different identity categories in
legal practices that focuses on the continuous and the similar at the expense of
heterogeneity/discontinuity and difference. Eng’s analysis sheds light on the “like
race” (2010, 41) logic. Linking this analogical framework to the prominence of the
rhetoric of colour-blindness, Eng provocatively asks, “As race disappears, how will the
law ever come to see it?” (41). The importance of Eng’s observation is indisputable.
And yet, in this dissertation, I want to rethink the relation between identity and
difference through a notion of difference that inhabits with/in an identity,  and at the
same time differentiates itself (see Kirby 1997).
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economy that underlines the fxation of racial differences? 
In order to broach these questions, and in connection with our
discussions of the Saussurean conception of language, part two starts
with a closer engagement with the question of the Saussurean notion of
the sign. My reading here is mostly inspired by Vicki Kirby’s analysis of
Saussure’s work. The specifc contribution of my reading  is the critical
engagement with Saussure’s conceptualisation of the notion ethnisme, of
the relation between the visual and the aural, as well as the question of
dis/continuity through a close reading of the “carrying” function of the
signifer. Chapter fve pays particular attention to the phenomenon of
language acquisition and broaches the crucial question, which is how to
transform habits of racial thinking. Chapter six takes a closer look at the
practices of learning to trill and analyses the psychic life of the tongue. 
Signifer/Signifed and the Unit of Sign 
As Kirby reminds us, “Saussure’s notion of the signifer … couples the
visual with the auditory in his image acoustique, not as one mode with
another so much as the intermodality of perception itself” (1997, 64). I
want to add to Kirby's observation, and to clarify a crucial point already
here at the outset. For Saussure, the image acoustique is strictly the
psychological imprint. That is, it is an interpretation, a representation,
rather than the materiality of the visual and aural perception itself.
Related to this, the signifed is posited as the concept but it is also a form
of imagery, a fgure if you will, as we can see in the illustration below.67
The unit of the sign binds and creates signifer/signifed. Interestingly,
67 For the original illustration see Saussure ([1983] 2013, 99).
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Saussure has (within the same page) two contradictory claims concerning
the relationship of signifer, signifed and sign. First, Saussure states that
a sign includes both signifer (sound image) and signifed (concept), and
should not be confated with signifer alone. As Saussure explains, ‘‘if
arbor is called a sign, it is only because it carries with it the concept ‘tree’,
so that the sensory part of the term implies reference to the whole’’
([1983] 2013, 100). Although terms such as “carry” and “refer” connote
the different elements and their relations within the unit of sign, from a
different perspective, they could also be interpreted as indicating that the
signifer stands (in) for the whole of the sign by virtue of a necessary and
essential linkage between the signifer and the signifed. 
Saussure seems to have also sensed such a possibility of confation,
and the necessity for further clarifcation. In the paragraph that follows
this one, Saussure moves to the second proposition, which is to replace
the term “concept” with the term “signifcation” and “sound pattern”
with “signal”. According to Saussure, the change in terminology helps
resolve the ambiguous relationship between signifer, signifed and sign.
This is because the words “sign-ifcation” and “sign-al” are not only both
manifestly part of the “sign”, but are also arbitrarily related to each other.
Nevertheless, a contradiction arises in taking together Saussure’s two
assertions. Arbitrariness is also a spatial notion. It assumes an originary
separateness, because the lack of intrinsic connection, between the
signifer and signifed. This is made clear in Saussure’s likening of the
sign to the operation of economics. Saussure considers both economics
and the linguistic system share in common the notion of value that
enables “a system of equivalence between things belonging to different orders.
In one case, work and wages; in the other case, signifcation and signal.”
([1983] 2013, 114, emphasis in original). Given this, even if we can
concede to the arbitrary nature of the sign, we still need to ask how the
two originally distinct terms become linked together and what the nature
is of their linkage that takes the shape of containment and transmission,
as Saussure’s use of the word “carry” implies.  
With this in mind, and to further contemplate the conundrum at hand,
we can consider further the illustration above. Whereas Saussure’s
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second assertion is in line with what is demonstrated in the illustration,
his frst statement nevertheless qualifes the separation and distinction of
the three terms. As we see, it seems that although both signifer and
signifed are bound within the unit of the sign, a line nevertheless
segregates them. Following Kirby, we can interpret this line in relation to
Saussure’s comparison of language with a sheet of paper (1997, 11). That
is, the idea that the concept and the sound pattern each occupies the front
and back side of the paper. Although the unity of the paper suggests that
both signifer and signifed are part of or contained in the whole, the
spatial metaphor of the front and back suggests a space, a gap, that
separates the former from the latter. Kirby’s observation assists us here:
This analogy would appear to capture the paradox of the sign’s divided
unity in time. However, there is a problem with this. If the signifer and
signifed are contemporary according to this comparison, they are
nevertheless separated in space by the thickness of the paper itself. Thus
thought and sound are fgured as both amorphous and spatially
delimited. (1997, 11, emphasis in original)
Reading Saussure against himself, we see that his contention that the
signifer carries the signifed and refers to the whole contradicts the
spatial segregation the illustration and the paper analogy attest to. For the
word “carry” presents the signifer and signifed not so much as disparate
and enclosed parts of the sign that are simply joined together. In a similar
vein, the word “refer” (re- “back” + ferre “carry”) implies that not only is
the signifer part of the whole, but it also carries traces of, and thus
incorporates the whole. We should add here that in the chapter that
immediately follows, Saussure argues for the inseparability of signifer
and signifed: “a sequence of sounds is a linguistic sequence only if it is
the bearer of an idea: in itself, it is merely an item for physiological
investigation … a concept becomes an identifying characteristic of a
certain sound, just as a given sound is an identifying characteristic of the
corresponding concept” ([1983] 2013, 144 -145).
Having laid bare the relation between signifer (signal) and signifed
(signifcation), Saussure goes on to expand upon the criteria that defnes
the unit of the sign vis-à-vis its two parts. To put it briefy, the unit of the
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sign is predicated upon the linearity and sequence of a segment of sound
as well as the meaning attributed to it, which enables the sign to be
delimited because it is distinct from other signs. Saussure uses the
example of encountering foreign sound patterns: 
When we listen to an unknown language, we are not in a position to
say how the sequence of sounds should be analysed: for the analysis is
impossible if one takes into account nothing more than the phonic side
of the linguistic event. But when we know what meaning and what role
to attribute to each segment in the sequence, then we see those
segments separated in the sequence, then we see those segments
separated one from another, and the shapeless ribbon is cut into pieces.
([1983] 2013, 145)
In an attempt to identify the basic unit or object of analysis for
linguistics, Saussure (unwittingly) undermines his earlier proposition of
the related but discrete domains of these three elements. Following on
from the above assertion, not only is the signifer and signifed part of the
unit of the sign, but as it turns out, the whole of the sign only becomes
such when it is, or better yet, is capable of being fragmented into its parts.
That is, the unit of the sign is delimited and identifable not despite, but
precisely because of the cutting – “together and apart” (Barad 2007, 389) 
the signifer and the signifed. Signifcantly, it could be further inferred
that each part – signifer and signifed  is already the whole unit of the
sign, albeit differently. Signifer, signifed and the sign each is enacted
with and in the other, a simultaneity and implicatedness that articulate
their consubstantial nature (Kirby 1997, 18).68  As we will see, the
ramifcations of the consubstantial and radically involved nature of part
and whole are considerable for the analysis of racialised political
economy of the visual and aural. But before we proceed to reread the
opening episode in visual-aural terms, I want to pause to consider the
implications of the temporal and spatial relation of “carrying” that
Saussure imputes to the signifer, as well as the corollary problematics of
68 As Kirby makes clear, the term “consubstantial” captures the paradoxical essence of
the Saussurean sign - “and ‘entity’ -  whose invariance is made possible by a system of
referral that is pure variation” (2006, 161).
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the referent that haunts the Saussurean sign (Kirby 1997). This reading
will also inform my analysis of the racialised visual-aural economy in this
chapter. What I am trying to get at is the need to reconsider the
perception and conception of race through, and not simply beyond, the
visual. 
Dis/Continuity and the Relation of Carrying
What interests me here is the ways in which the nature of the relation
between signifer and signifed bears resemblance to the idea that racial
substance is carried in the blood as addressed in chapter two. With
Haraway, we noted that the fgure of blood in its fuidity and
permeability both promises and threatens the continuity of racial lineage.
We also discussed the how and where of the location of racial substance,
supposedly predicating the identity and the signature of a racial unity.
Based on these observations, it seems that the identity of race, an
invariant mark of race’s signature, is made possible only through the
lineal referral and deferral of the blood fows. Is such a modality of the
relational what Saussure had in mind when he described the carrying of
signifed in signifer? If the signifer, as Saussure explains, is the sensory
part of the sign, what does the signifed consist of? Quite a few issues
need to be carefully unpacked here. First, in examining what is at stake in
Saussure’s depiction of the signifer that carries the signifed, I want to
draw attention to the second principle of the Saussurean sign: the
linearity of signifer/signal. 
An observation should be made here: in comparison with the other
two sections (part one Sign, Signifcation Signal and part two First
Principle: The Sign Is Arbitrary), Saussure’s explanation of the linearity of
signal makes up the least of the chapter Nature of the Linguistic Sign.
Saussure has probably felt the need to provide an explanation of such an
arrangement: “This principle is obvious, but it seems never to be stated,
doubtless because it is considered too elementary” ([1983] 2013, 103). The
linear succession of speech sounds in the form of a chain, to use
Saussure’s word, is often considered to be self-evident. Saussure
summarises the linear character of the linguistic signal as follows: “(a) it
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occupies a certain temporal space, and (b) this space is measured in just one
dimension: it is a line” ([1983] 2013, 103, emphasis in original). In order to
make this explicit, Saussure compares the auditory/linguistic signal with
that of the visual. For Saussure, the nature of the visual entails multiple
dimensions that coexist, whereas the auditory signal is only available one
at a time.
Such a conception of the linearity of linguistic signal/signifer echoes
our earlier discussion of the continuity of time. Recall that for Karen
Barad the assumed distinction between continuity and discontinuity
separates nature from culture, time from space, and enables the
calculating, intentional  and intelligent human subject. The continuity of
time is predicated upon discrete and discontinuous moments - the
segmented syllables and sounds in this case - contained in space and
taking place in time. Clearly then, the confguration of the signifer as the
carrier that incorporates the signifed evokes something of the
nature/culture question as well as the problem of the human subject. This
is made patently manifest in Saussure’s explanation of the ways in which
the unit of the sign is delimited, or becomes a sign:
[A] language does not present itself to us as a set of signs already
delimited, requiring us merely to study their meanings and
organisations. It is an indistinct mass, in which attention and habit alone
enable us to distinguish particular elements. The unit has no special
phonic character, and the only defnition it can be given is the
following: a segment of sound which is, as distinct from what precedes and
follows in the spoken sequence, the signal of a certain concept. ([1983] 2013,
146, my emphasis)
For Saussure, the attention and habit of the human subject is
indispensably the single factor (as his deployment of the word “alone”
must mean) in the becoming of the sign. Without the intending human,
language is but “indistinct mass”. This is interesting given Saussure’s
attempts to displace the agency of the speaker through likening the
restricted liberty of the speaker to that of the card player. As Kirby
comments, Saussure “retained an unqualifed investment in agency and
intention nevertheless. If the ordinary speaker is unwittingly played by
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the dictates of language, it still remains somewhat heretical to suggest
that the linguist is similarly duped” (1997, 48). Approached in terms of
continuity, we see that the linearity of the signal presumes the self-
presence of the consciousness of the individual subject at sign's initiation.
From a slightly different perspective, it could also be said that the unit of
the sign as a segment of sound imputed with meaning is a moment in
time “whose tangible immediacy is present to experience and then absent
from it” (Kirby 1997, 47, emphasis in original).  
And yet, this purportedly self-evident linearity undergoes a sort of
spatio-temporal distortion in the very conception of signifer/signal as a
mental imprint of sound. It might seem straightforward that the signifer
– the element perceptible through the senses or “the representation of our
sensory impressions” (Saussure [1983] 2014, 98) –  is psychological in
nature. That is, it is a mediated effect of the meaning making process,
primarily conditioned by subjective intention and attention, as well as
social conventions. Nevertheless the term “signal” makes vulnerable the
confdence with which the primacy of human agency is assumed. The
word “signal” connotes a command, an incitation and invitation to
action. With the replacement of sound image with signal, it follows then
that the sound pattern is not only the result of the meaning making
process of man, but it also commands and incites the subject to perceive
and interpret. In other words, the sound pattern evokes and initiates
perception even before it is perceived, substantiated and interpreted. But
how is this possible? For surely, as Saussure notes, it is the attention of
the human subject – the process of attending to, leading out of and
toward, and regulated by social conventions as embodied habits – which
alone makes perceptible and intelligible the otherwise amorphous mass in
the frst place. What then is the nature of the signal and the sound
pattern? And how does it come to matter?  
We are presented with a strange spatio-temporal condensation in
which the command of the perceptible to be perceived, attended to and
grappled with is heard by the very subject who makes it perceptible and
intelligible in the frst place. It follows that instead of a serial/linear
unfolding of moments that fow from the initial moment of
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perception/interpretation/representation by the human subject, we
encounter dis/continuity at and of the beginning, wherein the intention of
the human subject cannot simply be denied or conceded. This is the
involuted and torsional nature of the “initial condition” (Kirby 2006, 89)
that echoes Haraway’s wonder at the “somehow” of racial continuity.  I
recall the discussion of “somehow” of racial continuity here to fag the
profound implications the question of dis/continuity has for the
racialised visual-aural economy we are about to explore.
Returning to, and beginning again from, the question of the signifed,
it should be noted that, although Saussure emphasises the “unifed
duality” ([1983] 2013, 145) of signifer and signifed, intriguingly, it seems
that only the signifer carries the signifed, and not the other way around.
For example, as Saussure writes, “the phonetic contrasts” ([1983] 2013,
163) that distinguishes a word from other words “is what carries the
meaning” (163). To carry is to contain and to transmit. In the relationality
of carrying, the carrier is the medium that transports an object from point
A to point B. The hierarchised confguration of the carrier and the carried
needs to be underscored here. The signifer, understood as the linear and
sensorial perceptible substantiated by human attention and habit is
privileged as the carrier of the signifed. Furthermore, it is said that the
signifer also expresses the whole unit of the sign. As aforementioned, the
mobility of the chain of signifcation is defned against what is relegated
to be outside it, that is the external-linguistic reality. Such a confguration
installs the nature/culture split that accords human calculus, as the
arbitrary culture, with the capacity for mobilisation. And yet, as we have
also pointed out, with the conception of signal, the temporal and spatial
priority of the human agency is strangely confounded and radically
qualifed.
On a different register, the relation of the signifer and signifed is
reminiscent of the formulation of racial identity as blood lineage
addressed earlier. In this account, the blood is the medium or vehicle
through which a constant racial essence is sent from a former generation
and inherited by its latter.69  It is not diffcult to discern the essentialising
69 Kirby’s reading of the relation between language and thought also attends to the
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implications in this formulation. And yet, and importantly, Haraway
does not simply reject but teases out the indeterminacy entailed in the
fuidity of blood. Regarded as necessary for the lineage of race, the fgure
of blood both promises and threatens to undermine the identity of an
originary racial essence. That is because the continuity of the racial
identity, carried in blood, necessitates the containment – discontinuous
cutting, delimiting – against contamination. In a similar vein, the
Saussurean sign also renders intricate the relation between continuity and
discontinuity. Saussure’s assertion that the signifer incorporates and
transmits the signifed could be read as an endeavour to uproot the
concept/signifed from the real object, and henceforth to re-locate the
value of the sign in the chain of signifcation. Along these lines, we could
consider the arbitrariness of the sign as providing the groundless ground
for sign's discontinuous representation. That is, the identity of the sign is
enabled by the process of pure differentiation within the linguistic
system. And yet, we have noted that for Saussure, a signifer/sound
pattern is only materialised – identifed, delimited and distinguished
from other segments of sound – through the attention and habit of the
human subject. Not only is the self-presence and continuity of the
conscious subject assumed in this account, the habit of meaning making is
understood as predicated upon the continuity of conventions as social
constraints. Interestingly then, not only “the conventional” and “the
arbitrary” – terms that are supposedly oppositional – become confated
(see also Kirby 1997, 26), but both the continuity and discontinuity of the
sign are made simultaneously possible and impossible. In chapter two,
we discussed the ways in which Saussurean sign has considerable
ramifcations for an investigation of the nature of race. To reiterate the
point made earlier, this is because the severance of the linguistic system
temporal priority accorded to signifer:Just as the relationship between signifer and
signifed was likened to that of a vehicle of expression and its content, the relationship
between language and thought is similarly conceptualized. We noted above the
temporal priority is granted to the conduit, or vehicle of expression, in the mistaken
assumption that the signifer evokes the signifed. Similarly, Benveniste argues here
that language, as thought’s instrument, is the necessary predication of thinking, for
‘this content has to pass through language and conform to its framework’. (1997, 22-
23)
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from the material and the real assists to undermine any predetermination
and fxation of what race is. Nevertheless, as we will see below, the hope
to dispense with the extra-linguistic reality is proven impossible, because
the identity of the signifer ultimately hinges upon, or rematerializes, the
transcendent, foundational existence of the concept, and of the thing
itself. This poses a conundrum, indeed. 
The Outside of the Sign
We have mentioned that reality, nature, and concrete objects fall outside
of the Saussurean linguistic system. Unlike the transparent immediacy of
reality, the “empty confgurations” (read lacking intrinsic value) of
linguistic signal and signifcation suggests the delimited and ephemeral
nature of signifcation processes. And yet, we might wonder what it is
about reality/nature/object that makes them both inaccessible and
known. On the one hand, they are inaccessible because the nature of the
s ign i s the process of delimiting, wherein perception is always and
already an inscription; that is it always involves the concept or idea of its
object, rather than the thing itself. On the other hand, the assigning of
reality to the exterior place of the process of signifcation necessitates
assumptions about, if not knowledge of, its nature and properties. Put
otherwise, the delimiting and emergence of the unit of the linguistic
system links the knowable with the unknowable (read as the
inaccessible). In light of this, both intelligibility and unintelligibility are
reconceived. For if the linguistic system is radically set apart, because
distinct, from the realm of the natural, or the real, how does the latter
come to lend support to the emergence of the former? That is, how can
the extra-linguistic reality be relegated to the outside of the linguistic
system, thus marking its boundary and its identity, if it is unknowable
and inaccessible? Consequently, even exclusion is an involved and
implicated process wherein an outside is discovered as the outside that
in-forms the inside. 
This is made patently clear, as Kirby notes, when Saussure unwittingly
(but perhaps inevitably) confates the signifed with the thing. In the
Course, we see that Saussure is at pains to argue for the psychological
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nature of sound patterns as well as of the concept. As Saussure writes,
“The sound pattern may be called a ‘material’ element only in that it is
the representation of our sensory impressions” ([1983] 2013, 99). To prove
this, Saussure draws on the example of internal dialogues: “Without
moving either lips or tongue, we can talk to ourselves or recite silently a
piece of verse. We grasp the words of a language as sound patterns”
([1983] 2013, 99). Consistent with this confguration of the signifer, and in
an attempt to avoid confusing the signifed with the material object or
thing itself, Saussure goes on to argue that the signifed – the concept, the
meaning, that which is understood – is the more abstract part of the sign.
We could further note that Saussure’s emphasis on the “unifed
duality” or consubstantiality of the signifer and signifed is in accordance
with his persistent rejection of the axiomatics of nomenclature. With the
frst principle – the arbitrary nature of the sign – Saussure posits that
there is no “internal connexion” ([1983] 2013, 100) between the signifer
and signifed. Put otherwise, there is no natural origin or essence that
determines the sound pattern. Interestingly, and particularly relevant to
our discussion at hand, we see that Saussure contrasts the linguistic
signal with the visual symbol to support his argument:
The word symbol is sometimes used to designate the linguistic sign, or
more exactly that part of the linguistic sign which we are calling the
signal. This use of the word symbol is awkward, for reasons connected
with our frst principle. For it is characteristic of symbols that they are
never entirely arbitrary. They are not empty confgurations. They show
at least a vestige of natural connexion between the signal and its
signifcation. For instance, our symbol of justice, the scales, could
hardly be replaced by a chariot. ([1983] 2013, 101, emphasis in original)
Saussure does not actually dispute that the symbol is a visual signal,
but frmly argues against the confation of the visual with the linguistic
signal. This is because for Saussure symbols are not “empty
confgurations”70 but have intrinsic values rooted in “natural
70 We might wonder what “empty confgurations” actually imply. Does it mean that the
linguistic signal and signifcation are devoid of the substantial existence that is found
present in visual signifcation? But what then is the nature of the signal if the sign is
only an ephemeral veil that only receives the mark of human inscription? In other
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connexions”. We could infer from this that by “natural connexion”
Saussure means that the symbol as a visual signal is determined by and
refects a truth, a reality, a concrete, substantial fact. By comparison, the
linguistic signal does not hinge upon any extra-linguistic essence. In the
unitary bond in which the linguistic signifer contains, because it carries,
the concept/idea, Saussure sets into motion a chain of endless deferral
and referral. Yet interestingly, Saussure’s endeavour to demonstrate the
arbitrariness of this sign confounds the very identity of the arbitrary, for
it eventually rests on the transcendental essence of the concept, and of
reality itself. As Kirby observes, in Saussure’s work, “there is a slippage
… between the words ‘thing’ and ‘idea’” (1997, 11). For example, we see
that in Saussure’s discussion of the distinction between language and
civilisation mentioned in chapter two, Saussure repeatedly comments on
the thing in relation to the presence or absence of a word in a language
that signifes it:
The absence of a word has been interpreted as proof that originally a
primitive civilisation lacked the thing in question. This is a mistake.
Asiatic languages have no verb for “to plough”, but this does not prove
that ploughing was originally unknown there. It may have been
abandoned or replaced by other techniques, called by other terms.
([1983] 2013, 207–208, my emphasis)
In this quote in which Saussure attempts to counter the argument that
language provides evidence for civilisation, it seems that Saussure cannot
fnally dispense with the presence of the thing. In this account, the
concept and the thing seem to be blurred, or as Kirby puts it, “the
words, how can an empty, passive confguration generate an impression? I want to
underline the sexualising economy inherent in this description. Kirby’s discussion of
the question of the “empty signifer” inspires my reading here. Commenting on Judith
Butler’s and Slavoj Žižek’s investment in the transformative potential of empty signs,
Kirby asks “what it could mean to describe phantasmatic projections in terms of
emptiness, as if the body of the sign bears nothing? If these projections are also
signifcations, as Butler suggests, then why is the differential of giving and receiving
understood through the terms of presence and absence, value and lack, which mirror
the phallocentrism and heterosexism of male and female? How is the difference of
phantasmatic projections translated into anything given their apparent lack of identity,
their nonexistence?” (1997, 119).
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referent, or reality’s substance, is inadvertently smuggled in as the
signifed to which it attaches” (1997, 12). In spite of Saussure’s assertion
of the abstractness of the signifed, it seems to remain bound to the (extra-
linguistic) referent, the materiality of the thing. In light of this, the
conception of the linguistic sign both concedes to and repudiates the
immediacy of self-evident reality. For even the domain of the arbitrary
has to discriminate against, and henceforth incorporates, what it is not. In
view of this, I want to briefy return to the distinction between symbol
and signal that Saussure makes in the earlier quote. As we have seen, for
Saussure, what differentiates the linguistic signal, conceived of as
arbitrary in nature, from the visual signal is the attachment of the visual
to the positive facts of reality. Saussure takes the example of the scale as
the symbol of justice to bolster his argument. Curiously, in an attempt to
prove the obviousness of the scale, Saussure is forced to differentiate the
symbol of justice from the symbol chariot which often signifes war. The
question then arises as to what is the nature of the “natural connexion”
specifc to the visual, if its truth can be proved only through the process
of differentiation from other positive facts? 
The Question of the Visual
Saussure’s conception of the visual certainly demands further
consideration. For how is the “natural connexion” of the visual signal and
its signifcation readily assumed? What is it about the psychological
imprint of sound that visual perception cannot articulate? Similarly,
commenting on the image, with which Saussure demonstrates the “error”
of nomenclature that presumes an independently pre-existing idea,71
Kirby considers the following points: 
[I]t is conventional practice to describe the sign’s components in the
order signifer/signifed (left/right) rather than the other way around.
Given this, why do we so automatically break with convention and
presume that the left-hand fgure is the signifed? Is the reason for this
that we have also merged the notion of “concept” with “reality,” just as
Saussure did before us? If we admit that the difference between
71 Source of the image Saussure ([1983] 2013, 98).
114
“concept” and “reality” is indeed blurred here, we still need to explain
how this confusion is produced. Why, for example, is the drawing quite
naturally confused with reality? It is worth noting that the word is no
less a graphic image than the drawing is. And yet, we tend to regard
the word as a cultural (and therefore arbitrary entity), whereas we tend
to regard the drawing as deriving from nature. (1997, 13) 
In my opinion, Saussure does concede to the idea that writing is a
visual form, wherein the visual shape of individual letters “functions like
an ideogram” ([1983] 2013, 57). Interestingly, whereas visual signals such
as symbols are considered as having natural connections, writing is
conceived of as the second-order representation of the sound system of
language, which is always inaccurate. For Saussure, the study of the
sound system “provide[s] a natural substitute for the artifcial aid” ([1983]
2013, 55, my emphasis), that is writing. Again, we see the slipperiness and
ambiguities of the nature/culture distinction. 
Throughout the Course, Saussure carefully distinguishes the visual
from the auditory and privileges the latter over the former. For example
and to recapitulate, Saussure argues that visual signs “are observed to
coexist in space without confusion” ([1983] 2013, 145) as opposed to the
linear succession of sound in time. Moreover, whereas Saussure
distinguishes between the sound pattern – the semiological – and the
changing, complex, though less important, physiological vocal
production of sound itself, he seems to be taken in by the transparent
immediacy of visual perception itself. That is, not only is the “natural
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connexion” of the visual imagery to the extra-linguistic object self-
evident, but the how of the visual perception of the signal is never itself in
question. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that Saussure also concedes to the
inseparability of the visual and the aural: “if we try to … do away with
any visual image altogether, we run the risk of being left with an
amorphous object which is diffcult to grasp. It is as if someone learning
to swim had suddenly had his cork foat taken away” ([1983] 2013, 55).
Here, Saussure provides a very vivid metaphor wherein the visual
imagery, as the concept, provides the pattern or form that makes
perceptible and graspable the otherwise fuid string of sounds. Its
centrality to the survival of the subject is depicted in the life saving
function of the cork foat that prevents the swimmer from drowning.
Such a confguration makes palpable the entanglement of the visual and
aural in the earlier mentioned term image acoustique or sound image. This
is not a simple coupling of two disparate sensorial domains or orders, but
a visual audibility and an audible visuality that displaces and reconceives
both the visual and the aural. And yet, the temporal priority accorded to
the human subject (depicted as the swimmer) and the fuidity of sound
(represented metaphorically as the water in which the subject swims)
needs to be further addressed. It seems that the visual image as the
foating cork can be simply given or taken away in the scene of
swimming. However, if the entangled unit of signifer/signifed as sound
image provides the condition of possibility for any identifcation that
delimits an entity, how is the fuid and amorphous nature of sound and
perhaps even  the swimming subject itself readily available? 
The question of the visual imagery becomes even more crucial when
considered in the phenomenon of translation, based on which Saussure
fnds support for his conception of the arbitrary nature of the sign. For
instance, Saussure gives the example of the signifcation “ox” that has as
its signal “b-ö-f” ([1983] 2013, 100) (boeuf) in French and “o-k-s (Ochs)”
(100) in German. Translation here is conceived of as the process of
bridging different signifers – b-ö-f and o-k-s enabled by the same
signifed – the concept/image of the ox. In this account, translation
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necessitates an equivalence within difference. However, if we follow
Saussure’s assertion that the signifed is carried by and incorporated
within the signifer, and only acquires linguistic property when identifed
by “a certain sound” (Saussure [1983] 2013, 144, my emphasis), how then
does the same concept anchor two distinct signifers? What enables the
process of variation/translation that also secures the invariance and
consistency of its meaning? As Kirby’s reading on the vexed nature of
translation cogently shows, despite Saussure’s persistent rejection of the
idea of reality’s substance that pre-determines language, “the notion of a
‘thing in itself’, an objective reality in a transparently translatable world,
insistently manifests itself” (1997, 17). Instead of treating Saussure’s thesis
simply in terms of self-contradiction, we could consider such a
complexity consistent with the very paradoxical nature of signifcation
and identifcation Saussure’s work explores and articulates.  
Saussure’s anti-essentialist formulation of language cannot fnally
bracket off the referent. It should be emphasised however that this does
not mean that we have returned to a purportedly unmediated reality that
pre-exists signifcation, because the thing/referent is immanent within,
and henceforth mediated by, subjective perception. Neither is this simply
a confusion of the compromised effect of reality with an unmediated and
immediate fact, if confusion means that two radically distinct (to use
Saussure’s vocabulary here) entities are mistaken for each other. Rather
translation is a process of “making equivalent” (Kirby 1997, 27), in which
the “signifcance and substance, thought and matter, human agency and
material objectivity, must be consubstantial” (2011, 77).  
Further to this, and importantly, I want to stress that such a
formulation of translation does not forfeit specifcity for the sake of a
universal translatability. As this consideration is especially important for
a critical engagement with racialised and racialising language learning
policies that install the hierarchical asymmetries between the origin and
the copy, I want to make clear my stance on this point. As the
engagement with Saussure’s often contradictory arguments have shown,
the origin is never simply present or absent, here or there, but is
dis/continuous with itself. In light of this, the question of the translatable
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and the untranslatable should also be rethought. Whereas the translatable
is often conceived of as the universal condition of translatability that
presumes an insured ground against which translation is measured, the
untranslatable hints at the specifcity of an originary unity which is then
corrupted or compromised through the process of translation.
Interestingly, both poles of the opposition assume the a priori self-
presence of what is being translated. However, if the origin is never
readily available, but relentlessly hails itself into existence as its other,
then the translatable and the untranslatable could be said to be
“fundamentally the same, and always translate each other” (Derrida 1998,
57). In Monolingualism of the Other, Jacques Derrida comments on the
question of translation. As it is particularly relevant with my discussion
here, I cite it at length: 
Nothing is untranslatable, however little time is given to the
expenditure or expansion of a competent discourse that measures itself
against the power of the original. But the “untranslatable” remains –
should remain, as my law tells me – the poetic economy of the idiom,
the one that is important to me, for I would die even more quickly
without it, and which is important to me, myself to myself, where a
given formal “quantity” always fails to restore the singular event of the
original, that is, to let it be forgotten once recorded, to carry away its
number, the prosodic shadow of its quantum. Word for word, if you
like, syllable by syllable. From the moment this economic equivalence –
strictly impossible, by the way – is renounced, everything can be
translated, but in a loose translation, in the loose sense of the word
“translation.” (1998, 56-57) 
Importantly, Derrida's meditation not only confounds the distinction
between the translatable and the untranslatable, but also, and
importantly, it foregrounds the specifcity of subject formation that arises
from the process of translation as writing in general, which always
translates itself. Following Derrida, I want to stress that what is unable to
be translated is not a self-present entity that is simply elided or lost in the
process of translation. Rather, it is “forgotten once recorded” and “carried
away” in the form of a shadow. To put it differently, the untranslatable is
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materialised as it is rendered unavailable, in the same stroke.
Signifcantly, Derrida does not simply concede to or deny the notion of
origin. For example, his description of the failure “to restore the singular
event of the original” is not simply the lament of the lost origin, for as
Derrida writes, this very failure or error manifested as the untranslatable
is what enables the subject. Without this failure of translation, Derrida
argues, “I would die even more quickly”. We can glean two important
insights from this assertion. First of all, if the untranslatable, the shadow
that is forgotten once recorded, is the blind spot of translation all the
while evincing the specifcity of the subject's emergence, then it could be
said that the subject is her or his blind spot (see also Chiew 2012). Second,
if the untranslatable simultaneously marks the specifcity and identity of
the origin (read as what is being translated) and of the copy (read as the
translation of the origin), then it witnesses and articulates the process of
splitting as translation in general. Linking to my discussion of
dis/continuity in this dissertation, I want to underline and clarify another
crucial point. If the original is not present before (in both spatial and
temporal sense), but marked by the failure of the event of translation,
then translation process is not driven by the need to restore the origin, as
such. Rather, the very stuff of the reiterative process of translation is the
dynamic materialising of both translated and the untranslatable. What I
am getting at is the spatio-temporal condensation and torsional
becoming, wherein the split is not a cut, that takes the shape of a gap, and
divides a pre-existing entity into two, pure and simple. Rather it is the
dis/continuous and originary self-encounter, which as Derrida describes
as the relationality of “myself to myself”. In other words, the split is itself
“broken into, broken open, and globally dispersed (written/read) by a
process of differentiation whose energies it is” (Kirby 2011, 36).
In view of this, both arguments for the specifc and for the universal
could be said to rely upon an unqualifed investment in the notion of
originary unity, even as these arguments are supposedly opposed to each
other. Feminist, postcolonial and critical race theorists have importantly
shown the situatedness that is the sexual and racial motivation inherent
in every claim for universality. In spite of the indisputable importance of
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the attention to specifcity and difference in any knowledge production
process, we also hear the concerns regarding the ways in which such a
displacement will inadvertently undercut the political effcacy of the
claim to identity. This conundrum about specifcity and universality
recurs throughout this thesis, and will continue to inform the rest of the
dissertation. It will be more systematically engaged in my reading of the
polyglots’ accents and the cyborgs’ noises in chapter seven. For now, I
want to note that with the notion of dis/continuity that reconfgures the
identity of the origin, and of the human (in fact of any entity), as
dispersed, disseminated and all the while objectively manifested, the
specifc and the universal are not simply opposed and discrete domains,
but each is manifested with, through, and as the other.
Racialised Visual-Aural Encounters 
Here I will re-turn to and begin again with the utterance of “musta mies”,
which for me involved a process of translation that makes intelligible the
Finnish pronunciation m-u-s-t-a-m-i-e-s. Although it was not directly
addressed to me, I was held by and hailed into a racialising and racialised
inter-subjective position expressed in the stiffness of my back as a felt
surface, one which resonated with my and others’ silence as a
non/response (that is to say, my inability to respond to the situation was
surely itself a response too).72 Approached in terms of a process of
72 I am thinking here of Rey Chow’s discussion of the limiting process in terms of
racialised aphasia, generally conceived as the loss of voice. Chow draws on the auto-
biographical account of Barack Obama, where he recalls his visceral reaction as a nine-
year-old to a photograph in a magazine of the hands of a black man, who received
chemical treatment to lighten his complexion. Obama recollects the visceral feeling of
aphasia as his reaction to the encounter with the photograph: “‘As in a dream, I had no
voice for my newfound fear’” (Obama quoted in Chow 2014, 2). In contrast to a
generalised conception of “limiting experience”, understood as the experience “in
which one reaches the end of certitude and touches the edge of the abyss” (Chow 2014,
2), Chow emphasises its specialising mechanisms. That is, aphasia as a wound that is
“asymmetrical, nonmutual, and unsuturable” (2014, 7, emphasis in original). This
resonates with the emphasis placed by feminist and postcolonial theorists’  on the
specifcity of, and differences between, differences. As Chow argues, it is only some
rather than others that come to “bear the brunt of the cut’s force/violence” (2014, 7).
The importance of attending to the hierarchical differences is indisputable. In the
main, my work is in agreement with this strand of thought. And yet, in this thesis I
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making equivalent, wherein dis/continuity is at and of the beginning of
perception, the translation and signifcation of the word “musta mies”
does not presume the a priori existence of the self-present racial truth of
the black body that anchors various signifers such as “musta mies” in
Finnish and “black man” in English. Rather the utterance of “musta mies”
signifes and real-ises the racialised visual-aural imagery of and as the
material substance of racialised black body, which in turn is felt through
and as inter-subjectivity. 
The twists and turns of Saussure’s own argument afford us an insight
into the operation of the chain of signifcation that qualifes any simple
distinction between inside/outside, identity/difference, reality/sign,
presence/absence, and visual/audible patterns of representation and
interpretation, even as it reinstalls these divisions. In the scenario
presented here, the utterance “musta mies” in the setting of the Finnish
for foreigners class is also an articulation of the ubiquitous force or trace
of an originary dis/continuous racial interpellation.  Put differently, the
here-ness of race or racial identity – in the case of the signifcation of
“musta mies” – is also strangely non/locatable. Non/locatability hints at
the originary ambiguity or ontological complexity where “the trace of an
entity’s ‘being-itself’ could be present in various and seemingly separate
locations” (Kirby 2011, 2-3). In the case here, the signifcation as
translation process that real-ises the location of the racialised “musta
mies” also and simultaneously in-forms the inter-subjective positions into
which I am hailed. Such an interpellation (see Ahmed 1998, 2000) takes
the form of dis/identifcation with the histories of racism that objectify
the fgure of the “black man”, which is saturated with injuries and brute
violence. 
In passing, I want to underscore my deliberate deployment of the term
dis/identifcation, with which I mean to call into question and complicate
argue that the difference between specifcity and universality should not be conceded
quickly, simply to be elided once more. Rather than a conception of universality that is
at the expense of specifc hierarchical differences, I argue that an examination of the
mechanisms that generate specifcity demands the rethinking of the nature of
difference itself. 
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the clear separation of identifcation and disidentifcation.73 This is
particularly important, I want to argue, when dealing with the question
of one’s response and respons-ability to racial prejudices. In her
examination of racism in institutional life, Sara Ahmed problematises the
gesture of disidentifcation with racism. For Ahmed, disidentifcation
with racism and with the histories and conditions of racist violence
paradoxically reproduces racism(s). This is because the disidentifcation
with a form of racism implies that this particular set of practices are
detected and recognised or made intelligible as racialising acts, rather
than other forms of racism. In other words, disidentifcation is
performative, because it generates what is considered as recognised
racialising behaviours. This performative nature of disidentifcation must
be made visible, for otherwise the defnition of racism is reifed “to what
we can see”, that is, to what “can be seen or detected” in certain forms of
behaviour” (Ahmed 2012, 46), which leaves intact the social mechanisms
that produce racialised asymmetries in the frst place. As David Theo
Goldberg asks, “In any affrmation, accusation, or denial of racism, what
conception of ‘race’ is being asserted, presupposed, implied, or perhaps
attacked? Is this assumption of ‘race’ identical for each kind of attitude,
73 I n Bodies that Matter, Judith Butler remarks on the ambivalent displacement of
identifcation and disidentifcation at the heart of any claim to identity. Whereas my
discussion here focuses on the dis/identifcation with acts of naming, Butler’s insight
is about the relation between disidentifcation and identity politics (and in fact an
apparent privileging of the former over the latter), especially in terms of the
mobilisation of the identity categories of sex, which is worth noting here. As Butler
writes, “Although the political discourses that mobilize identity categories tend to
cultivate identifcations in the service of a political goal, it may be that the persistence
of disidentifcation is equally crucial to the rearticulation of democratic contestation.
Indeed, it may be precisely through practices which underscore disidentifcation with
those regulatory norms by which sexual difference is materialized that both feminist
and queer politics are mobilized. Such collective disidentifcations can facilitate a
reconceptualisation of which bodies matter, and which bodies are yet to emerge as
critical matters of concern” (1993b, 4).
Taken together Ahmed’s concern with the ways in which disidentifcation functions as
a technology of indifference that reproduces racisms, I propose here that Butler’s
insistence on the political signifcance of disidentifcation, in the formulation of
dis/continuous dis/identifcation,  serves to elucidate not the ambivalence towards,
but rather the dis/continuity that conditions and is integral to, any identifcation and
disidentifcation.
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indeed, for each instance of the kind? What, in other words, are the
ontological and social commitments of any sort of ‘race talk?’” (1990, ix). 
Furthermore, disidentifcation can also become a simple rejection of
the responsibility for racism. As Ahmed argues, the recognition of the
racist acts that one identifes against, might also mean that individuals do
“not see themselves as involved ‘in it’ at all” (2012, 46). Concurring with
Ahmed’s observation, I deploy the term dis/identifcation to make
explicit the radical involvement and displacement at the heart of any
identifcation. This also hints at the necessity for sustained political
intervention into the absent presence of trace, the genesis and historicity
of what is made identifable and intelligible. This is consistent with
Ahmed’s suggestion of the need to both identify racism and to maintain
“the defnition of racism as unseeing” (2012, 46). Further to this, in
complicating the process of dis/identifcation with the ontological-
epistemological dis/continuity, i.e. dis/continuous dis/identifcation, I
argue for an inescapable response-ability (see Derrida [1994]2006, xviii;
Taylor 1992, 182; Haraway 2008, 88) for racism.74 This is because the
sexual and racial diacritics of signifcation, translation or writing in
general that generate political asymmetries also produce the perceiving
and intending subject.
To further elaborate on the dis/continuous response-ability, I want to
take a quick detour through the problematics of the spatio-temporal
condensation of the notion signifer/sound pattern/signal discussed
earlier. Recall that for Saussure, signifer as sound pattern is the
representation of our sensorial impressions of language, which is
substantiated and made signifcant by attention and habit alone. And yet,
the replacement of the term sound pattern with signal gives rise to the
conundrum as to how it is possible that the sound patterns are able to
command and incite the subject to perceive and to interpret them even
74 Reading Fanon’s analysis of the interpellation and objectifcation of the black man,
Chow  notes, “refusal or nonrecognition is not a simply matter – that nonparticipation
in the transindividual situation of racialisation (or racialising interpellation) is in fact
out of the question” (2014, 5). In some ways, my proposition of non/response is in
agreement with Chow’s assertion of the inevitable inter-subjective process of
racialisation.
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before they are identifed and made intelligible. It is important to note
here that the capacity and will (Ahmed 2014) to animate – to bring to life,
or in this case to attribute quality and identity to the otherwise
amorphous sound – is often considered as characteristic of the human
subject, understood in terms of freedom and agency. 
In passing, I want to note the ways in which animacy is hierarchised.
My understanding of the notion of animacy, which is a linguistic
principle, takes its cue from Mel Y. Chen’s work on animacies. In
Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect, Chen introduces
the term animacy, which is generally understood in the feld of linguistics
as “the quality of liveness, sentience, or humanness of a noun or noun
phrase that has grammatical, often syntactic, consequences” (2012, 24).
Drawing on the work of John Louis Cherry (1992) who provides the
schema for the hierarchy of animacy based on cross-linguistic studies of,
for example, “Swahili, English, Navajo, Shona, Chinook, Algonquian,
Hopi, Russian, Polish, and Breton” (Chen 2012, 26), Chen writes:
[A]n adult male who is “free” (as opposed to enslaved), able-bodied,
and with intact linguistic capacities, one who is also familiar,
individual, and positioned nearby, stands at the top of the hierarchy as
the most “animate” or active agent within grammars of ordering.
Lower down, and hence less agentive, would be, for example, a large,
distant population of females. Lower still would be nonhuman animals
(ranked by size). Near the bottom would be something like “sadness.”
(2012, 27)
For Chen, this hierarchy of animacy clearly indicates the ways in
which animacy, and its related sense of “agency, awareness, mobility,
and liveliness” (2012, 2), is gendered and racialised. Moreover, familiarity
and proximity as the condition of possibility of animacy is telling of a
“‘like kind’ recognition”,75 an anthropocentric gesture that differentiates
75 The process of racialisation is also the dynamic spatial relation between proximity and
distance. For example, in Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-coloniality, Ahmed
writes that “[C]olonial encounters do not just involve a transition from distance to
proximity: they involve, at one and the same time, social and spatial relations of
distance and proximity. Others become strangers (the others who are distant), and
‘other cultures’ become ‘strange cultures’ (the ones who are distant), only through
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between human and nonhuman, animate and inanimate.
In view of this, animacy or the animating capacity of the human
subject, entails and in fact is the involvement and intimacy of
identifcation and disidentifcation. To further complicate this account,
let’s consider identity in its most general terms as the boundary-drawing
and limiting process. The convoluted spatio-temporal involvement of the
sound pattern/signal that calls into question the how and when of the
human subject who identifes segments of sound, also obliterates the
animacy of Man. In other words, the condition of possibility for the
animating capacity of Man is the necessity to respond to the command and
the evocation of what is being identifed or disidentifed. 
I use the term “respond” deliberately to lead to the following
meditation on the question of responsibility as dis/continuous
dis/identifcation. In his essay “And Say the Animal Responded?”
Derrida rethinks the difference between reaction and response, between
human subject and animal nonsubject and argues against its reifcation.
Instead, Derrida maintains that it is crucial to account for “the whole
differentiated feld of experience and of a world of life-forms” (2003, 128).
Of special relevance for my consideration of the spatio-temporal
condensation of dis/continuous dis/identifcation that responsibility is,
Derrida offers the following reading of Lacan that echoes the conundrum
of the sound pattern/signifer. For this reason, I cite this passage at
length:
[I]t would be a matter of developing another “logic” of decision, of the
response and of the event – such as I have also attempted to deploy
elsewhere and which seems to me less incompatible than one might
coming too close to home, that is, through the proximity of the encounter or ‘facing’
itself” (2000, 14, emphasis in original). In addition, Ahmed notes that the relation of
proximity and distance is symptomatic of the “economies of touch” (2000, 49). That is,
instead of a form of being-with, the social body is the hierarchised relationality of
“being with some others over other others” (2000, 49).  As Ahmed makes clear, “[t]he social
body is … created through the relations of touch between bodies recognisable as
friendly and strange; who one allows near, who is further away, and so on. Bodies
with skins, while they are already touched in the sense of being exposed to others, are
touched differently by near and far others, and it is this differentiation between others that
constitutes the permeability of bodily boundaries” (2000, 49).
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think with what Lacan himself, in “The Subversion of the Subject,”
maintains concerning the code as “code of the Other.” He refers to that
Other as the one from whom “the subject receives even the message
that he emits” (305). This axiom should complicate the simple
distinction between responsibility and reaction, and all that follows from
it. It would, therefore, be a matter of reinscribing this difference between
reaction and response, and hence this historicity of ethical, juridical, or
political reponsibility, within another thinking of life, of the living,
within a different relation of the living to their selfness [ipséité], to their
autos, to their own autokinesis and reactional automaticity, to death, to
technics or to the mechanical [machinique]. (2003, 128-129, emphasis in
original)
At stake is the dis/continuous self-differentiation that identity is. From
the Other, one receives the messages one sends. In other words, one is
both the receiver and the sender of the message. Or one must respond to
an incitation and a command even as one is responsible for the initiation
of its frame and content. As Mark C. Taylor writes, following Derrida,
“The subject’s responsibility is actualized in its response-ability, that is, in
its ability to respond to the provocation of the other” (1992, 182, my
emphasis). Thinking the question of responsibility through response-
ability reveals the internal split that at once makes the presence of human
subject, who is capable of intending, deciding and animating, as well as
the object that is subjected to the subject, both possible and impossible.
This splitting contaminates the spatial and temporal coordinates that
separate responsibility and reaction, human and nonhuman, animate and
inanimate. Given this, it is ethically and politically salient to investigate
how the line is drawn in these conceptual distinctions.  This is because
response-ability is the dis/continuous subject formation. In When Species
Meet, Haraway elaborates on the implications of response-ability which is
particularly relevant to the discussion of dis/identifcation with racism
here. Haraway writes, 
I act; I do not hide my calculations that motivate the action. I am not
thereby quit of my debts, and it’s more than just debts. I am not quit of
response-ability, which demands calculations but is not fnished …
Calculations – reasons – are obligatory and radically insuffcient for
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companion-species worldliness. … We have reasons but not suffcient
reasons … Suffcient Reasons is a dangerous fantasy rooted in the
dualisms and misplaced concreteness of religious and secular
humanism. (2008, 88-89)
The crucial import of Haraway’s elaboration, which is in line with
Derrida’s theorisation of responsibility, is that the essence of ethics and
responsibility is an incessant demand for the examination of the limit-ing
process as the condition for the emergence, in the case of the
dis/identifcation with racism, of both the racialised bodies as well as of
the dis/identifying subjects. The motif and gravity of the limit-ing
process is the felt uneasiness through which the historicity of race
persistently and insistently hails and articulates itself through and as its
other. Such a conception of the corporeal as always and already
inescapably social and affective, i.e., inter-subjective, is congruent with
the onto-epistemological dis/continuity I am suggesting throughout this
thesis. The question of limits relates to my discussion in chapter three of
feminist engagements with difference through metaphors such as the skin
and the contour of the body. We should also add to the list the
formulation of limits in postcolonial literatures as borderlands
(Anzaldúa) and as the third space (Bhabha). 
For Gloria Anzaldúa, “a border is a dividing line … a vague and
undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural
boundary... and is in a constant state of transition” (1983, 3). In a similar
vein, Homi Bhabha also asserts the hybrid (as opposed to the fxity of
cultural differences) ambivalent third space, that is “the other space of
symbolic representation, at once bar and bearer of difference” (1994,
101).76 
76 Despite their similarities, the slight difference between Bhabha’s third space and
Anzaldúa’s borderland needs to be mentioned here. The borderland in Anzaldúa’s
theorisation is an intersectional space that could take various physical, psychological,
sexual and spiritual borders,  and is inhabited by “the squint-eyed, the perverse, the
queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed; in short, those who
cross over, pass over, or go through the confnes of the ‘normal’” (Anzaldúa 1987, 3).
The interpretation of the third space throughout Homi Bhabha’s work seems to be a
bit self-contradictory. For example, in his essay “Sly Civility”, Bhabha celebrates the
emptiness of the third space, that always gives rise to anxiety, as the “crisis of
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Although drawing inspiration from these feminist and postcolonial
conceptualisations of the limit, I want to go further and rethink the
identity of the limit, not simply as the edge, the gap, the in-between, or a
“middle space” (Cohen and Weiss 2003, 2). For example, despite their
respective assertion of the “undetermined” (Anzaldúa 1987, 3) and
“liminal” nature of the limit, in both Anzaldúa and Bhabha’s writing, it is
represented as the place of difference, “the passage” (Bhabha 1994, 36),
the “something else besides, in-between” (Bhabha 1994, 219, emphasis in
original) that is “neither One nor the Other” (219). And further to this,
both Anzaldúa and Bhabha argue that the in-between space is “peculiar
to borderline existences” (Bhabha 1994, 218). The discussion which
follows about the question of the visual and the work of the tongue will
further problematise this “conceptual containment” (Kirby 1997, 30) of
difference as the in-between place. It suffces to note here that, following
Kirby, I argue that difference is not only what is delimitable as between
and besides two terms (however minimal the space, such as the notion
edge indicates), “that separates identities and thereby also establishes its
own” (1997, 79), but also that it resides within, that is at the heart of
identity itself. This means that, for example, rather than considering the
contour of the body as simply “the body at its limits” (Cohen and Weiss
2003, 9), which presumes the domain of the unrepresentable outside of
confnement, I argue for “the pellicular essence’” (Derrida quoted in
Kirby 1997, 78) of the body that confounds any simple distinction
between surface and depth, inside and outside. In other words, as I will
argue, the body is its limit – “the scene of writing/reading” (Kirby 1997,
78).
Furthermore, I want to underscore that this does not mean that the
social body and the biological body are now muddled together as the
same. To say that they are ontologically consubstantial does not mean
authority” (Bhabha 1994, 101). And yet, in “Interrogating Identity: Frantz Fanon and
the Postcolonial Prerogative”, Bhabha maintains that this in-between space, is “neither
empty nor full, neither part nor whole”, but is a “vicarious processes of signifcation”
(Bhabha 1994, 92, emphasis in original). It could be argued that Bhabha’s third space
differs from the fguration of the borderland by way of its virtuality. That is, it
presents as a cut or gap of intercutting, splitting and doubling.
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they are in any sense the same. Rather, the social body, the biological
body, and, we could add, the individual body, constitute, distinguish
from, and manifest with, through and as each other. The specifcities of
these bodies are the very stuff of the dynamic process of differentiation.
That is, a difference that subjects itself to what Derrida calls “the whole
differentiated feld of experience” (2003, 128). At stake is the where,
when, and how, of the limitation and emergence of the social and the
biological. This question will be further dilated on in the following
engagement with the racialised visual economy. As we will see, such an
approach is crucial for a critical project that addresses the objectifcation
and fxation of the fgure of racialised others differently. I have opened
this chapter on the racialised visual-aural economy with this particular
scene from the Finnish for foreigners course, a scene which cannot be
straightforwardly discussed in visual terms, because I wish to highlight
the intricate complexity of the visual and the aural which are the major
focus from this chapter onwards. In what follows it will become evident
that the visual and the aural are by no means clear cut perceptual
domains or sensorial orders, but each is implicated in and manifested
with and as the other. Undoubtedly, this dis/continuity is rehearsed in
my engagement with such a convoluted involvement. Such is the intricate
and labyrinthine structure of onto-epistemology that the following
discussion of the racialised visual-aural economy will make manifest.
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Chapter Five
Transforming the Racialised Political Economy
The Saussurean notion of the sign provides an important framework for
critical anti-essentialist engagements with race. For if the signifcation and
signifcance of race is not pre-determined by an a priori racial truth that
determines and is demonstrated through racialised bodies, but is an
indeterminate and contingent system/systematicity of differentiation and
displacement, then the objectifcation and fxation of racial others is
radically qualifed. In this strand of thinking, the question of race is
understood discursively, as “an ideology, a narrative” (Saldanha 2006, 9)
and approached as an epistemological problem, predicated on readings
and representations of visible differences, such as “hair type, nose shape
and skin colour” (Alcoff 2002, 14). In light of this, theorists have
convincingly argued for the ways in which racial differences are
discursively constructed and made intelligible. And yet, other critiques
have also expressed concerns about the political effcacy of such an
account. For although we can show how “race-habits” (Opondo 2012,
248) of recognition fx bodies in racialised and hierarchical confgurations
of space that determine and discriminate the bodies in-place from those
marked as alien and out-of-place (cf. Ahmed 2006; Puwar 2004), race still
continuously operates as our “penultimate visible identities” (Alcoff 2006,
7) in every day encounters. As Alcoff writes:
The processes by which racial identities are produced work through the
shapes and shades of human morphology, and subordinate other
markers such as dress, customs and practices. And the visual registry
thus produced has been correlated with rational capacity, epistemic
reliability, moral condition and, of course, aesthetic status. (2006, 16)
Given the primacy of the visual in racialised social relations, Alcoff
argues for the importance of taking into account the practices of the
visual, without falling back into any naturalising appeal to phenotypic
differences as illustrations of original essence. For Alcoff, one of the ways
to achieve a contextual and located understanding of racial designation is
to situate the analysis in a phenomenological description of the visual
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mediation that informs “the way we read ourselves and the way others
read us” (2002, 16). The question that remains is thus this: how do we
proceed? Or: how do we contend with and transform various forms of
“race habits” if they are always already constructed and constrained by
the racialised visual episteme? 
My task in the following pages is to read closely conceptions of the
racialised visual-aural economy. Drawing on my auto/ethno/graphic
account and online forum discussions among Chinese immigrants in
Finland regarding how to train the trill, as well as other relevant
anecdotes in scholarly work that engage with the question of the
racialised visual-aural economy, I examine in this chapter what the
transformation of race-habits consists of. Having teased out the
conundrum of the visual, the audible as well as the extra-linguistic reality
in the Saussurean theorisation of the sign, I hope to open up, rethink, and
complicate assumptions regarding the visual in conceptions of race. The
notion of onto-epistemological dis/continuity is again kernel to my
reading and my engagement with the psychic life of the trilling tongue. 
Before proceeding, a few preliminary remarks on the ways in which
the notion “political economy” is deployed in this thesis are in order. In a
sense, this notion is in line with the conception of the moment-um of the
process of valuation that informs the Saussurean notion of the sign.
Saussure’s remark on the relation between economics and linguistics
elucidates the point. He likens the study of economic history with
diachronic linguistics, and political economy with synchronic linguistics,
i.e. the question of signifcation and signal. As Saussure explains, “The
reason is that, as in the study of political economy, one is dealing with the
notion of value” ([1983] 2013, 114). To recapitulate, in the Saussurean
framework, the identifcation and delimitation of the unit of the sign is
the process of valuation, that is not determined by any substantial and
material truth. It involves a form of exchange between two dissimilar
elements, such as signifer and signifed, as well as the comparison
between similar items, such as the signifer of one unit of sign and the
signifer of another, or the signifed of one unit of sign and the signifed of
another. With these two axes of comparisons, Saussure deliberately
distinguishes value from meaning/concept/signifcation. For as he
makes clear, to equate these two terms would simply repeat the
erroneous assumptions of nomenclature. That is, a given meaning/idea
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can be exchanged with a variety of different signifers, by virtue of its
determined value. In fact, for Saussure, it is precisely such presumed lack
of the intrinsic value that underpins the possibility of the chain of
signifcation. 
Nevertheless, as our foregoing discussion has hopefully shown, the
extralinguistic referent is always and already discovered in and
repudiated by the signifcation process in which the sign’s identity
emerges. Given this, I prefer to think of the notion of value in terms of
weight,77 as in Derrida’s conception. In On Touching, Derrida
contemplates the notion of weight as thinking that is the writing of
senses. Derrida underscores the simultaneous transitive and intransitive
nature of the verb “to weigh”:
1. Transitivity: thought weighs: and by weighing it examines and
weighs out what it is weighing, evaluating sense exactly; it indicates its
exact weight.
2. Intransitivity: thought weighs, it is weighty as much as pondering or
thinking; it has the weight of sense; it weighs, itself, what sense weighs,
neither more nor less, exactly. (2005a, 74, emphasis in original) 
Thinking through the duplicity of the notion of weight and its affnity
with thought, Derrida also reworks the temporal priority accorded to
signifer/signal as our earlier engagement with the formulation of
carrying has pointed out. We could consider thought weighs itself in
acquiring its own weight. This takes place simultaneously, within the
same stroke (read as writing) in which the perceiving subject is invited to
substantiate what is being perceived. More importantly, this notion of
weight as the operation and substance of thought also reconceives
corporeal sensibility as “originally speculative” (Derrida 2005a, 74). As
Derrida suggests, “in this tactile corpus, one is dealing … with thinking,
which is to say pondering, weighing that which gives itself over to tact in a
thousand ways, namely, the body, the corpus, inasmuch as it weighs – and
therefore, in a certain way, thinks” (2005a, 71, emphasis in original). Such
a conception of the weight of and as thought assists further investigation
of the matter of race, for it accounts for the insistence, that is the weight
and gravity, of the perceived and conceived that renders the economy of
77 Kirby also notes the question of weight as valeur in Saussure’s theorisation of “the
consubstantiality of semiological association” (2011, 78). 
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signifcation workable. Crucially, an account of the generalised operation
of weight as a political economy needs not to be at the expense of
hierarchy, difference and specifcity. As Vicki Kirby reminds us, the
political economy is “inficted through a sexual diacritics” (1997, 79) that
operates through a force feld of hierarchical oppositions – intimate
couplings – of “presence/absence, value/lack” (79). The radical import of
this conception of the tactile corpus as thought that weighs and
represents itself is to understand the identity and essence of race,
differently. 
Another aspect of the deployment of political economy in this thesis
concerns the ways in which host country language skill is fgured as a
form of “linguistic capital” (Bourdieu 1991), a capacity that functions as a
criterion for integration, especially into the labour market. According to
John Thompson, the notion of linguistic capital refers to “the capacity to
produce expression à propos, for a particular market” (1991, 18). It
functions in relation to “the distribution of other forms of capital
(economic capital, cultural capital, etc.) which defne the location of an
individual within the social space” (Thompson 1991, 18). It follows then
that accent also comes to mark the hierarchical differences of linguistic
capital that index “the social positions of speakers” (Thompson 1991, 18). 
What can be gleaned from the rendition of accent and speech
production in terms of capital, is that for Bourdieu and Thompson, accent
as embodied differences marks class rather than racial differences. This
presumed categorical distinction needs to be fagged here, as it relates to
our discussion in chapter two on the relation between race and ethnicity,
often touched upon in terms of terminological differences. Fatima El-
Tayeb’s (2011) observation assists us here. Commenting on the
construction of the narrative which proposes a colour-blind Europe, that
is a geo-political space “free of ‘race’” in contrast with its American
counterpart, El-Tayeb gives the example of the infuential argument
against race as an analytical category in the European context put forth by
Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant. According to El-Tayeb, Bourdieu
and Wacquant warn against the risk of introducing or importing the
analytical category of race into the European context that it is alien to.
Instead, Bourdieu and Wacquant present class as the pertinent category
of social analysis for the European context. Class is the European
alternative to race, which is particular to the American context. 
133
The assumption that Europe is originally free of racial issues, because
“racialised minorities have traditionally been placed outside of the
national and by extension continental community” (El-Tayeb 2011, xvii)
functions simultaneously to construct the whiteness of European identity
and to equate race with people of colour. The substitution of class for race
as an analytical category proper to the European context not only serves
to “prohibit discourses around racialised oppression” (El-Tayeb 2011,
xvii), but also presumes and generates a notion of race as an independent
category, located in specifc racialised bodies, that can be simply absent or
present from analysis. I want to accentuate that the ways in which this
logic, which singles out race as a self-present category from other identity
categories, also underpins the argument that race is everything and
everywhere. To explicate this point, we could consider the biologisation
of race in polygenism, the argument for the originally diverse/distinct
genesis of races. As Kay Anderson and Colin Perrin (2008) point out in
their article “How Race Became Everything: Australia and Polygenism”,
race was found everywhere precisely with the rise of polygenism and the
turn to the biologically determined conception of racial differences.
Understanding race as a process of becoming its other, my analysis here
does not present accent as the embodied marker of either class, or race.
Rather, I argue that at stake is the general political economy of valuation
through which accents become identities through and as racial and class
differences. 
We will revisit the matter of accent in terms of racialised habitus, and
in relation to what Nirmal Puwar calls “somatic norm” (2004, 109) in the
following section. Related to this conception of linguistic capital, the
political economy refers to the ways in which the specifcity of the host
country language learning process is entangled with the political
economy of immigration and integration. This is evident in for example
the particular course in which one is eligible to enrol, the choice of
language – Finnish or Swedish – and the eligibility for subsidies as
mentioned in chapter one. Taken together, we can consider these co-
permeating and co-distinguished levels of political economy are of and as
the general process of valuation – exchange and production. This is a
“différantial process” that is “a political economy because it operates
through a force feld of hierarchical oppositions whose presumed
separability denies the ongoing mode of their production” (Kirby 1997,
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79). Having laid bare the im-plications of the political economy, and
keeping in mind the problematics of the referent, the visual and
physiological sound in Saussure’s account, it is now possible to examine
the racialised political economy of visual-aural encounters. 
Prelude: It’s a Trill
During the second session of a class on Finnish for foreigners at Turun
Iltalukio, students were given instructions on how to practice their
pronunciation of the Finnish alphabet. I sat at the back of the classroom,
assuming that this position would provide a better view of the whole
class and the events which would transpire. When the teacher
approached me I was concentrating on taking notes about the practice of
pronunciation – the sounds that bodied forth from all corners of the room
of students playing with tone and pitch. When my Finnish teacher asked
if I could try to pronounce the rolling r, a one-on-one instruction, I felt the
attention focused upon me. Other students nearby turned towards me
and stopped their practice. For some reason, I became nervous, feeling
their sharp gaze, their silent scrutiny and anticipation. I was fully aware
that my success rate in articulating the rolling r was (and in fact still is)
very low. The chances of getting it right in a conversational situation are
random, especially when I feel anxious. Nervously, my tongue tip
pushed and rubbed against the alveolar ridge. A stream of air from my
lungs was blocked by my tongue tip so that it vibrated, leading to a quick
tapping movement. “Rrr”, I voiced, with a success that took me
completely by surprise. It’s a trill! The teacher was similarly shocked and
commented, “Chinese cannot pronounce that, which can be sometimes
very problematic for others to understand”.
The Racialised Visual Episteme
As mentioned earlier, in the line of inquiry that conceives of race as an
epistemological problem, the seemingly neutral act of seeing is also
subjected to scrutiny. The practices of visual representation – appealing to
sight, “the King of the senses” (Braidotti 2011, 107) – are considered to be
crucial to the genesis of the modern human subject. For example, in her
analysis of “the process of speciation”, Megan H. Glick argues that visual
representation as a form of “ocular anthropomorphism” entails “the
dualistic movement between processes of racialisation and speciation”
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(2012, 99). From a different perspective, this could be read in terms of
“whiteness as humanness” (Sullivan 2012, 303), an optics – an epistemic
perceptual schema – that engenders and differentiates between the white
anthropos as the agentic center/sovereign subject and its others (see also
Hinton and Liu 2015). To further elaborate on this, I turn to Nikki
Sullivan’s (2012) description and analysis of the “somatechnics of
perception” (2012, 302) through Janet Schaw’s anecdotal entry in her
journal (see also Montag 1997, 281) at length, for it is an excellent
illustration of the ways in which the universalisation of whiteness as
humanness is at work. Sullivan writes, 
On a visit to Antigua in 1774 Schaw wrote of an incident that tells us
much about the somatechnics of perception and its role in the
somaticization, the coming-to-matter, of the non/human. Proceeding
on foot from St Johns Harbour to her lodgings, the newly arrived
Schaw was startled by “a number of pigs [that] ran out at a door, and
after them, a parcel of monkeys” (1923, 78). This, she writes, “not a little
surprized me but I found what I took for monkeys were negro children,
naked as they were born” (1923, 78). (2012, 302)
For Sullivan, as for Warren Montag, this anecdote attests to the
racialised mode of perception that simultaneously engenders the human
subject and its racialised (non)human others. That is, to quote Sullivan,
“whiteness-as-humanness is integral to a specifc, situated, somatechnics
of perception which helps constitute the necessary background from
which Schaw knows her ‘self’ and (her) ‘others’” (2012, 302-303).
This phenomenological confguration of racialised visual perception is
echoed in Alcoff’s observation of the emergence of racial hierarchies.
Drawing on a Foucauldian conceptualisation of the “Classical episteme”,
Alcoff notes that Western fetishistic classifying practices which delineate
and differentiate natural terrains and types, such as map-making and
table-drawing, emerged simultaneously with the “metaphysical and
moral hierarchies between racialised categories of human beings” (2002,
13).78
78 Ahmed provides an excellent elaboration on account of the ways in which
phenomenological methods could be supplemented by a genealogical approach. For
example,  Ahmed reexamines this possibility in Willful Subjects: “How can
phenomenology and genealogy be seated at the same table? After all, the
phenomenological method of the epo ché , which requires we bracket our
presuppositions of a given object, might also require we bracket our knowledge of the
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In reconfguring what is taken as self-evidently visual in racialised and
anthropomorphic perceptual practices, the above accounts provide strong
critiques against an “ocular consciousness” (Glick 2012, 99) characteristic
of the sovereign and disembodied human subject, coded as white and
masculine. This line of thought effectively argues that the immediacy of
phenotypes is “a produced obviousness” (Alcoff 2002, 14). The
signifcance of this argument needs to be highlighted here. In chapter
two, it is noted that the received notion of race often concerns the ways in
which the essence of human differences could be found – localised and
contained in individual bodies – in a set of corresponding properties or
attributes: for example phenotypical, biological and moral differences.
Furthermore, the perceived fxity of racial differences are said to evince
and index the racial hierarchies, thus providing the justifcation for
various forms of racism. In reconfguring the perception of race as
engendered by racialised optics that are always and already conditioned
upon the universalisation of whiteness as “the very form of human
universality itself” (Montag 1997, 285), the direction of essentialism’s
logic of causality is reversed. In other words, the visible racial differences
are understood as the result, rather than the cause, of hierarchised racial
positioning. 
Nevertheless, despite such interrogations, the visual registry continues
to function as a powerful determinant, mediating everyday racialised
encounters. This speaks to critical race theory’s call for attending to
“everyday racism” (Holland 2012, 3, emphasis in original), because it
“defnes race, interprets it, and decrees what the personal and
institutional work of race will be” (3). In addressing the terms through
which racialised visual practices operate, it may be argued that racialised
and feminised others could appropriate the gaze in situated encounters,
and produce an “oppositional gaze, of looking back or claiming the visual
feld, rather than looking down or being the object of visual inspection”
history of that object” (2014, 25, emphasis in original). For Ahmed, these two
approaches are compatible because both of them assist an investigation of the arrival
of the behind from spatial and temporal aspects. That is because one could only
perceive the object in profle. Thus the coherence of the object’s identity is predicated
upon the “conjuring of a behind” (Ahmed 2014, 25). This “behind” of an object is not
immediately perceptible but is assumed to be there. It follows then that the conjoining
of phenomenological and genealogical approaches could effectively address the
“conditions of arrival” (Ahmed 2014, 25) of the behind. 
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(Griffn and Braidotti 2002, 223). And yet, in this formulation of social
encounters, the self-presence of an ocular consciousness, the very stuff of
how it works or what it is, is left intact. It thus unwittingly returns to the
logic of presence/absence that has enabled the white racist gaze in the
frst place. Even when the process of subject formation is acknowledged,
it remains contested as to whether and how to approach the materiality of
phenotypes (Saldanha 2006). And further to this, it is unclear exactly how
the feld of the visible can be transformed, given the deep-rooted racial
prejudices that often take the form of stereotypes. Is it at all possible to
read otherwise?
The Materialisation of Racialised Bodies
In light of these concerns, Judith Butler’s engagement with the question
of race in “Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White
Paranoia” proves important, for it offers a performative account of seeing
that real-ises racialised bodies. I want to fag here the importance of the
question of real-ising. In chapter one, it is noted that the fctitious drug
Finnexia opens up the question of fact and fction through, for example,
the technics of visual illustration. In chapter three, the methodological
implications of the pair – real/fction – is laid bare. For example, drawing
on Homi Bhabha’s reading of the ways in which the colonial condition is
captured and evoked on the border of history and the unconscious, I have
argued that the auto/ethno/graphic account goes hand in hand with the
troubling of what counts as the ground of analysis.79 Furthermore, in the
examination of the question of the visual in Saussure, I have observed the
unqualifed investment in the visual perception as attaching to and
refecting the real, manifested in the ways in which Saussure
distinguishes the visual from the linguistic signal. For Saussure, what is
seen is factual, by virtue of the natural connection with or refection of
reality.  For example, to recall, Saussure argues that the symbol of justice,
79 It should also be added here that the very notion of “ground” itself is symptomatic of
the sexualised and racialised diacritics. The conception of empirical fact as the
“ground” that is awaiting to be dissected, analysed and made sense of is informed by
and reinscribes the sexualising and racialising economy which, as Kirby writes, “casts
‘woman’ as improper – the primordial ground against which the male subject is
defned” (2006, 24). In light of this, Kirby continues to argue, “woman is aligned with
‘otherness’, ‘the body’, ‘irrationality’ and ‘the animal’, and all these concepts seem
naturally to conjure one another” (2006, 24, emphasis in original).
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the scale, cannot be replaced by a chariot, which often signifes war. The
question of the real that has been touched upon so far in this thesis is
central to discussions of race. As the beginning of this chapter makes
clear, the reconfguration of race in terms of discursive and produced
effect has been an important manoeuvre to counter racist claims of racial
properties and dispositions. Nevertheless, in the face of the continued
effect of phenotypes as the primary markers of racial differences in
everyday encounters, the question that needs to be raised is perhaps not
simply whether race is real, but what the nature of reality is, and how it is
realised. 
With these questions in mind, Butler’s commentary on the Rodney
King case is relevant. On March 3, 1991, Rodney King, a taxi driver was
stopped for speeding on the freeway by offcers from the Los Angeles
Police Department. During the arrest, King was beaten repeatedly by four
offcers, which was videotaped by a local witness George Holliday. This
footage was aired nationwide. The four indicted offcers were all
acquitted. This came as a shock for many Los Angeles residents. Many
took to the streets to protest, in a movement generally referred to as the
Los Angeles uprising.80
The video evidence was thought by many at the time to show an attack
by the police on King, and not the other way around. For Butler, the
“white racist episteme”, as a “historically self-renewing practice of
reading” (1993a, 22) which structures the visual feld, is at work here.
More specifcally, it functions as the precedent and antecedent of regulatory
norms that order the messy feld of vision into a coherent and intelligible
narrative. According to Butler, “the white paranoiac forms a sequence of
narrative intelligibility that consolidates the racist fgure of the black
man” (1993a, 16), whose “body is circumscribed as dangerous, prior to
any gesture, any raising of the hand” (18).
Butler depicts a scene in which the white racist episteme materialises
and real-ises racialised bodies. In examining the how of the interpretation
processes that render the beaten body as the source of violence, Butler
argues that seeing is not a direct or neutral perception. Rather, it is a
political construal of the visible, symptomatic of a racialised visual
episteme, which is “hegemonic and forceful” (Butler 1993a, 17). This
80 https://www.cinema.ucla.edu/collections/rodney-king-case-and-los-angeles-
uprising, last accessed 6 July 2015. 
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means that what is seen is itself a racial formation, integral to a racialised
visual economy that discriminates, “orchestrates and interprets” (Butler
1993a, 20). Positing the body as a sign, Butler’s account radically calls into
question the referential stability of phenotypical differences as the
immutable ground and the incontestable truth of hierarchical racial
positioning. Importantly, this provocative argument does not simply
reverse, but radically confounds the terms of linear causality that inform
most racist narratives. As Butler makes explicit, “This signifcation
produces as an effect of its own procedure the very body that it
nevertheless and simultaneously claims to discover as that which precedes
it own action” (1993b, 30, emphasis in original).
The (re)production of what counts as valuable and intelligible is, for
Butler, kernel to the political economy that (re)produces hierarchical
differences that justify forms of violence, exclusion and denigration. At
stake here is the condition of limit-ing, or the “‘logic of morphing’” (Kirby
2006, 84). According to Butler, the bodily contour is a permanently
shifting and negotiated interface of interior and exterior, self and other.
Drawing on several theoretical frameworks, Butler’s conceptualisation of
contour/threshold is understood in terms of “interpolation[(sic]
(Althusser), enunciation (Benveniste), body imago (Lacan), and
inscription (Foucault)” (Kirby 1997, 126). Given that Butler’s reading of
race here draws on Frantz Fanon’s notion of a “‘historico-racial schema’”
(Fanon quoted in Butler 1993a, 20), which challenges the Lacanian model
of the mirror stage, I want to focus on Butler’s reading of bodily contours
in terms of bodily imago. This is because the psychoanalytic approach
shows that a racialised and racialising dynamic is already present in the
formation of a bodily image (Ahmed 2000, 59-60). This may shed light on
the process of real-ising race in the example of the successful
pronunciation of the trill.  
In Jacques Lacan’s thesis theory of the imago, individuation and
identifcation take place through the unstable dynamic of projection and
misrecognition of imaginary bodily contours. This specular image is an
idealised totality that confers a visual integrity and coherence, which is in
fact a compensatory mask of the irretrievable loss of original unity.
Signifcantly, the inevitable ambiguity of bodily ego/imago – as “a visual
fction” (Butler 1993b, 138), “a site of méconnaissance” (138) – has profound
implications for the earlier discussion of ocular consciousness in
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racialised encounters. First of all, given that the bodily ego as imago is the
relation of identifcation, which can never be fnally achieved, the
phantasy of a self-present subject, capable of exercising an objectifying
gaze that is itself coherent, is radically qualifed. Secondly, since the
morphological scheme that inaugurates the ego also provides grids of
intelligibility – “the threshold of the visible world” (Kirby 2006, 58) – the
racist phantasy that renders racialised others radically different and
separate will prove futile. As Kirby observes, “how we perceive the
difference between people, objects and their inter-relationships (the shape
and defnition of otherness) will be extruded through a corporeal
imaginary which has constitutive force: the subject is this process, where
the differentiation of world and ego emerge in the same refex/refection”
(2006, 58).
Not only is the question of “who sees and reads” in racialised
encounters radically confounded, but the materiality of racialised bodies
is also cast in a new light. Following Fanon, Butler argues that “the black
male body is constituted through fear, and through a naming and a
seeing” (1993a, 18). This reading is exemplary of Butler’s
conceptualisation of corporeality and materialisation. For Butler, there is
no outside of signifcation, for “every effort to refer to materiality takes
place through a signifying process which, in its phenomenality, is always
already material” (1993b, 68). It is important to note that the term
“material” here does not connote the “in-itself of matter” (Kirby 2006, 69).
Kirby’s reading of this detail is especially informative. As she writes,
The argument that the body’s substance is a sign rather than a fxed
solidity or prescriptive referent is furthered in the happy coincidence
between the words “matter” and “materialise”. While these words
evoke a notion of physical substance, these signs are also synonyms for
“meaning” and the larger semantic process of meaning-making. (2006,
69, emphasis in original)
Butler posits the phenomenality of the visual (and the aural) as the
materiality of the signifer, which “will signify only to the extent that it is
impure, contaminated by the ideality of differentiating relations, the tacit
structuring of a linguistic context that is illimitable in principle” (1993b,
68). Given Butler’s vigorous attention to initial conditions, in this account,
the nature of phenomenality is assumed, and problematically rendered as
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“the substantive, material anchor of signifcation” (Kirby 1997, 110). For if
“what appears only signifes by virtue of those non-phenomenal
relations, i.e., relations of differentiation” (Butler 1993b, 68), it seems that
the process – the how of appearing visibly and aurally – is severed from
what is understood as non-phenomenal. 
Undoubtedly, Butler’s examination of the maintenance work that
enables the anticipating and inscriptive effcacy of white paranoiac visual
perception is an important intervention, for it is precisely the denial and
erasure of its operation that reproduces “a white racist imaginary that
postures as if it were the unmarked frame of the visible feld, laying claim
to the authority of ‘direct perception’” (Butler 1993a, 19, emphasis in
original). Nevertheless, its implication is undercut by virtue of the
incommensurable gap that Butler installs between signifer and signifed,
as well as between sign and referent. For Butler, the irretrievable loss of
the referent or the a priori moment, determines the sign’s purported
failure, and functions as the momentum that propels its recitation. Given
this, Butler argues that it is precisely within the historicity of the sign –
the necessity of its reiteration – that the potential for transformation, i.e.,
for reading otherwise – is located. For if seeing is a political construal, a
cultural formation, then its inherent instability (because of the slippage of
meaning) necessarily involves the process of re-signifcation. It follows
then that it is only through reiterated readings that “the workings of
racial constraints on what it means to ‘see’” (Butler 1993a, 16) may be
called into question. 
However, if the racialised visual episteme is equated with an
oppressive notion of power that always already delimits perception as
cultural imprint, then it remains unclear how to read differently within
the “racially saturated feld of visibility” (Butler 1993a, 15). As Butler
herself acknowledges: 
It is not, then, a question of negotiating between what is “seen,” on the
one hand, and a “reading” which is imposed upon the visual evidence,
on the other. In a sense, the problem is even worse: to the extent that
there is a racist organization and disposition of the visible, it will work
to circumscribe what qualifes as visual evidence, such that it is in some
cases impossible to establish the “truth” of racist brutality through
recourse to visual evidence. (1993a, 17)
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This lack of clarity calls for the examination of the different but inter-
related modalities of racialisation. What challenges would emerge or
what possibilities would be opened up in taking into account the ways in
which the materialisation of race is not only seen, but also felt and heard?
Do these perspectives complicate and confound the racialised visual
episteme? Or are they informed by and enclosed in the same political
economy of racialisation? With these questions, I now turn to Sara
Ahmed’s theorisation of affect and racialisation. 
Eye-to-Eye and Skin-to-Skin Encounters
Ahmed’s and Butler’s frameworks share a structural commitment to, and
political investigations of, the notion of difference understood as a gap, or
break, and I suggest that these parallels merit further analysis. For
example, Ahmed locates the analysis of race in encounters, understood as
involving gaps between histories of encounters and the present moment
of contact, between the visual economy and the affective economy or the
modality of eye-to-eye and skin-to-skin, between “unconscious emotions”
(Ahmed 2004, 44) and conscious recognition. Drawing on Butler’s
formulation of performativity, Ahmed understands these gaps as the
inevitable consequence of the cut or excision from histories of encounters
and the repression of ideas “to which the feeling may have been frst (but
provisionally) connected” (2004, 44). Because of an “imperfect translation
of the past” (Ahmed 2004, 184), these gaps indicate potentially
transformative moments of hesitation “between the domain of the
particular –the face to face of this encounter – and the general – the
framing of the encounter by broader relationships of power and
antagonism” (Ahmed 2000, 8).
Finding in Butler’s consideration of the bodily boundary an important
attention to historicity, Ahmed supplements the economy of the visual
with the affective. Whereas the former involves “techniques for
differentiating” (Ahmed 2000, 3) through racialised visual coding, the
latter is a process in which emotions and feelings, as impressions felt on
the skin, “circulate between signifers in relationships of difference and
displacement” (Ahmed 2004, 44). For Ahmed, an encounter implies both
eye-to-eye and skin-to-skin modalities that converge on the surface of the
body. Importantly, conjoining the affective with the visual, Ahmed
argues that an intervention into any one perceptual modality will always
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involve other, related concerns. 
First, the confguration of skin as “a border that feels” (Ahmed 2000, 45,
emphasis in original) affords an account of racialisation that is attentive
to the lived experiences of racialised others. Second, the metonymic
sliding of affects calls into question “the tyranny of the visible” (Alcoff
2002, 19), which marks the hyper-visibility of racialised others that
renders unassailable the invisibility of whiteness. As Ahmed dilates, “The
skin is not simply invested with meaning as a visual signifer of
difference (the skin as coloured, the skin as wrinkled, and so on). It is not
simply implicated in the (scopophilic) logic of fetishism where the visual
object, the object which can be seen, becomes the scene of the play of
differences” (2000, 44, my emphasis). The proposition that the surface of
skin as a bodily boundary “is felt only in the event of being ‘impressed
upon’ in the encounters we have with others” (Ahmed 2004, 25),
signifcantly qualifes the racist phantasy of segregation and
homogeneity. On this account, affective contamination is always and
already implicated in the boundary formation of a supposedly pure and
undifferentiated whiteness. For example, commenting on the economy of
xenophobia, Ahmed  argues that it “involves not just reading the
stranger’s body as dirt and flth, but the re-forming of the contours of the
body-at-home, through the very affective gestures that enable the
withdrawal from co-habitation with strangers in a given social space”
(2000, 54).
Last but not least, drawing on critical insights from psychoanalytic
accounts of unconscious emotions and Marxian notions of value, Ahmed
posits that repression – the “‘absent presence’ of historicity” (2004, 45) –
motors the affective, all the while contributing to the stickiness of signs
that accumulate affective value as they circulate. The question “what
sticks”, centres on Ahmed’s interrogation of the repetition and
reproduction of stereotypes and racial prejudices. As she writes, “‘What
sticks?’ … is a reposing of other, perhaps more familiar, questions: Why is
social transformation so diffcult to achieve? Why are relations of power
so intractable and enduring, even in the face of collective forms of
resistance?” (Ahmed 2004, 11-12).
This last point in particular needs to be read in relation to Ahmed’s
general political project. Ahmed’s primary concern is to account for the
materialisation and the specifcity of hierarchical differences, i.e., which
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differences come to matter, a question that moves beyond the essentialist
reifcation of racial differences that feeds racism. She is also critical of the
postmodernist indifference to the specifcity of difference, here, that of
racialised others, as well as the privileging of mobility in narratives that
celebrate nomadism, indeterminacy and the free foating play of
difference.  As Ahmed notes, “That chain of endless deferral, that
seemingly open fuidity, is halted at certain points, partially fxed in the
process of becoming intelligible” (1998, 129). With this in mind, it
becomes clear that Ahmed’s anti-essentialist account of race requires an
economy of signifcation that operates without positive terms, and one
which is manifested in the visual and the affective. In order to keep the
question of origin moving, Ahmed endeavours to hold in tension the
processes of “circulation and blockage” (Liu, 2012) that resonate with the
“determined, but not fully determined” (2000, 6) nature of racialised and
racialising encounters.
This approach is signifcant to Ahmed’s analysis of “relations of
othering” that “contest[s] the model of race as a bodily attribute” (2004,
16). A good example of this is Ahmed’s reading of the “effect and affect”
(2004, 59) of economies of hate. Recall that in Butler’s reading of the
Rodney King case,her analysis of the racialised visual episteme makes
explicit the ways in which the inverted projections of white paranoia
render the black man’s body hateful and fearsome. Similarly, Ahmed
acknowledges the racialising effect of the visual, whereby phenotypical
differences function as “the visual prompt that triggers identity thinking”
(2000, 129). And yet, Ahmed worries that a mere focus on the visual
registry may run the risk of reinstalling the assumption that hate resides
in particular bodies of and as signs because of the “fetishisation of skin
colour” (2000, 130), which is “seen to hold the ‘truth’ of the subject’s
identity” (131). For example, with reference to John Griffn’s Black Like
Me, which is “an autobiographical account of a white man who receives
medical help to alter the colour of his skin so that he can ‘discover’ the
truth of being black” (2000, 131), Ahmed writes:
His transformation into a stranger, where he passes as black in the
mirror, produces the naked face of the black man, a face that
immediately gets coded as ferce and glaring, as monstrous and bestial.
In passing as black in his own mirror image, the vision of the black face
is hence over-determined by the “knowledges” available of blackness
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central to the violence of colonialism. (131)
For Ahmed, bodies of and as signs of hate tend to stick “because they
become attached through particular affects” (2004, 60, emphasis in
original), which are “visceral and bodily” (2004, 58). In light of this,
Ahmed asserts that at stake is the question of how emotions are actually
produced in racialised encounters, as thinking through this aspect of the
puzzle foregrounds the “contingent rather than necessary” (2000, 54)
association between objects and emotions, suggested by the term
“sticky”. Related to this, Ahmed offers a performative account of hate
that operates “by providing ‘evidence’ of the very antagonism it affects”
(2004, 52). As she explains, “In seeing the other as ‘being’ hateful, the
subject is flled up with hate, which becomes a sign of the ‘truth’ of the
reading” (2004, 52, my emphasis). In laying bare the contingency and
historicity of the subject and object of emotions, Ahmed hopes to open up
possibilities for seeing and knowing differently.
Nevertheless, as Ahmed’s description of the performativity of hate
makes clear, her account of affect remains primarily visual. To put this
differently, the histories of visual perception, limited by social regimes of
signifcance, structure and condition the realm of the affective within the
horizon of cultural intelligibility. In a similar vein to Butler’s theorisation
of visual perception, the affective economy in Ahmed’s account focuses
upon the problem of limiting conditions. We are made to wonder once
more about the actual possibility of generating alternative readings that
might enable political contestation, for it seems that an oppositional and
prohibitive conception of power, one that also informs how signifcation
works, foregrounds Butler’s and Ahmed’s interpretation of limit-ing
conditions in the frst instance. This is evident, for example, in Ahmed’s
understanding of sociality as an antagonistic differentiation, opposed to
the inclusion and the with-ness of corporeal generosity (2000, 48). Recall
the spatial dimension of identifcation and disidentifcation articulated by
relations of proximity and distance discussed in terms of animacy
hierarchies. According to Ahmed, although the exposure of bodies in
being touched is the condition of possibility for generating social and
individual bodies, this is not a simple state of being-with. Rather, it
involves “an economy of touch” (Ahmed 2000, 184) that differentiates
and hierarchises bodies through touching and being touched differently
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by ones that are near as well as distant others. 
Butler’s and Ahmed’s interventions rest on the shared notion that
prohibition induces a reconfguration of approach. Inasmuch as
perception always moves, it will never faithfully represent a referent that
escapes culture, and this implies that a certain failure of ft, a mis-
measure, is inevitable. However, it is precisely this movement that
heralds the possibility of change. Nevertheless, Butler and Ahmed
understand this “within-ness” as a failure to see what is really there, what
could be there if we weren’t encumbered with prejudice. The problem
with this position is that if affective visual perception is always negative
and oppressive in the frst and last instance, then it is unclear exactly
what will enable and substantiate the leap to its potentially indeterminate
and subversive outcome, or, in terms of what Butler hopes for, “a contest
within the visual feld, a crisis in the certainty of what is visible” (1993a,
16). 
Interlude
The discussion thus far has centred on the affective and performative
reiteration of seeing in the racialised visual feld. By way of a transition
that also recalls the opening scene, I want to read two anecdotes provided
by Ien Ang and Ming-Bao Yue respectively. In so doing, I want to lay
emphasis on the racialised stereotypes that conceive of visible differences
as correlated with one’s accents or the language one ought to speak. It
may appear that I am introducing the realm of the audible as a separate
domain that joins forces with or complicates the logic of the visual.
However, with these anecdotes, I mean to linger over and contemplate
the how of the visual and audible perception, whose complexity and
importance has hopefully been made manifest  in my engagement with
the Saussurean sign and Butler’s and Ahmed’s reading of the visual and
the affective.
In her book On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and the West,
Ien Ang who is of Chinese descent, born in Indonesia and raised in the
Netherlands, recalls her experience of being perceived as Chinese:
Chineseness ... inscribed as it was on the very surface of my body,
much like what Frantz Fanon (1970) has called the “corporeal
malediction” of the fact of his blackness. The “corporeal malediction”
of Chineseness, of course, relates to the “fact of yellowness”,
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identifable among others by those famous “slanted eyes”. … So it was
one day that a self-assured, Dutch, white, middle-class, Marxist leftist,
asked me, “Do you speak Chinese?” I said no. “What a fake Chinese
you are!”, was his only mildly kidding response, thereby unwittingly
but aggressively adopting the disdainful position of judge to sift “real
from fake” Chinese. (2001, 28-30)
We could interpret Ang’s account through the theorisation of a
racialised visual episteme, wherein her visible Chineseness –- “the fact of
yellowness” – informs the expectation of her ability to speak Chinese (as
her mother tongue). This determining prominence accorded to the visual
is made all the more conspicuous in the “mildly kidding” judgement of
Ang’s “fake” Chinese identity, which ironically is for Ang an imposed
identity from which she desperately wanted to distance herself. As Ang
writes, refecting on the title of her book, “‘Not Speaking Chinese’ … is a
condition that has been hegemonically constructed as a lack, a sign of loss
of authenticity” (2001, 30). 
In other words, the inability to speak Chinese fails the expectation of
Ang’s Chineseness. And yet, we could ask as well, what is it about the
visual perception that implies the mis/recognition and identifcation of
one’s supposed capacity to speak a certain language, which is normally
considered as audible in nature? How can the visual register anticipate,
and thus include in its operation, another perceptual realm – the audible
in this instance – that supposedly occupies a different spatio-temporal
dimension from the visual? With these questions in mind, I want to
consider Yue’s account of not looking German. Whereas in Ang’s
anecdote, her inability to speak the Chinese language did not actually
alter the perception of Ang as Chinese, albeit as a fake/inauthentic copy,
in Yue’s account below, the fact that she and her brother speak German
natively, did not change the perception of their non-Germanness. In “On
Not Looking German: Ethnicity, Diaspora and the Politics of Vision”,
Yue, who is born and raised in Germany, sets out to elucidate the
practices and processes of visual othering:
The incident happened in the 1970s when my brother and I took the
subway home one day. We were chatting away in German and hardly
noticed an older German male, sitting in a row behind us. He had
obviously been eavesdropping for a while when he suddenly got up
from his seat, walked over and interrupted our lively, if self-absorbed
148
conversation. “Excuse me,” he asked, and his tone revealed a mix of
curiosity and annoyance, “how do you speak German so fuently?” I
was totally unprepared for this interruption, but while I was still
thinking of an appropriate reply, I heard my brother saying: “Well,
that’s because we’ve learned it.” To which the man responded in a
more hostile tone: “But how long have you been living here?” Before I
could think of a reply, I heard my brother saying with a smile: “Oh,
we’ve only been here about a year. You know, German is such an easy
language!” Of all possible responses, this was certainly the last the man
had expected, especially as Germans believe their language to be
particularly diffcult. The man’s face paled instantly and, without so
much as another word, he turned around and retreated to the other end
of the subway car. (2000, 175)
What I fnd striking in this scenario is that Yue and her brother’s fuent
German speech did not so much convince the German male of their
Germanness, as it became a source of a confusion – “How do you speak
German so fuently?” The diffculty in identifying their Chinese
appearance with their Germanness is all the more telling in the ways in
which the German male was offended by Yue’s brother’s answer “You
know, German is such an easy language!”  The German language is often
marked by its diffcult grammar. We could here recall our discussion in
chapter two of the identifcation of the grammatical complexities with the
capacity of a race and a nation for intellection, culture and civilisation.
What we could glean from the German male’s annoyance – indicated by
his instantly paled face and his  retreat from Yue and her brother – is that
he was probably offended not only by Yue’s brother's belittling of
German as “an easy language”, but also, and more importantly, by the
downgrading of his German identity. Although Yue’s intention was to
make visible the overdetermination of visual perception as a technology
of othering, Fatima El-Tayeb fnds intriguing the contradictory visual and
aural logic at work in the perception of Yue and her brother’s non-
Germanness. As El-Tayeb asks: 
Why was the perfect German of the children not enough to make them
readable as (minoritarian) Germans? Why did their answer, which
seemingly confrmed the man’s curiosity and end the conversation?
(2011, xxiv) 
Taken together, it seems that on the one hand, these anecdotes evince
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the primacy of the visual perception of phenotypical differences which, as
El-Tayeb maintains, overrides the logic of the audible. On the other hand,
it could also be said, using Butler’s terminology, that the aural perception
troubles the visual perception of racial identifcation in Yue’s account. In
Gender Trouble, Butler argues that on one level trouble is inevitable,
because it is precisely the ambiguities of trouble – in the sense that
making trouble would get one in trouble, thus “the rebellion and its
reprimand seemed to be caught up in the same terms”(1999, xxvii)  – that
condition power’s operation. As Butler makes clear, “the prevailing law
threatened one with trouble, even put one in trouble, all to keep one out
of trouble” (1999, xxvii). On another level, and given the inescapable yet
troublesome force through which the “I” or any category of identity
emerges, Butler suggests the enduring and necessary interplay of the
“seriousness” of the process of claiming identity for feminist politics and
the “laughter” (1999, xxviii) which denotes the parodic problematisation
of these very identities. That is, there is a need both to claim identity, in
however provisional and contestable ways, as well as to trouble it.
In the main, the ways in which the term “trouble” is deployed here are
akin to Butler’s meditation on the inherent ambiguity of power and
identity. And yet, as Butler’s frst assertion of the conjoined sense of
rebellion and reprimand in the word “trouble” shows, central to this
conception of trouble is the juridical notion of power, whose intention, as
has been noted in our discussion earlier, remains repressive and
suppressive if not in the frst then in the fnal instance. Following this line
of inquiry, it could be said that the racialised visual episteme structures
racial perception and identifcation, whereas the realm of the audible
becomes a potentially transformative site of “the queering of ethnicity in
response to the European ideology of colorblindness” (El-Tayeb 2011,
177). And yet, if such a trouble, understood in terms of disturbing the
otherwise stable order and structure, is intrinsic to power’s operation, its
iterability, then the trouble and confusion brought by the audible
mis/match, in Yue and her brother’s case, is actually essential to and
strengthens the regulation of a racialised visual episteme as exerting
prohibitive power. Reading Butler’s  meditation on the trouble of power
alongside the “diffculty without which no “I” can appear” (1999, xxv, my
emphasis), we could ask the how of power’s own emergence. That is,
what are the troubles and diffculties through which the prohibitive
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identity of power may emerge? It is not that power as racialised visual
episteme frst establishes its confnement and regulation, and is then
troubled by an alternative force from outside it. Rather, the trouble of
identity is at, and of, power’s inception, i.e. the dis/continuity of power.
To elaborate on this point, we could consider the connotation of
trouble. Not only does it denote disorder, confict and disturbance, but it
also hints at a generally muddy, sedimented and yet agitated and restless
condition, as its etymological association with the word “turbid”
indicates. It follows then that, besides interpreting the aural as confusing
the visual determinations and constraints of racial identity that are felt to
be an imposed surface that contours the body, what I am conjuring up is
also a convoluted and troublesome, because muddy, agitated and restless
“corporeography” (Kirby 1997) wherein visuality as aurality as tactility is
“utterly referential” (Kirby 2011, 124). This restlessness or excitation
points to the later discussion in this thesis on the psychic life of the
tongue. Again, this dis/continuous consubstantiality means that the
racialised visual and aural perceptions are distinguished from, limited by,
even as they are emergent through and as, each other. What are the
implications of this confguration for our examination of the racialised
visual episteme that contours racialised bodies as a felt surface?
Furthermore, and importantly, what are the implications of the psycho-
social open-ended involvement (the troubled power) which gives rise to
our declared desire for political intervention and transformation? With
these questions in mind, and especially given the urgent need to break
away from the racialised visual episteme, I will turn to the possibility of
moving beyond the visual. 
Moving Beyond the Visual?
Writing in the context of the racialisation process of the turbaned Sikh,
Jasbir Puar acknowledges the importance of Butler’s and Ahmed’s
interventions, but remains unconvinced of the political effcacy of the
performative reiteration of seeing. If the visual feld is so thoroughly
saturated by the historic-racial schema and constrained within the realm
of the cultural and the discursive, then, according to Puar, it seems that
the only way out of this epistemological, ocular economy is by moving
beyond and outside its confnement. As Puar writes, 
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Butler and Ahmed rely on acts of reading to contest epistemological
truths; that is, the logic of visibility is challenged through the logic of
visibility by pointing out the instability of visual evidence, rather than
moving aside the visual, however momentarily, as the primary
epistemological terrain of racial knowledge. Similarly, the logic of
signifcation is contested through pointing out the instability of signs.
(2007, 189) 
Part of Puar’s concern is that the preemptive force of the visual entails
a paranoid logic that will endlessly confrm and reconstitute its own
racialised reading. Instead, Puar opts for the perceptual realm of the
haptic and/or the tactile. Following Brian Massumi (2002), Puar
approaches affect and bodily matters not as an effect of cultural
inscription, but as “the body’s ‘visceral sensibility’” (2007, 189) which
“precedes sense perception” (189) and “reasserts ontological rather than
epistemological knowing” (194). For Puar, the implications of the
disparities between conceptions of bodily participation are considerable.
Instead of rendering the body as a sign, Puar argues that the antedating
nature of bodily visceral sensibility provides a site of intervention before
and beyond the “discursive baggage” (2007, 184) and “representational
weight” (191) of racial prejudice.
Rather than focusing on the limiting conditions, Puar attends to the
conditions of emergence. Whereas limit-ing conditions, or the logic of
morphing,81 concern the operation of regulatory norms that always
already structure and constitute what counts as intelligible, the condition
of emergence is said to shed light on the ontogenetic priority that is itself
a feld of affective intensity. In light of this, discursive structures, or
cultural grids of intelligibility, are understood as forms of relative stasis
which derive and emerge from a state of fux, i.e., affect before
representation. This distinction between the economy of representation,
which that cuts and dissects, and the purportedly material and affective
domain that exists before and outside the constraints of representation
and intellection is made clear in Arun Saldanha’s  following remark:
81 The notion of morphology, according to Kirby, “mediates between a purely
anatomical and a purely psychological account of the body and its pleasures”
(Campioni and Grosz quoted in Kirby 1997, 171). It designates the forming of the
contour and the structure of the bodily ego as necessarily marked. In Kirby’s work, the
question of morphology is read through the process of limiting that resonates with the
pellicular essence of the body as writing discussed earlier. 
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While today’s poststructuralist thinkers of racism have done much to
dismantle the notion of a rational individual acting independently from
exploitation elsewhere in the world, their radical force is tempered by
their shared adherence to the post-Kantian paradigm founding
universalism upon consciousness and representation allegedly entirely
contingent in relation to materiality. But, like all power relations,
racism operates frst of all through the materialities of desire and
landscape far “below” any mental or linguistic detectability. (2013, 7)
For Saldanha, the poststructuralist and Marxist anti-racist projects lose
sight of the actual corporeality of the “looking, desiring, struggling
bodies” (2013, 8, emphasis in original) that is indispensable in the
constitution of racial differences. That is, as Saldanha argues, the
materiality of bodies are the prerequisite for racialised signifcation to
have any effect at all. In an attempt to address the material irreducibility
of the process of racialisation, Saldanha proceeds to read Fanon’s “train
passage”, wherein Fanon was interpellated by and discovers his
blackness through “a racial epidermal schema” (Fanon [1952] 2008, 84).
As Saldanha maintains: 
The statement “Tiens, un nègre” requires a larynx, the proximity of a
Negro, a comprehension of French, and being within the earshot to
hear it … Fanon’s phenotype is not at all “performed” or “constituted”
by the body’s exclamation … [but] is constituted … by genetic
endowments, environmental conditions, exercise, hormones, diet,
disease, ageing, etc. (2006, 12) 
In line with Saldanha’s proposed “immanentist-materialist”
conception of race that attends to its material irreducibility and inquires
into “how bodies are materially differentiated into hierarchies” (2012, 7),
Puar conceives of affect in its “ontogenetic dimension”, “as prior to
representation – prior to race, class, gender, sex, nation, even as these
categories might be the most pertinent mapping of or reference back to
affect itself” (2007, 215). Whereas visuality is said to freeze bodies in
cultural frames of sorts, the ontogenetic difference takes the expression of
“movements, intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities, and textures as
they inhabit events, spatiality, and corporealities” (Puar 2007, 215). 
In accordance with this reading of affect, Puar endorses Saldanha’s
theorisation of phenotypical encounters, that is attentive to “the matter of
phenotype and how phenotype matters” (Puar 2007, 190). In contrast to
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Ahmed’s reading of encounters wherein the regulatory and hegemonic
mechanism of racialisation imposes itself upon bodies “through the force
of historically blighted signifers that metonymically link and bleed into
each other” (Puar 2007, 190), in Puar and Saldanha’s formulation,
phenotypical difference in itself is regarded as operating through the
autonomous affect that is “unmediated, in all of its connective glory”
(Saldanha 2006, 22, my emphasis). This unmediated and autonomous
phenotypical encounter is understood as “the encounter of smell, sweat,
fushes of heat, dilation of pupils, the impulses bodies pick up from each
other, the contagion of which we know little, the sense of being touched
without having been physically touched, of having seen without having
physically seen” (Puar 2007, 190, my emphasis). In sum, by rendering
encounters in corporeal terms Puar aims to “comprehend power beyond
disciplinary regulation” (Puar 2007, 215). 
Given the visual connotations of phenotypes, the proposition that the
tactility of phenotypical encounters is somehow before and beyond visual
perception is indeed curious and confusing. For how are phenotypical
differences perceived as such? Butler’s intervention into “the
presumption of the material irreducibility of sex” is pertinent here (1993b,
28), in as much as she enquires as to, “how and why ‘materiality’ has
become a sign of irreducibility, that is, how is it that the materiality of sex
is understood as that which only bears cultural constructions, and,
therefore, cannot be a construction?” (1993b, 28). 
In addition, we could ask whether the postulation of the material
irreducibility of race and sex, as the tactile corporeality, that is “charged”
(Saldanha 2006) by and bears the mark of representation, is not itself an
inscription of matter with racialising and sexualising connotations. That
is, the body is the ground that awaits the charged inscription, and
penetration of language, and only through this process alone does it
become signifed/signifcant. This is telling in Saldanha’s reading of the
process of interpellation in the “train passage”. Note the temporality in
this reading: 
There was certainly real phenotypical difference before the
exclamation, but it had no effect on the situation (yet). The exclamation
brings out a latency, a latency Fanon knew was there, but had perhaps
forgotten, looking absent-mindedly for a seat. After the exclamation,
Fanon’s options are limited. Now, his phenotype is alive, chaining him
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to the histories and geographies of race and colonialism. (2006, 12, my
emphasis)
Undoubtedly, the attentiveness to corporeality is a signifcant attempt
to re-value the presence of bodies, which is said to be absent in the
constructionist account. Nevertheless, this fip-fop from absence to
presence renders the bodies as lacking in signifcance as they are seen to
have “had no effect on the situation (yet)” (Saldanha 2006, 12), a
defciency attributed to racialised and feminine others. 
And yet, the importance of Saldanha’s account of the specifcity,
historicity and embodied sedimentation of racial formation should be
highlighted. His attention to the materiality of race also makes visible a
“relative fxity” (Saldanha 2006, 18) that is manifested in “sticky
connections” (18) or “‘local pulls’” (18).  For example, Saldanha argues
that “Whiteness […] is about the sticky connections between property,
privilege, and a paler skin. There is no essence of whiteness, but there is a
relative fxity that inheres in all the ‘local pulls’ of its many elements in
fux” (2006, 18). 
In view of this, Saldanha suggests a modality of viscosity that
complements an ontology of emergence. Whereas the notion of viscosity
pertains to the certain propensities in racialised bodily formations, the
term emergence refers to the genesis of racial differences. This
formulation of viscosity echoes Ahmed’s conceptualisation of the
stickiness of signs. It is interesting to note that both Saldanha and Ahmed
draw on the fgure of slime, as exemplary of the quality of a substance
that “is not simply solid or liquid” (Ahmed 2004, 90).  The material
specifcity of viscosity – neither solid nor liquid, neither fxed nor fowing
– affords a consideration of the reiterative emergence and contingency of
racial becoming.
For Saldanha and Puar the ontology of emergence – the question of
genesis nevertheless proceeds before and outside the formation of
hierarchical power relations. As the earlier quote about Saldanha’s
reading of the  Fanon’s “train passage” makes apparent, the phenotypical
encounters are conceived of as unmediated, as opposed to the epistemic
constraints imposed by modalities of representation and categorisation.
Underpinning this conception is the logic of temporal and spatial
separation, which takes the shape of an incommensurable gap between
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ontological emergence and epistemological mediation.
To make explicit what is at stake, especially in relation to the onto-
epistemological dis/continuity of race I am proposing throughout the
thesis, I want to turn briefy to Derrida’s reading of the haptic in On
Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy. It assists our thinking here in two interrelated
ways  in that it addresses both the question of continuity and its relation
to visuality and the (re)centering of the human subject. First, in terms of
continuity, Derrida writes, “What makes the haptical … cling to closeness
… [and] ... keep up with the appropriation of the proximate, is a
continuistic postulation. And this continuism of desire accords this whole
discourse with the general motif of what [Gilles] Deleuze and [Felix]
Guattari … claims as the ‘body without organs’” (2005a, 124-125). Second,
and in relation to its relation to the visual and the subjective, Derrida
observes the certain place of “becoming-haptical of the optical” (2005a,
123) in Deleuze and Guatarri’s oeuvre: “The hand is not far … The fnger
is not far … since this even deals with the ‘close range’, with ‘close vision’
… with the mind, the very mind” (2005a, 123, emphasis in original). 
The upshot of Derrida’s point is that the discontinuity, fracture and
fssure are found at the heart of the continuism of the haptic. That is the
originary separation of the smooth and the striated space, the haptical
and the optical. Furthermore, this originary determination/separation
(which is what Derrida refers to when he says the “hand is not far”), is
the product of the labour of the hand of the self-present human subject,
that is, the hand of Man. This reading of the haptic in terms of continuism
resonates with the earlier examination of the question of the human, of
anthropocentrism as well as the functionality of carrying of the
signifer/sound pattern/signal. It is interesting that even, and perhaps
especially, when the human, the visual and the cultural are most
vehemently repudiated and decentered, their central position are
reasserted and transmogrify into other shapes and forms. 
This point is of particular relevance for the rethinking of the question
of the visual. Puar’s “affective politics” (2007, 215) shares with Butler’s
and Ahmed’s theorisation the taken-for-granted understanding of what
constitutes an ocular economy – visuality as seeing through the eyes  – as
an overdetermined, epistemological and cultural construction in which
power aims to restrict and to prohibit. Ironically, given Puar’s vehement
challenge to the fxation of difference in poststructuralist epistemology,
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her investment in the affective must nevertheless depend upon and
therefore reinstall this reading, interpretation, and representation of the
visual as fxed and somehow incorporeal when compared to tactility. 
Returning to the question of sensorial, translative involvement posed
earlier, we will recall that Puar holds that bodily affective contagion
cannot be known to us, because “‘something recognizable’ [is already] a
quality (or property)” (Massumi quoted in Puar 2007, 281). However,
given this, the question remains as to how the “subtraction” (Massumi
2002, 58) and registration of “excitation” and “intensity” (61) from the
purported fxity of the symbolic order might actually proceed. This
puzzle is clearly exemplifed in Puar’s elaboration of bodily visceral
sensibility: 
It anticipates the translation of the sight or sound or touch perception
into something recognizable associated with an identifable object.” So
the lungs spasm even before the senses cognate the presence of a shadow
in a “dark street at night in a dangerous part of town” and the shadows
are then the identifable objects for which epistemic force is confrmed
only after, or more accurately, as affective response has taken place (2007,
189, my emphasis added).
In the above description, there is a clear sense of a mind/body split, in
the form of a temporal and spatial linearity. The corporeal body, the
lungs in this case, generates affective and active responses before
intellection, understood as culturally constrained epistemological
knowing. And yet, Puar is quick to assert that affect as ontogenetic
difference is not a matter of “pre-existing” through “temporality” (2007,
214), nor is it in a relation of “relay between stasis and fux” (215). Rather,
according to Puar, it is “a temporality and a spatialization that has yet to
be imagined” (2007, 214). 
If, as Puar claims, affect occupies an ontologically different order “yet
to be imagined” (2007, 214), one quite different from an epistemological
order which presumably is imaginable, then we are left with something
of a riddle. Simply put, given this radical abyss, this in-between the
ontogenetic and epistemological, it is unclear how one can perceive these
bodily responses at all. What is it that falls between these two orders of
experience? After all, how can the ontogenetic affect exist “outside” our
ability to be affected by it? 
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Recall that in Ahmed’s formulation of racialised encounters,
individuation and differences are said to arise from encounters. As
Ahmed remarks:
Identity itself is constituted in the “more than one” of the encounter:
the designation of an “I” or “we” requires an encounter with others.
These others cannot simply be relegated to an outside: given that the
subject comes into existence as an entity only through encounters with
others, then the subject’s existence cannot be separated from the others
who are encountered. As such, the encounter itself is ontologically
prior to the question of ontology (the question of the being who
encounters).(2000, 7)
Distinct from the immediacies of affective corporeal sociality in Puar’s
and Saldanha’s propositions of phenotypical encounters, Ahmed posits
encounters as performative, which “cannot, then, be detached or isolated
from such broader relations of antagonism” (2000, 9). In other words, the
absent present historicity, as the limit of intelligibility, foregrounds the
very designation of “‘the encounter’ as such” (2000, 9). Interestingly,
Ahmed concedes that an encounter “involve(s) surprise” (2000, 8),
because it “is not a meeting between already constituted subjects who
know each other: rather the encounter is premised on the absence of a
knowledge that would allow one to control the encounter, or to predict its
outcome” (8). 
This description of the encounter seems to echo that of Puar, at least in
terms of the surprising, multi-layered and enlivening possibilities that
may be generated. Are these two notions of encounter radically different?
Or can we entertain the possibility that the enclosure and limitation of the
performative encounter confned within the social/cultural is implicated
with/in the corporeal sociality in phenotypical encounters? If we can
agree in the main with Ahmed’s postulation of the encounter as the
foundational frame that accompanies any ontological question, and if we
add this to Puar’s reading of ontogenetic differences, could we perhaps
interpret these seemingly different encounters – their enclosure within
two distinct and segregated orders – as a bifurcation which is affected by,
through and as, a generalised self-encounter which the organism has with
itself?
In sum, what seems to be presented here are two expressions of the
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same racialisation process. Butler and Ahmed locate the transformative
potential in the instability of signs and various gaps. Puar, following
Saldanha and Massumi, stresses the need to account for bodily
experiences before and beyond the visual register. It is unclear, however,
how the tactile and the haptic can be neatly severed from (or be seen as
existing before, beyond, outside of) the visual, because as Puar herself
concedes, phenotype is experienced “through the haptic where the visual
induces the sensation of touch” (2007, 190). But what is most intriguing
here is that in segregating “ontological becoming” and “epistemological
knowing” (Puar 2007, 196), as well as the bodily sensation in itself, from
the visual – because this is mediated by the racialised economy of
signifcation – two modes of racialisation, isolated temporally and
spatially, are said to be at work.
However, in an attempt to both explain and counter prejudice, is it
possible to close off the realm of the sensible as if it exists as an absolute
exteriority? If so, what would be the locatable difference, the in-between,
which mediates and communicates these two modalities of racialisation?
To put this differently, if bodily, visceral sensibility precedes culturally
mediated perception, as Puar understands it, and by extension, if the
neurobiological precedes the socio-political as nature precedes culture,
then the question remains as to where and how the transition from the
former to the latter can proceed.
It is to this extent that the conceptualisation of racialised encounters
seems unnecessarily circumscribed in both frameworks. And yet a
generalised notion of the encounter that affrms the historicity and specifcity
of visuality and tactility could, together with Butler and Ahmed, be read in
a way that will acknowledge Puar’s concern about corporeal sociality, not
as an absolute exteriority, but as always already knitted into an economy
of signifcation. For if the encounter is what enables an ontological
interrogation of the question “what is”, as Ahmed notes, as well as the
production of any difference, any identity, then the construction of the
insurmountable barrier that severs corporeal substance as an absolute
exteriority (outside and beneath) from the materialisation (the cultural
construal) of skin is radically qualifed. Kirby offers a compelling
contribution to this issue which can assist us here:
By remaining on the body’s surface its internal meat needn’t be
mentioned: it is simply excluded from corporeal reinscription, its process
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and registration. Thus, although signifcation is an operation whose very
experience and possibility is registered and forged through the entirety of
the body’s biological and perceptual apparatuses – our neurological
maps, cognitive representations, sensate recordings, expressions and
translations, and so on – Butler’s thesis must refuse any suggestion that
biological substance might be semiological in nature. … What is it that
actually creates and receives inscriptions if it is not the body’s interior
complexity? And if that interiority reads and writes those inscriptions
(because it must be in the nature of biology to do this), then need we
assume that fesh itself is outside, or before, textuality/language? (2006,
83)
As Kirby’s last question makes clear, the investigation of the bodily
substance does not mean that it is below or before the inscription of
language, which would return us to the conception of the material
irreducibility of race. Rather, it points to the pellicular nature of the body,
conceived of as the scene of reading/writing, that is the process of
limiting and emergence. On this account, the distinction between bodily
surface and its substance is reworked. The conception of the pellicular
nature of the body is coherent with the onto-epistemological
dis/continuity that does not reify the differential as the middle space, the
in-between, the spatiality of beside, against the “vertical dimension”
(Bhabha 1994, 48) of identity in terms of depth and memory.  
Instead, I argue that depth and its associated terms such as interiority,
specifcity, and memory are never simply present or absent, but are
expressions of the “infnite allusion” (Derrida quoted in Kirby 1997, 78)82
that involves both the becoming space or becoming locatable of memories
and substances, as well as inherent resistance to any fnal enclosure. In
82 Kirby’s reading of Derrida’s reading of the mystic pad in Sigmund Freud’s work
informs my analysis here. In Writing and Difference, Derrida comments on the writing
machine, the “Mystic Pad” , which includes the double system of “freshness of surface
and depth of retention” ([1967] 2005b, 272). For Derrida writes, “the depth of the Mystic
Pad is simultaneously a depth without bottom, an infnite allusion, and a perfectly
superfcial exteriority: a stratifcation of surfaces each of whose relation to itself, each
of whose interior, is but the implication of another similarly exposed surface. …
Temporality as spacing will be not only the horizontal discontinuity of a chain of
signs, but also will be writing as the interruption and restoration of contact between
the various depths of psychical levels: the remarkable heterogeneous temporal fabric
of psychical work itself. We fnd neither the continuity of a line nor the homogeneity
of a volume; only the differentiated duration and depth of a stage, and its spacing”
([1967]2005b, 281). 
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light of this, it is possible to engage productively with the conundrum of
performativity and generation as set out by Vikki Bell, which was
mentioned in chapter two For the identifcation, or enclosure, of the
essentialising gestures found in terms such as depth, interiority,
substance, memory is simultaneously an opening and rewriting, which
marks, as Kirby  asserts, “an indebtedness to limits that is limitless” (1997,
81). 
Following on from the rethinking of surface/depth, and returning to
our discussion of the visual, I suggest that a potentially more illuminating
argument, one which continues to address political concerns, might
conceive of the encounter as “the relational dynamic of sociality itself”
(Kirby 2006, 114). This conception would serve to open up the very
identity of power, language, corporeality and visuality as the generative
nature of the Sensible that encounters and produces itself in all its
expressions. Instead of conceding to the interpretation of visuality as
seeing with eyes, vision is recast as “a sort of wild associational and
synaesthetic conversion, a supersaturation within and across all
perceptual modalities, such that we hear visually, taste aurally, and so
on” (Kirby 2011, 128). Thus, this “radical interiority of the Sensible”
(Kirby 2011, 124), “the fesh of the world” (118)83, posed as subjectivity in
general, interrogates and acquires knowledge of itself through self-
encountering. In view of this, “perception is instead likened to an
ontological organ of conception. It is a desiring organ that seizes upon its
own alienness, and in the wonder of the encounter, is reconceived”
(Kirby 2011, 120, emphasis in original). As we will see in the following
section, such a rethinking helps us to broach the problematics of accent
which articulates what I call “the psychic life of the tongue”.
83 I want to make clear that the notion of fesh and corporeality I am engaging with here
does not simply assume the distinction between body (understood as belonging to the
proper personhood) and fesh (as what precedes the forming of the body) that informs
both Hortense Spillers’ (1987, 2003) and Alexander G. Weheliye’s (2014) theories. For
Weheliye, following Spillers, the fesh represents “both a temporal and conceptual
antecedent to the body” (2014, 39). In other words, before the body as “legal
personhood qua self-possession” (Weheliye 2014, 39) takes shape, the fesh presents
the site of “human life cleaved by the working together of depravation and
deprivation” (39). My understanding is that the point is not to simply erase the
difference between body and fesh either. Rather, in my engagement with corporeality
or corporeography, I seek to open the very notion of difference to the momentum  of
the originary dis/continuity in order to rethink the how of the differentiation, where
and when. 
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Chapter Six 
The Psychic Life of the Trilling Tongue
Parched Tongue, Stammering Tongue
By way of engaging with such a self-encounter, and to circle back to the
opening scene of the previous chapter, in which I tried to pronounce the
trill, I want to examine the question of the tongue. The tongue is fgured
prominently in scholarly and literary work on language issues in the
postcoloniality. For example, Hosu Kim presents “the parched tongue”
(2007, 34), whose sensation articulates the loss and displacement of
racialised subjects in “the political economy of language … of the
dominant society” (34) as well as making palpable the multiplicity of
“unrecognized tongues, bodies and memories” (34). The parched tongue
is then the locus of displacement and condensation, whose poetics is
made manifest in Kim’s following autobiographical account of her own
experience as a Korean student in the United States: 
Nobody dared to question why I wanted to learn English so bad like
that
Nobody asked why I wanted to study in the United States
Agreed silence may connote the shame and the pain interlaced with
U.S. -Korean relations
Instead I was told that we are living in a global society and English is
the global language
Thought that English gave me a power that I can’t reach
Hoped that English would be the language that I can master
Carefully chosen, meticulously practiced
Yet my unruly Korean accent in English disclosed soon 
After passing a few seconds
My accented tongue sticking out of its own will against my arduous
efforts
too much foreign touch, translated into untamable and uncivilized - 
grocery, nail salon, fsh market English in the United States. (2007, 39) 
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To Um-ma
Did you ever notice that I despise your curse?
Did you ever notice that I felt embarrassed because of your tongue?
I have been running away from your swearing and devouring tongue
Far father farthest
Time arrested
for the moment my envy to perfect English halted
The voice heard
which is not from me
which has never lived in, but through me
My loss in words flled with your memory and someone else’s memory
It slams back to my own experience, which has never been fully
experienced
Running away from you, um-ma
Running from your impoverished tongue
I met different ummas through my blushed skin
Many untold stories without a body
Passing through my broken tongues
Other mother’s unacknowledged sobbings
Joined my bruised tongue with many injured bodies 
in the American dream for a better life
Um-ma,
My tongue always accidentally confgured
My tongue always in between
My tongue always dreaming
My tongue always unsealing
For the stories yet to be told 
(2007, 44-45)
We can glean from Kim’s description two important insights. First,
accents, typically understood as the speech production of the target
language infected by one’s habits of speaking – the labour of “mouth
work” (Kim 2007, 34) – are embodied differences that are not equally
different. As Kim makes clear, the “Korean tongue with English [is]
treated differently from those European tongues in English. Korean-
accented English does not invite the same curious gaze and envy as
European accented English does. Instead, disapproving looks and
outlandish racial slurs” (2007, 39). For Kim, her accented English betrays
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her attempts to try to pass as a native speaker, to acquire the social and
economic status that she could not otherwise achieve. Importantly, Kim’s
writing reverses the terms of causality. It is normally considered that
(certain) accents present as the failed copy of the target language and
contribute to diffculties in communication that result in the speaker’s
disadvantage in the labour market of the host society. Further to this,
accents are said to be embodied differences that reveal or mark one’s
racial and ethnic identity. Related to our discussion of discontinuity and
continuity, we can consider accented speech production as what disrupts
and corrupts the fuency of the original target language.  Rey Chow’s
reading on this point assists us here:
Having an accent is, in other words, the symptom precisely of
discontinuity – an incomplete assimilation, a botched attempt at
eliminating another tongue’s competing copresence. In geopolitical
terms, having an accent is tantamount to leaving on display – rather
than successfully covering up – the embarrassing evidence of one’s
alien origins and migratory status. (2014, 58) 
Chow’s insight is that these discontinuities associated with accented
speech should be affrmed rather than stigmatised. This is because such
discontinuities are the condition for the emergence of the identity of any
language and its speaking subject. For Chow, any claim to originary
unity/wholeness is contestable, for the discontinuity that is the cut (and
we can recall that the process of delimiting is essential to the Saussurean
system of the sign) which bifurcates subject from object, is “fundamental
to the way language operates” (2014, 6).  In the main, my take on
accented speech production in terms of dis/continuity concurs with
Chow’s observation. However, I want to push further and complicate the
relation between the origin and the copy, continuity and discontinuity
through the trilling tongue. For even if the coin is fipped, so that accents
are revaluated as signs of multiplicity and discontinuity, as what precede
and give rise to the identity of language and its speaking subject, the
identity of discontinuity is itself kept intact. In other words, discontinuity
and multiplicity now assume the prominent status of origin. We see this
in Chow’s assertion that “A native speaker becomes audible or
discernible only when there are non-native speakers present, when more
than one language is already in play, explicitly or implicitly, as a murmur
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and an interference” (2014, 58). On this account, difference is understood
in oppositional terms as situated in-between different languages.
However, if the origin of any identity is never simply available, how is
the originary status of discontinuity as accents so readily assumed? We
can recall Karen Barad’s question discussed earlier. What is
discontinuous discontinuity? We will shortly revisit this point. 
As Kim points out in her theorisation of the parched tongue, the irony
of the global lingua franca status of English is that only certain versions of
English with certain accents, for example European accents, and we could
add, spoken by certain rather than other bodies, are considered to have a
rightful claim to the socio-economic privilege that the English language
accords. “Translated into untamable and uncivilized - grocery, nail salon,
fsh market English”, the marked deviance of Kim’s accent, with “too
much foreign touch” is not the cause, but the effect of the racialised
hierarchies manifested in the racial discrimination and segregation in the
labour market, as well as the historicity of American imperialism, or more
specifcally, of “U.S. - Korean Relations”. In other words, Kim’s accent is
the effect of what Chow calls “preemptive hierarchical value judgements”
(2014, 25). Just as Fanon discovers his blackness in the historico-racial
schema, Kim comes to recognise the shameful Korean infected English
pronunciation and her unruly tongue in the racialised political economy
of visual-aural encounters. 
This preemptive hierarchical value judgement resembles Jasbir Puar’s
diagnosis of the performative loop of the racialised visual episteme,
which means that Kim’s laborious attempts to pass as a native speaker of
English, an acquisition of whiteness (cf. Chow 2014; Fanon [1952] 2008),
will prove futile. This is expressed through the stubbornness of the
parched tongue, “sticking out of its own will against my arduous efforts”.
We could perhaps interpret the unruliness of the tongue, of Kim’s Korean
accent, in a similar vein as my earlier discussion of the uneasy
non/response to the accented utterance “musta mies”. That is, what is
unruly is precisely the historicity of racialisation and the sedimented
violence and injury that persistently and insistently articulates and
surfaces itself, through and as the parched tongue. Kim’s accented speech
is in fact a “skin tone” (Chow 2014), an expressed and perceived racial
identity that manifests audibly and visually (see Butler 1987, 1993b).
Importantly, as the term “skin tone” indicates, the visual and aural
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registry converse and translate into one another. 
This leads to the second insight gleaned from Kim’s poetic writing. For
Kim, the parched, brokenness of the tongue attests to the disjoining or
severance from the origin that is manifested on three levels: (1) the shame
and pain of the “generation of [Korean] comfort women who were forced
to work as sexual slaves to maintain high morale among soldiers in the
Japanese imperial army” (2007, 46); (2) the loss of the mother tongue,
through the phenomenon of Korean birth mothers who sent their
children to other countries for adoption “due to poverty, war, and the
stigma of unwed motherhood”(46); (3) and the perpetual state of
displacement of the general condition of language (read as chains of
signifcation) that is most vividly felt by racialised accented speaking
subjects. These are not independent, self-present levels, because the lost
origin defes such claims. Rather, Kim’s argument is similar to Chow’s
affrmation of discontinuity. That is, that these levels traverse and speak
through and as each other fnds expression in the parched tongue. Sara
Ahmed’s discussion of the different levels of the body is informative in
this regard. As Ahmed urges us: 
We need to refuse any assumption of the body as a material given that
operates at one level, in order to understand “the body” as  a trace of the
collision between different levels: the body feels, it is mine (psychic), this
body is read and interpreted (textual), this body is touched by others
(social), this body is written as “the body” (theoretical/philosophical),
and so on. (1998, 20, emphasis in original)
For Ahmed, traversing and “crossing over” (1998, 20) is the condition
for any identifcation and discussion of the body. Likewise, the tongue in
Kim’s theorisation comes to be felt, recognised and identifed, albeit in its
brokenness, precisely because of the sedimented and displaced historicity
of these intertwined levels – the tongue that feels, the tongue that is
touched by other tongues – whose relations are “always accidentally
confgured”. And yet, Kim’s revision of accent as the discontinuous
bodying forth of sedimented historicity, raises the question of the how of
the parchedness of the tongue. For although we can concede to the
displacement of the tongue that traverses multiple and indeterminate
levels, we still need to account for the ways in which the unease of this
displacement is expressed through the heat and the dryness of the tongue
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and the throat. For example, how is the memory of shame, once
embodied in the mother tongue that is now lost and disjointed from,
capable of “spilling through porous ... lines” (Kim 2007, 44) of “discrete
bodies” (44)? And how does the parched tongue articulate the affective
lived realities of racialisation if it is only discontinuous, decentered and
dispersed? 
Sneja Gunew’s account of the “stammering” (2003, 41) tongue in her
work on language learning practices in the context of colonisation and
migration could help us to think about this question further. According to
Gunew, the stammering sensation registered on the tongue in the process
of language learning testifes to the ways in which colonised and migrant
bodies are choreographed and structured. The palpable displacement of
the mother tongue is described as a form of somatic reaction that provides
an insight into the otherwise inaccessible unconscious process of
displacement and alienation. The stammer is a psycho-somatic expression
that indexes “a ghostly absence … where the presence of another tongue
impedes the subjugated tongue of the stammering speaker” (Gunew
2007, 107).
Importantly, the conception of language learning as choreographies of
the tongue, a psycho-somatic expression, leads us to think further about
the relationality of the corporeal and the psyche. A few issues bear closer
investigation. First of all is the question of what the two tongues in
Gunew’s analysis actually consist of. As Gunew explains, her theorisation
of the ghost absence of the mother tongue draws inspiration from Jacques
Derrida’s conception of “hauntology” ([1994]2006, 63) which is
understood to hint at an irreducible absent presence that undergirds the
question of being itself. According to Derrida, “To haunt does not mean
to be present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very
construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts
of being and time” ([1994]2006, 202). Given this, what does it mean to say
that the “presence of the other tongue impedes and subjugates the mother
tongue”?
Contrary to Derrida’s hauntology as the condition of any identity and
being, the mother tongue in Gunew’s writing was once present, and only
becomes an absent present because of the presence of and suppression by
another language. My point here is not to say that Gunew simply
misreads the implications of hauntology. Rather, I see this contradiction
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as indicative of the tension in accounting for the embodied specifcity of
the racialised language learning practices on the one hand, and the
general condition of discontinuity and displacement that is considered
symptomatic of an enlarged and universal process of writing, what Chow
terms “languaging” (2014, 37), and being. 
We can see this in the ways in which Gunew opposes somatic affect as
“corporeality in a specifc sense” (2004, 57) to “subjectivity in general”
(57). Gunew’s thinking on corporeal choreographies follows Elizabeth
Grosz’s corporeal feminism, where the study of bodies affords an
understanding of “concrete specifcities … in a way that mind does not”
(1994, vii; see also Hinton 2007, 4). For Gunew, the study of somatic affect
provides a glimpse into the psychic-corporeal operation of language that
presents as an alternative to subject formation through the visual register.
This conception of the visual clearly echoes Ahmed’s and Butler’s
insights, wherein the visual is understood as the subjective, the symbolic
and the cultural. With this in mind, we can see more clearly the originary
separation of the corporeal and the subjective, of specifcity and abstract
generativity in this account. Given this, one wonders how the “psychic
phenomena [of language learning] … are linked to corporeal reactions”
(Gunew 2004, 58). Related to this, feminist philosopher Adrianna
Cavarero’s theorisation of the voice needs to be mentioned here. I do not
claim to be able to give a thorough engagement with Cavarero’s delicate
writing, by which I am greatly inspired. I want to underline here the
ways in which Cavarero imputes transformative potential to the voice as
opposed to the visual sphere, as this relates to my discussion of the
racialised political economy of visual-aural encounters. For Cavarero,
“The visual sphere generates and decides the norms of politics” (2005,
158). Importantly, Cavarero does not posit the absolute distinction
between the vocal and the visual, and rejects the notion of the originary
wholeness of the mother tongue, the pure voice against language as the
Symbolic and the Paternal. As Cavarero dilates: 
[T]he insistence on the mother as the source of this vocalic pleasure –
no matter how good or theoretically grounded the intention may be –
does not therefore justify her stereotypical opposition to a father who
would be instead the one from whom speech ultimately comes. This
opposition in fact goes on corroborating the old metaphysical
dichotomy between “pure” phonic and “pure” semantic, which
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identifes the semantic itself with thinking rather than with speaking.
(2005, 179)
I absolutely concur with Cavarero’s insight on this point. What
differentiates my reading from Cavarero’s is the way in which she
conceives of the visual in terms of the subjective, whereas the vocal for
her is intersubjective and material. This is evident in her assertion that
“the aim is to free logos from its visual substance … to listen … in speech
itself the plurality of singular voices that convoke one another in a
relation that is not simply sound, but above all resonance” (Cavarero
2005, 179). Related to this, Cavarero reads Derrida’s conceptualisation of
auto-affection – the ways in which the speaker at once “coincides with …
and … dissociates himself from his name (pronounced, audible)” (2005,
237) – in terms of the separation of the presence from voice, as if the
immediacy of voice is itself not in question. In my opinion, however, this
precise excerpt on auto-affection speaks of the consubstantiality of the
subject and object of interpellation, a self-encounter that is a notion of
body as primordially inter-subjective (cf. Johncock 2014). 
Having said this, I now turn to the second concern regarding the
workings of the stammering tongue. Gunew’s conception of the psycho-
soma follows the Lacanian psychoanalytic account of language as
associated with the Symbolic, with consciousness, and with the paternal.
Calling into question the centrality of the ego in Freud’s thesis, Jacques
Lacan asserts “a rift, an unmastered gap or discontinuity between
consciousness and the unconscious” (Grosz [1990] 1998, 10). It is beyond
the scope of this dissertation to engage fully with psychoanalytic theory
and its implication for the theorisation of sexual and racial difference, but
in order to make sense of the idea of “trilling” race, I want to point out an
important detail in Lacan’s theorisation of language, which relates to our
discussion of Saussurean system of the sign. Saussure’s use of the
analogy of the sheet of paper to explain the relation between signifer and
signifed is signifcant here. Following Vicki Kirby, it has been argued
that the thickness of the paper itself presents as the separation between
signifer and signifed, in spite of Saussure’s overall argument about their
consubstantiality. Within the parameters of Lacanian formulation, the
space that separates the signifer from the signifed takes a central stage.
For Lacan, this space in-between presents as the absolute discontinuity
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between two chains of signifcation that are “separated by a barrier, a
censorship, which cannot be traversed” (Grosz 1990 [1998], 96). As Grosz
notes, “The unconscious consists in signifers which have fallen below the
barrier, i.e., submitted to repression, preventing them from traversing the
bar and gaining access to consciousness” (1990 [1998], 96). 
Given this radical break between the unconscious and consciousness in
the Lacanian framework to which Gunew explicitly refers, her
theorisation of the psycho-somatic reaction is indeed puzzling. What is
the nature of this linkage that bridges the unrepresentable psycho-
somatic operation, and our perception and conception of it? In addition,
what is the process through which the “somatic reaction” of one tongue
“impedes” or “subjugates” (in the sense of constrains, limits and forces
the submission of) the other? Where does this process take place? And
when does it begin?84    
84 There are some interesting and relevant observations within the feld of  second
language acquisition (cf. Moyer 2004; Norten 2000; Menard-Warwick 2009) as well as
phonetic sciences (cf. Hardcastle et al. 2013), that I want to mention here. .First, in the
scholarly felds of both second language acquisition and the phonetic sciences, cross-
disciplinary engagements are advocated. Second, some studies on the neurobiology of
second language acquisition could enter into an interesting dialogue with, if not
complicate or challenge some of the assumptions of, host country language learning
effciency, often articulated in discussions on integration.  For example, Simmonds et
al. suggests that “producing speech output does play a role in language acquisition,
but only indirectly. The beneft of speaking is not that it improves language
acquisition itself, but rather that the acquisition and use of fuent speech encourages
dialogue with others. Thus, speaking increases being spoken to, the quantity of which
is matched by the quality, as native speakers use more natural language to learners
they deem to be at a higher level” (2011, 9). Further to this, and somewhat counter-
intuitively, Simmonds et al. suggest that by artifcially prohibiting the production of
second language, adult language learners may be able to perceive the subtle features
and differences of inputs (thus better the production) of the second language, such as
“new phoneme distinctions and unfamiliar sequences of stress patterns” (2011, 10).
This is what they call a mute period, which can be artifcially induced, in which adult
second language learners are intensively exposed to the second language (especially
acoustically) before the actual uttering practices. Another interesting suggestion by
Simmonds et al. is that learning orally, rather than being exposed to the
written/orthography of the second language is to the advantage of the effcient speech
production. That is, “Representations of L2 speech sounds are more plastic and less
infuenced by automated activation of native representations that might be triggered
by reading a letter.” (Simmonds et al. 2011, 10) In sum, these observations suggest that
taking time to be spoken to, and to be exposed to the sound of the second language is
more benefcial for effcient second language acquisition than rushing into producing
the second language in both oral and written form. I want to emphasise that this does
not mean that the neurobiological researches on second language acquisition provides
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The title of this chapter “The Psychic Life of the Trilling Tongue”
alludes to Butler’s theories about the psyche and subject formation. In The
Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, Butler considers the ways in
which “power that at frst appears as external, pressing the subject into
subordination, assumes a psychic form that constitutes the subject’s self-
identity” (1997b, 3). In opening up and reconfguring the division
between the social and the individual, the Symbolic and the psyche,
Butler shows that not only can the spatial-temporal separation between
the two systems not be simply maintained, but also, and importantly, that
the social and the psychic do not pre-exist the process of internalization.
Through a critical intervention on subjection, Butler discovers the excess
of the unconscious and the residue of the body at the heart of power, and
rethinks agency and the possibility of transformation. We could recall our
earlier elaboration on the notion of trouble, which enables and compels
the reiterative operation of power. The formulation of the psychic life of
the trilling tongue points to two interrelated aims. First, with reference to
the “originary humanicity” (Kirby 2011) set out in chapter two, the
displacement of the psyche that is presumably human calls into question
the premises about the corporeal and the subjective, and assists us to
reconsider the nature of intention and agency,85 crucial for a conception of
the onto-epistemological dis/continuity of race. The second aim concerns
the accents and corporeography of the tongue, and is related to Butler’s
reference to Pierre Bourdieu’s theorisation of habitus. Likening the notion
of habitus with Althusser’s conception of ideology “that constitutes the
‘obviousness’ of the subject” (1997b, 210), Butler emphasises the sociality
of the body that enables the process of subjection. As Butler writes, “the
concept of the habitus … underscores the place of the body, its gestures,
its stylistics, its unconscious ‘knowingness’ as the site for the
reconstitution of a practical sense without which social reality could not
incontestable truth that should be simply applied in language learning and education
planning and practices. And the brief reading here in no way does justice to the feld
of neurobiological research on language acquisition. My intention  is to fag the
importance of interrogating the nature of language acquisition and the underlying
assumptions and investments in certain notions of effcient language learning process. 
85 Kirby's discussion of the book's title The Psychic Life of Power informs my reading here.
As Kirby writes, “To impute human intention to the notion of force/power, while at
the same time destabilizing the subject as a self-possessed and self-conscious agent,
muddles the reference points of these debates and makes us think more deeply about
our (humanist) premises”  (2006, 110).
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be constituted” (1997b, 210, emphasis in original). Especially relevant to
our discussion here is the notion of linguistic habitus exemplifed in
accented speech production (Bourdieu 1991). As Thompson elaborates:
A particular accent … is a product of a certain way of moving the
tongue, the lips, etc.:  it is an aspect of what Bourdieu calls, following
Pierre Guiraud, an “articulatory style”. The fact that different groups
and classes have different accents, intonations and ways of speaking is
a manifestation, at the level of language, of the socially structured
character of the habitus. (1991, 17)
In both Excitable Speech and The Psychic Life of Power, Butler takes
leverage from Bourdieu’s theorisation of habitus to rethink the operation
of the social, the linguistic and the psychic. Habitus, understood as
unconscious knowing and bodily being, which gives rise to a certain
obviousness (the second nature of bodily practices), is at once constitutive
of and regulated by the social and the linguistic. Butler argues that the
spatio-temporal differentiations between these seemingly separate realms
are radically compromised. 
In light of this, we could take further the reading of Kim’s poetic
writing about the parched tongue and Gunew's description of the
stammering tongue. I noted the importance of Kim’s strategic revision
wherein the shameful and anxious Korean accent is no longer the cause,
but is rather the bodying forth of the historicity of racialising and
sexualising violence and injury, as well as the lived realities of racial
discrimination and segregation, in for example the labour market. We
also wondered about the how of psycho-somatic reaction, the corporeal
choreography that makes it possible to understand the otherwise
inaccessible unconscious unease of the subjugation of the mother tongue
by the presence of the second language. With the notion of accent as
(linguistic) habitus, can we entertain the possibility that an accent, often
conceived of as a form of speech production which deviates from the
norm, is not so much the second-order error, but is the spatio-temporally
sedimented, dispersed, differentiated, yet objectively manifested
corporeality that is inter-subjective and agentic?  
With the assistance of Kim’s and Gunew’s theorisation of the tongue,
we have attempted to set into motion the question of origin and presence
in asking not only about the nature of the stammering tongue, but also
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about the where and when of its location. What happens if the
parchedness and the stammer of the tongue is not the reaction to a
prohibitive power that exerts its force from a supposedly locatable
outside, but is the dis/continuity – the process of uneasy delimiting – that
enables the performative reiteration of the racialised visual-aural
economy that is never in the same way (see Kirby 2011; Barad 2003). 86 I
want to underscore that this dis/continuity does not privilege
discontinuity, differentiating or splitting, (which in Chow’s and Kim’s
work, for example, is considered as the means to revaluate racialised
others) as the groundless ground that precedes the substantiation of the
corporeal, the social, the psychic. Rather, it emerges with, through and as
the psycho-soma that is the inter-subjective. The task in the remainder of
this chapter is to think further about this question and examine the
trilling tongue in its torsional self-encounter.  
Tonguing Tongued Tongues
Let me begin this contemplation with an episode in which I was
instructed by a friend to practice the alveolar trill with a pencil in my
mouth. 
Abril: “Place this pen, breadthwise, in your mouth. Bite it. Now push your
tongue against it. Do you feel the tip of your tongue?”
I nod.
Abril: “Good. Now try to move it up and down, say, rrr.” 
“lll.” 
Abril: “No, no, come on, chinita, say rrr.”
“lll.”
Abril: “No, you have to practice”, my friend laughed.
Frustrated by the stubbornness of my tongue, I took my friend’s advice
and tried the pencil. The entangled sensation of the warm and feshy
surface of the tongue caressing, and pushing the cold plastic body of the
pencil enabled a bodily awareness of and forceful attention to the tip of
the tongue. 
In an endeavour to think through the psychic life of the trilling tongue
86 In her article “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter
Comes to Matter”, Barad argues that “performativity is not understood as iterative
citationality (Butler) but rather intra-activity” (2003, 828). Barad's point here is to call
into question the assumption that performativity is the reiteration of the same. This
could be read in relation to Barad's formulation of discontinuous discontinuity. 
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that qualifes the premise of the tongue as a self-evident organ, as well as
the location of the sovereign subject who intends and perceives its racial
inscriptions, I want to consider here the verbal meanings of the word
“tongue”. When tongue is used as a verb, it connotes either: (1) a musical
sound (a note) made on a wind instrument by interrupting the air fow with
the tongue; or (2) a lick or caress with the tongue.87 The title of this section,
“tongued-tonguing”, is intended to accentuate these associations. These
meanings point to the general capacity of tongues to disturb an air stream
and to make it vibrate, thus producing sound. More importantly, they
indicate an articulation with and openness to other objects through
touching and licking.88 To stroke, to lick, to touch, to feel, to interrupt: the
materiality of the tongue articulates and is enacted by an open-ended
corporeography that is the process of transvaluation which entails the
whole of the body’s erotogenicity. 
The reference to the Freudian vocabulary of “erotogenicity” - “that
activity of a given bodily area which consists in conveying sexually
exciting stimuli to the mind” (Butler 1993b, 60) -  is a deliberate attempt to
think through the psychic life of the trilling tongue and to muddle the
separation of sexual difference from racial difference. Butler’s reading of
the instantiation and identifcation of body parts through the totality of
the process of erotogenicity, that also troubles the sovereignty of the
conscious subject, is informative here:
Curiously, Freud associates erotogenicity with the consciousness of
bodily pain … however, it is fundamentally unclear, even undecidable,
whether this is a consciousness that imputes pain to the object, thereby
delineating it – as is the case in hypochondria – or whether it is a pain
caused by organic disease which is retrospectively registered by an
attending consciousness. … If erotogenicity is produced through the
conveying of a bodily activity through an idea, then the idea and the
conveying are phenomenologically coincident.  As a result, it would
not be possible to speak about a body part that precedes and gives rise
to an idea, for it is the idea that emerges simultaneously with the
phenomenologically accessible body, indeed, that guarantees its
accessibility.  (1993b, 59)
87  See oxforddictionary.com.
88 The word “articulation” which connotes both making music and speech, and  forming
joints and connections, pairs well with the doings of the tongue that I want to stress
here. 
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Along these lines, we could consider that the tongue is not a fxed
substance, but it is made accessible and known, at the precise moment as
it demands and enables the attending consciousness. The substance of the
tongue is “its intra-active becoming – not a thing but a doing; a
congealing of agency” (Barad 2007, 336). 
The key to achieve the rolling r, or in its phonetic terminology, the
alveolar trill, lies in the activation of the tongue tip in the form of “a series
of very rapid tap-like closures” (Ashby and Maidment 2005, 59). This
movement of the tongue tip channels the airstream along the centre of the
tongue. The Finnish voiced alveolar trill or the the roll entails both the
vibration of the tongue tip and of the vocal chords. Chinese is my frst
language. I started learning English in Junior High school. Neither
Chinese nor English features the rolling r. How to activate the tongue tip
was already a major diffculty for me, let alone orchestrating and making
the airstream vibrate. The method of biting and pressing against the pen,
placed sideways in my mouth, did not directly lead to a successful rolling
r articulation. But the phenomenon of the tongued tongue tonguing pen
enabled an energising of the tongue tip. This did not result in a static and
muted adjacency or enmeshment of the tongue and the pen. Rather, the
action of the tongue tip, within the phenomenon of tongued tonguing
tonguing pen, is rather a set of pressing, squeezing and vertical
movements. The tongue licked and pressed against the pen. But so did
the pen tongue back on the tongue. This entangled phenomenon,
following Barad’s (2007) agential realist account, encompasses the
reconfguration and rearticulation of relationalities, hinting at a dynamic
topology with primary ontological units as “things” –  in – phenomena. 
The title of the section tonguing tongued tongues indicates this originary
dis/continuity. Through the somewhat confusing phrasing, putting
together the active, and the passive verbal forms and the noun form of
the word “tongue”, my intention is to trouble the assumptions about the
corporeal. This is also to foreground, by way of contrast, the inherent
rhythmic dynamic of corporeality,89 which is anything but dynamism,
89 I n Specters of Marx, Derrida speaks of the rhythm, that is the “waves, cycles, and
periods” ([1994]2006,133). As Derrida explains elsewhere, the rhythm is “the
intermediate schema” (2002, 99) that substantiates and undermines “the greatest
predictability” (99) and “the most unpredictable singularity” (99).  In my reading, this
rhythmic schema is the onto-epistemological dis/continuity. This has important
implications for questions of change or the possibilities of transformation. 
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because it is a dis/continuous operation through which it reads and
writes itself. To illustrate my point further, let’s turn to the following
accounts regarding how to train the trill posted by anonymous members
on the online forum kina.cc.90
My friends taught me this method. Use an electric toothbrush. Then tie
a soft copper wire at the brush end of the toothbrush. Turn on the
electric toothbrush and place it under your tongue. The copper wire
will make your tip of the tongue vibrate with it. Practice this daily for 2
months.  (My friend is Finnish. Her parents fgured out this method to
help her with articulating the rolling r when she was young. She could
not do it either back then). (This comment of the thread was entered in
the forum on 9th of February 2010.91)
Practice making knots out of cherry stalks. It can be either red or green
cherries for cocktails. The tongue should become quite fexible with this
practice. (This comment of the thread was entered on the forum on 11th
November 2006.92)
Lie on the bed. Relax your throat and your tongue. Feel the airstream
start from the end of the tongue. The airstream provides a wave-like
impetus along the tongue. This impetus would eventually enable the
vibration of the tip of the tongue. Finnish was my major in university. I
think it took me 2 months for pronouncing a clear rolling r. In the initial
stage, other consonants such as t and d are helpful. One can get rid of
them once one gets more experienced with the rolling r. (This comment
of the thread was entered on 1st of December 2006.)93
In the above accounts, a variety of creative strategies are suggested for
learning to activate the tongue tip, conjoined with organic and inorganic
artefacts and techniques. These artefacts include an electric toothbrush,
soft copper wire, cherry stalks and airstreams. The movement of the
tongue tip in articulating the consonants t and d are also suggested.
Technically, the oral consonant t is a voiceless alveolar stop, whereas the
90 This online forum is among one of the biggest virtual Chinese communities in Europe.
It was established in 2000. I became a member of this virtual community already in
2004 when I decided to pursue studies in Europe. 
91 See the original thread in Chinese at http://kina.cc/cm/script/forum/view.asp?
article_id=5441661, last accessed 8 July 2015.
92 See the original Chinese entry at http://kina.cc/cm/script/forum/view.asp?
article_id=4106227&Page=1, last accessed 8 July 2015.
93 See the original Chinese entry at http://kina.cc/cm/script/forum/view.asp?
article_id=4106227&Page=1, last accessed 8 July 2015.
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oral consonant d is a voiced alveolar stop. Alveolar stops are produced in
the vocal tract through a complete blockage of the airstream (Ashby and
Maidment 2005, 54). But the rolling r, as a voiced alveolar trill, as has
been discussed in chapter one, necessitates the channelling of the
airstream over the tongue tip so that it vibrates. As one member wrote,
the consonant t and d are supposed to assist the articulation of rolling r in
the initial stage. This is because these articulations and its involved
techniques enable an acute awareness and articulation of the tongue tip,
just as the sensation felt on my tongue tip when I tried to pronounce the
trill with a pencil in my mouth. In articulating alveolar stops, the tip
and/or blade of the tongue is pressed against the alveolar ridge, while
the tongue sides are pressed against the upper side teeth and gums
(Ashby and Maidment 2005, 54). The tongue tip in the articulation of the
consonants t and d can be seen as the materialisation of the phenomena of
tongued tongue tonguing alveolar ridge coupled with tongued tongue
tonguing teeth and tongued tongue tonguing gum. The awareness and
attention condensed on the tongue tip is qualitatively engendered and in-
formed by the kinaesthetic movements of the tongue in tonguing and
being tongued.  
Surely this process of learning the rolling r is emotionally laden. In my
experience, the inability to articulate the rolling r elicited surprise,
confusion and frustration. It was not until this moment that the
dysfunctional coordination of my tongue and the airstream, and the
resulting utterance mismatched with my expectation that my “mouth
work” (to quote Gunew 2007), became felt and audible. This echoes the
account which advocates relaxing the throat and the tongue by lying on
the bed. For Mandarin speakers, the closest to the rolling r is the
pronunciation of the Chinese d, similar to the English consonant t. The
airstream is obstructed to “Feel the airstream start from the end of the
tongue. The airstream provides a wave-like impetus along the tongue.
This impetus would eventually enable the vibration of the tip of the
tongue” (quoted from the third blog entry). When I tried to practice the
rolling r with the pen sideways in my mouth, it also brought forth
immensely uncomfortable, foreign and yet curious feelings. As the
tongue and the pen touched, licked, squeezed and stroke each other, I felt
the concentration on and the sensorial awareness of the tongue tip and
the possibility of moving it in a vertical motion. 
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But in my opinion, these emotionally laden and physically intense
practices do not necessarily and only evidence an oppression and
subjugation of the tongue. The tongue tip activated and made to vibrate
does not displace but reconfgures my Chinese mother tongue. That is,
borrowing Erin Manning’s term “originary technicity” (2007, xxii), the
tongue is qualitatively in-formed by technics and apparatuses at and of
its origin. As Manning maintains, “Technology is not something that is
simply added from outside. Technology is a supplement, an aspect of the
body that adds to it while it qualitatively alters the very body” (2007,
xxii). The mother tongue is never simply present or absent. Rather, its
identity is the open-ended process of entanglement – a dynamic topology
- that is the internal movement which produces and differentiates. I
suggest that the understanding of the mother tongue as lost, or
suppressed and awaiting recuperation, as we have seen in Kim's and
Gunew's respective work, is premised upon a conception of its spatio-
temporal separateness from the newly acquired foreign tongue.
Interestingly, both the notion of “parched tongue” and “stammering
tongue” foreground the felt movement of the tongue in the practices of
speech production, which expresses the psycho-soma dynamic of
displacement and uprootedness. It follows then, that for both Kim and
Gunew, the identity of the tongue is the process of its affective operation.
If the tongue is not an unchangeable entity, but whose substance is
materialised in tonguing and being tongued, then the question arises as
to how the mother tongue is replaced by the foreign tongue. Exactly
when and where does the foreign tongue begin? And when and where
does the mother tongue end?  
The confguration of the tongue as a dynamic and affective process
assists us to rethink its nature and its emergence. Rather than considering
the mother tongue as lost or as rendered ghostly present, because
oppressed by and subordinated to the other tongue, I argue that the
tongue is the tonguing tongued phenomenon that materialises, and in
fact is, the surface of the pen, the cherry stalk, the soft copper wire, the
felt airstream in the form of waves and the sensation of vibration. In other
words, in the practices of learning to roll r, the tongue is located,
identifed, all the while as it is displaced and differentiated. Such a
non/locatability (see Kirby 1997, 2011) means that the specifcity of the
tongue's emergence expresses and implicates the entirety of the force feld
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of transvaluation. It should be noted that this formulation of the
substance of the body as the dynamic process of materialising does not
suggest a simple assembly that adds together various human and
nonhuman apparatuses. 
For example, in “How to Talk about the Body”, Bruno Latour forwards
the notion of “articulation”. According to Latour, the term articulation
assists “to take on board the artifcial and material components allowing
one to progressively have a body” (2004, 210, emphasis in original). For
Latour, the articulated body is materialised in learning “to be affected
through the conjoining of the body with artefacts, techniques, and
technologies which defne the particular social practice” (Blackman 2008,
97; Latour 2004). My proposition of the non/locatability of the tongue as
an intra-active phenomenon (see Barad 2007; Kirby 2011) differs from
such a confguration of assemblage. The non/locatability of the tongue
means that the material being of the tongue is the inter-subjective
relationality that is dis/continuous at and of the beginning. To reiterate,
such a conception does not privilege either discontinuity or continuity,
but radically reconfgures both terms. Further to this, the identity of any
entity – the tongue, the body, the human, the nonhuman – is emergent
with/in a force feld of differentiation, which does not proceed these
identities in either spatial or temporal sense. In Latour’s conceptualisation
of the sensorial body as an assemblage, it seems that although the
nonhuman apparatuses acquire or are accorded agency (as Latour’s
description “to take on board” seems to imply), the hybridity and
multiplicity of the body as an assemblage is found on the logic of “and-
ness” (see Kirby 2011). That is, it is a form of conjoining and aggregating
that is inclusive in nature. We see this in Latour’s following statement:
“Articulations … may easily proliferate without ceasing to register
differences. On the contrary, the more contrasts you add, the more
differences and mediations you become sensible to” (2004, 211, emphasis in
original). This understanding of proliferation here appears to be rooted in
a conception of difference as different from, a point we have dilated upon
earlier. Moreover, Latour distinguishes between an inarticulate subject
and an articulate subject. Whereas the former is said to be affected only
by itself, the latter is “affected by others – not by itself” (2004, 210,
emphasis in original). As Latour further distinguishes articulation from
inarticulation, “Articulation thus does not mean ability to talk with
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authority … but being affected by differences” (2004, 210). Clearly, Latour
opposes identity to difference. Curiously then, there remains an
unqualifed investment in the identity of difference in Latour’s paradigm
that attempts to include and grant equal agentic capabilities to all human
and nonhuman entities. 
Approaching the question of difference through onto-epistemological
dis/continuity, and in a way that might also assist to think further with
Latour’s insistence on the holistic conception of the body, which does not
divide into the physiological and the phenomenological, I argue that the
phenomenon of tonguing tongued encounters is always a self-encounter,
myself to myself. This means that the tongue wills, desires and learns to
perceive and to be affected by (others) itself. In so doing, the tongue
(re)conceives and identifes itself and its other. Furthermore, this
non/locatability also means that these tonguing tongued phenomena
cannot be confned into the quarantined realms of the biological, the
social, the psychic or the cultural.  
What is the implication of the reconfgured notion of identity and
difference for an examination of Finnishness? My following discussion is
an attempt to address this question. To begin with, I want to recall one of
the anonymous member’s suggestion to activate the tongue tip through
the use of copper wire, was provided to the anonymous user by a Finnish
friend. According to the post, this Finnish friend could not articulate the
rolling r when she was young. Her parents devised this method of using
an electric toothbrush and soft copper wire to help her. The emphasis on
the Finnishness of the method, in my opinion, refects two intentions of
this anonymous member. On the one hand, it claimed the technique’s
viability. It was a Finnish method that helped the Finnish friend who at
an early age had diffculty pronouncing rolling r, and the scenario implies
that the technique must have worked. On the other hand, it also implied
that even a Finn might not be able to articulate the rolling r. Thus, the
diffculty that a Chinese speaker faced could be solved with right
techniques and suffcient practices. We see how the racialised
stereotypical fxity of the Finnishness of the trill is both destabilised and
reinstalled in this account. 
Related to the question of the Finnishness of the trill, I want to  return
to the opening scene in which I successfully pronounced the trilling r
during a Finnish lesson. What happens if this scene is approached in
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terms of Butler’s racialised visual feld? Recalling Butler’s description
here, the racialised body is always circumscribed and read in certain
ways, prior to any actual gesture of the body. In other words, racialised
visual regulatory norms are “the narrative precedent and antecedent to
the frames that are shown” (Butler 1993a, 16), which order and rearrange
the visual feld and its pluralities into a coherent fction.  In light of
Butler’s account of seeing as reading and writing in the general sense, this
scene can be interpreted as a performative encounter/enactment. That is,
the way in which I was seen performatively already anticipated and
materialised how I might be heard. 
However, using Ahmed’s account of the affective porosity of skin, we
can further argue that while the socialised visual feld sets (racialised)
limits to intelligibility - how I might be read and why I would probably
fail - the feeling, for example, of such nervous apprehension in being read
by others made me aware of the bodily boundaries and differences that
set me apart from others. Yet, with Puar and Saldanha as our guides here,
we also want to account for the haptic encounter, such as, for example,
the tension felt on my tongue tip - its activation, its rubbing, pressing,
licking, tapping – and the blockage formed by the interaction of the
tongue tip and the air stream. But how do I come to feel and register these
tensions? How are they limited, delineated and made intelligible? How
do they emerge? 
My articulation of the rolling r bodies forth the audible and palpable
movement of the vibration of airstreams and articulators, a strange self-
encounter that occurs within me. What confused and shocked the teacher
and other students that gave rise to a conficting reading of my race
cannot be reduced to the epistemological economy that equates seeing
with ocular perception. Rather, this visual perception of my Chineseness
is already a saturated feld of perception that involves a complex and
intricate transvaluation and translation of the tone and pitch of my
utterance and the vibration of my tongue. In order to digest this scene
from a different perspective I want to turn to Florence Chiew’s work on
sensory substitution. Here, we are offered another approach that again
questions the  easy assumption that sensory modalities are somehow
independent of each other. Working with research in neuroplasticity, her
account of its wiring is one of interimplicated connectivity, which Chiew
goes on to elaborate as an ecology of mind, or ecological tangle. As Chiew
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argues, “the individual experience of perception is not separable from the
general ecology of phenomena” (2012, 48). Calling into question the
locatability of the origin of perception, the where and what it is that
confounds the difference between perception and sociality, Chiew draws
on a familiar example in phenomenological research and discusses “the
points of contact between the blind man, the cane, the object/ground”:
[T]he blind person’s perceptual experience is oddly “externalized”
from the hand to the point of interaction between the cane and the
object/ground, suggesting that the cane has been incorporated into his
body schema, and one might say indeed that the cane is the hand, or
that the cane is the eye – and even that the ground is the eye! (2012, 51) 
The tongue becomes tense when faced with the rolling r challenge.
Can the tongue see the approaching teacher and the judgemental gaze of
other students? Can the tongue hear the teacher’s pronunciation of the
rolling r? Can the tongue predict and anticipate my potentially failed
attempts, my accented foreign pronunciation? Do the modalities of
perception recall each other? Chiew’s work on neuroplasticity and
sensory substitution cogently shows that the emergence of any modality,
any “locus” of perception, in fact any entity, involves the whole system of
translation and differentiation. Rather than an absolute break or
separation of entirely foreign entities, we could say that the origin of
encounters remains strangely open, local and dispersed, a constant that
continually reads and rewrites itself.  In light of this account, the tongue
sees and hears through tonguing and being tongued in practicing the
rolling r. I see this scene as a stuttering moment of race not only because
it is a crisis of perception that is the performative reiteration in which
power as visibility as sensibility as sociality is astonished and confused,
but one which also confrms the alienness within itself - between its own
anticipation of perceiving the condensation, translation and
convers(at)ion (see Kirby 2011) of Chinese accented speech production
and its substantiation.94 In doing so perception as sociality re-reads and
re-writes itself, even appearing as “not Chinese” sometimes and thereby
changing for everyone what the living signifer of Chinese identity
actually is. Tonguing tongued encounters are expressions of the scene of
94 The notion of “convers(at)ion” draws on Kirby's provocation that “any identity is
articulated with and by all others” (2011, 88).
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writing origin, a scene which includes the intricately involved condition
of limit-ing with, in and as emergence, integral to the performative
reiterations in which race’s “arrival” will always founder and stutter. 
Conclusion: Part Two
The question of what race is, according to Saldanha, should be coupled
with another equally urgent query about what race can be. As he explains:
Race need not be about order and oppression, it can be wild, far-from-
equilibrium, liberatory. … Similarly, the  molecularisation of race
would consist in its breaking up into a thousand tiny races … the
pleasure, the curiosity, and concern in encountering a multiplicity of
corporeal fragments outside the common sense taxonomies. (2006, 19)
Saldanha’s assertion is indicative of the current critical investment in
the hope to transform preemptive racialisation mechanisms, to revaluate
the materiality and agency of racialised bodies, and eventually to shift
our understanding of the nature of race. To be sure, my discussion of the
racialised political economy of visual-aural encounters shares the same
conviction that the question of race must be addressed rather than
shunned. And yet, in positing the onto-epistemological dis/continuity
throughout my analysis in this chapter, I hope that have shown that the
various temporal and spatial gaps – between the unconscious and
consciousness, between the visual and the aural, between the corporeal
and the discursive, between ontogenetic and epistemological, between
continuity and discontinuity, between nature and culture – that are
imputed to have transformative potential are im/possible to maintain.   
Beginning from the question of the visual and aural in the Saussurean
system of signs, proceeding to the weight of the racialised political
economy of visual-aural encounters, and fnally to the exploration of the
psychic life of the trilling tongue, my aim in this chapter is to rethink
some of the premises regarding the process of racialisation through
locating it in the particular discussion of accented speech production. The
trilling tongue articulates the dis/continuity that also marks the
non/locatability of race, that we also saw in the case of the “musta mies”
event in the classroom. 
In traversing the above mentioned realms that are supposedly
separated by an insurmountable gap, I argue that discussions of race,
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commonly perceived to be a risky terrain, should not and in fact cannot
be simply avoided by virtue of their essentialising tendencies. In fact,
even the nature of essence trills and reinstalls itself. In light of this, a
major focus of the latter part of the chapter has been on the psychic life of
the tongue. The deliberate manoeuvre that affrms, refutes and
reconfgures the anthropomorphic confgurations of agency, intention
and psychic interiority is consistent with the general contemplation of the
thesis regarding the dis/continuity of human race and racial differences
and the necessity for an account of “originary humanicity”. The tongued
tonguing tongues present the originarily inter-subjective corporeality as
displaced and differentiated, at the same time as it is  localized and
specifc.
Accordingly, the onto-epistemological dis/continuity is the primordial
sociality, a self-encounter that conditions and whose emergence is
simultaneously dependent upon, because manifested through and as the
weight/gravity/valuer of, identifcation. In this racialised political
economy of visual-aural encounters, the process of exchange and
transvaluation produces racialised and accented speaking bodies.
Moreover, the valuation process itself is unavoidably the erotogenic
transmutation of the racialised body.  I have argued that such a
conception of valuation proves crucial for the contestation of the
reifcation of certain accented bodies as the locus of racial differences,
whose lack of linguistic capital, because of erroneous speech production,
is said to cause disadvantage in the labour market.  
Through the conception of the psychic life of the trilling tongue, I
venture to rethink the nature of transformation in terms of an “intra-
ontology of being itself” (Barad 2007; Kirby 2010, 136), wherein alterity
and difference are intrinsic. This intra-ontology radically reconfgures the
relation between the mother tongue and the foreign tongue from that of
oppressive displacement and limitation to that of immanent enactments.
In other words, the relation between self and other, and difference as
temporally and spatially separated from identity, is reformulated as
follows: “It is not another entity on the border of my being, an entity that
marks the limits of my situation and what can be known from what is
unknown. If the limit to my situation is chiasmatically given, then my
situation is more than local” (Kirby 2011, 136). 
This last quotation leads us to the question of ethics that is central to
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feminist politics of difference. I can imagine that the ensuing question or
concern from my foregoing discussion is the ethical effect of how I
negotiate between difference and identity, specifcity and universality.
More specifcally, how the seemingly generalised and theoretical
engagements can account for everyday encounters in the political
economy of racialisation without further essentialising racial differences.
This is a question I have often been asked during the dissertation work. In
fact, I have kept on asking myself this very question, as I consider it
highly salient not only in our critical scholarly engagements with race
and difference, but as the engagements have direct implications for socio-
political negotiations and transformations. In this thesis, I have tried to
engage with this conundrum from the start, and will continue to focus on
it in the remaining chapters. As a whole, part two argues for a notion of
trilling race, that witnesses “corporeography” (Kirby 1997) wherein
visuality as aurality as tactility is “utterly referential” (Kirby 2011, 124). In
view of this, I argue that we should not, and in fact cannot simply move
beyond the visual, with the invested hope in identifying that which is
before and beyond signifcation or a racialised epistemological knowing.
Furthermore, the analysis of tonguing tongued encounters and the
psychic life of the trilling tongue suggests that bodies racialise
themselves, or that racialisation only happens by and through the body.
This is a form of bodily complicity, which as Peta Hinton maintains,
means that  the stuff of the body “(as difference) shares in a process of
producing value or meaning, even if this meaning is considered
‘negative’, and even if it is productive of relations of inequality” (2007,
225). Clearly, this raises disconcerting questions regarding ethics and the
possibility of political change. For example, Butler meditates on the
question of complicity in the process of subject formation and its
implication for notions of agency and subordination:
A critical evaluation of subject formation may well offer a better
comprehension of the double binds to which our emancipatory efforts
lead without, in consequence, evacuating the political. Is there a way to
affrm complicity as the basis of political agency, yet insist that political
agency may do more than reiterate the conditions of subordination? ...
The temporal paradox of the subject is such that, of necessity, we must
lose the perspective of a subject already formed in order to account for
our own becoming. That “becoming” is no simple or continuous affair,
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but an uneasy practice of repetition and its risks, compelled yet
incomplete, wavering on the horizon of social being. (1997, 29-30)
Butler’s contemplation raises many important questions that are
particularly relevant for feminist political and ethical engagements, which
will continue to be addressed in the following chapter. Whereas Butler
focuses on the complicitous nature of subject formation, what I am
proposing, following Kirby and Hinton, is that the very stuff or substance
of bodies is a corporeo-graphy that generates and is produced in the
general process of valuation and weighing, as thinking and writing. This
also means that difference is intrinsic and change is constant. As with
corporeal feminism (see Grosz 1994), racialised corporeality is itself open
to transformations and reconfgurations. 
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Part Three 
Chapter Seven
“Not Like a Native Speaker”: The Limits of Polyvocal 
and Performative Transgressions
Prelude
In a recent television documentary program Silminnäkijä [Eyewitness]95
aired by the Finnish national broadcasting company YLE, the issue of
accents was featured prominently as a marker of race. The signifcance of
the aural quality of accents was made all the more obvious in scenes
where all three participants, among whom only one spoke Finnish as a
native language, while the other two spoke Russian and Somali
respectively, made inquires for jobs by phone. As the three possessed
exactly the same credentials and working experiences, the only
differences between the applicants communicated over the phone were
their accented speech and their names. Both the Finnish and the ethnic
Russian were invited to two interviews, but the participant who spoke
Finnish with a Somali accent was not interviewed for any of the jobs. 
The issue of accent and its impact on communication was often
addressed in the different Finnish for foreigners classes that I attended.
For example, one of the teachers explained to us the necessity of
correcting students’ accents: “I was at a seminar, and we were suggested
to correct your pronunciation at an early stage”. And she continues to
explain: “there have been some cases … they know the vocabulary... but
cannot speak it correctly”. 
This part of the dissertation considers the urgency of racial
transformations through a critical engagement with questions of
polyvocality as well as transgressive performativity. Chapter seven
examines polyglots’ accents and cyborgs’ noises. It asks whether the
95 http://yle.f/uutiset/yle_uncovers_discrimination_in_job_market_and_nightclub_qu
eues/6885954, last accessed 16 July 2015.
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difference between universality and specifcity, homogeneity and
heterogeneity, represents an inevitable impasse for a feminist politics of
difference. It also asks about the possibilities and limitations of
transformation. Chapter eight engages with the art work Mamme/Vårt
land to investigate the paradoxical yet productive tension between
normative anticipation and transformation, with its attendant
problematic of responsible feminist practices of knowledge production.
After all, the question of how to think race differently often leads to
discussions of norms, and their implications for the politics and ethics of
theorising race. 
Against “Mother Tongue”: Rethinking Nomads’ Accents and 
Cyborgs’ Noises 
Nomads and Cyborgs, conceived as “traveling companions” (Braidotti
2011, 66), present as two of the most infuential feminist fgurations.
Evoking embodied experience as much as mythical abstraction and
idealization, the fguration of nomads and cyborgs affords a
reconciliation of the tension between specifcity and universality in Rosi
Braidotti’s and Donna Haraway’s respective political projects. That is,
they pay attention to the historical specifcity of embodied subjectivities,
on the one hand, and the necessity to radically reconfgure a phallocentric
conception of universality, on the other. For Braidotti (2011), nomads and
cyborgs as travelling companions promise a shift toward political
alignment through heterogeneity and coalition, counterposed to
homogenous community formation. Nevertheless, the ways in which
embodied specifcity is accommodated within the abstract fguration of
nomads and cyborgs has been criticised for its neutralisation of
differences, such that all differences are rendered equally different (cf.
Gedalof 1999).
At stake here is the difference between homogeneity and
heterogeneity, and by extension, universality and specifcity. Is this an
inevitable impasse for feminist politics, or, as Peta Hinton points out, “the
symptomatic of the convoluted nature of difference itself” (2007, 9)? In
this section, I will approach this supposed impasse with a focus on how
nomads’ accents and cyborgs’ noises are attributed empowering and
transformative potential. Nomads’ and cyborgs’ politics advocate the
plurality of voices against the unifying force of language and the lament
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over the lost mother tongue. However, while nomads’ accents and
cyborgs’ noises exhibit multiplicities and complexities, in as much as they
are presented as other than “once-upon-a-time wholeness before language,
before writing, before Man” (Haraway 1989, 174-175), the difference
between specifcity and universality is curiously recuperated. In other
words, the loss of a steady fxed origin provides the universal condition for
cacophonous politics. But if the origin is re-marked as unitary and lost
against which the evolved difference of nomads’ and cyborgs’ affrmative
politics can be measured, then at work is the simultaneous instantiation
of the lost origin and nomadic and cyborgian subjectivities. 
In an attempt to engage with Braidotti’s meditation on “the question of
how feminists reconcile the radical historical specifcity of their embodied
experience with the insistence on constructing new values that can beneft
humanity as a whole” (2011, 66), I will turn to Jacques Derrida’s (1998)
conceptualisation of the question of the mother tongue in postcoloniality.
I want to begin by conjuring a scenario of accented and multilingual
communication. It is presented, hyperbolically, as exemplary of the
everyday communications experienced among immigrants in Finland
trying to use their newly acquired Finnish language (or target language,
as Derrida would have it).
“Kaak’ao! I said Kaak’ao, but she could not understand me, so I had to
say hot chocolate!” Ilona complained, as we sat down at a cafe after that
day’s Finnish class. This “miscommunication” struck me as odd. Ilona
was my classmate at the Finnish for Foreigners class organised by
Arbis/Työväenopisto in Turku. She moved from Poland to Finland with
her husband, who started his doctoral training at Åbo Akademi
University. She spoke Polish as her mother tongue, as well as fuent
English. Our accented English conversations were always smooth. It is
thus intriguing that the subtle infection in stress and aspiration in Ilona’s
Finnish pronunciation brought her considerable diffculty in Finnish
conversational situations. As is described in the case here, the Finnish
word “kaak’ao”, translated into English as “hot chocolate”, is normally
pronounced with the stress on the frst syllable. In Ilona’s pronunciation,
the stress was on the third. Also, the plosive consonant k in Finnish
resembles the English consonant k as in the word “kit”, but should be
pronounced without aspiration. 
A quick note on the workings of aspiration is informative here.
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Aspiration, in phonetic terms, indicates that the Voice Onset Time – the
delay from the start of the burst of the airstream occluded in the vocal
tract, which is “the airway from the larynx to the lips, and the side-branch
via nasal cavities to the nostrils” (Ashby and Maidment 2007, 22) to the
beginning of vocal fold vibration – lasts longer than 30ms. In the case of
voiceless unaspirated plosives, the Voice Onset Time lasts for a shorter
time, around 10ms in average (Ashby and Maidment 2007). Ilona’s
pronunciation of the phoneme k resembled that of the voiceless aspirated
plosive k. But the difference between an aspirated and unaspirated
plosive k is in fact only a matter of degree. That is, they differ by the
duration that the vocal folds – contained within the cartilage – are held
still, and by the intensity in the burst of air. For Ilona, this difference was
diffcult to discern. Not only did she fnd it diffcult to actually hear the
difference between the Finnish consonant k and the English voiceless
aspirated plosive k, she also had trouble in keeping the stress always on
the frst syllable. 
The feeling that she was pronouncing the right word, using correct
grammar, but still could not be understood or heard “correctly” was
somewhat disturbing and indeed confusing. The concomitant anxiety is
considerable if one is uncertain whether one’s pronunciation of the most
simple words such as kaakao or even one’s own name could be
understood. In fact, the Finnish teacher in our Finnish for Foreigners
course was also called Ilona. Unlike the Polish pronunciation, with stress
on the second syllable, the name in Finnish is pronounced with stress on
the frst syllable, as with all other Finnish words. If the
miscommunication in the kaakao example is intriguing, yet somewhat
understandable, the diffculty in registering an address/a hailing,
because one’s name is pronounced with a slight different intonation, as
described in the following example, presents a puzzle that challenges my
assumptions about accents and communication.
During a lecture at the Finnish for foreigners course, I sat with Ilona
for group work. Some questions regarding the group work came up.
Ilona wanted to ask the teacher for help, but hesitated. “I don’t know how
to call her name”, she turned to me and the other classmate in our group.
“But you have the same name, why can’t you just call her the same way
as you would call yourself.” I was curious. “She won’t understand me. I
would say Il’ona, the Finnish version goes down”. Ilona explained her
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concern. “But try, maybe she will, I will write this in my feld notes”, I
encouraged her, fnding this all the more interesting in relation to Ilona's
and my earlier discussion regarding the pronunciation of kaakao. She
agreed. “Il’ona”. No response. “Il’ona”, still no response. “Il’ona”, the
third time she called out slightly louder. This time the teacher Ilona
turned around, and said “just a minute”.
Braidotti’s nomadic subjects seem to provide counter arguments
against the racialisation of accents, as the justifcation for various forms of
racism. The transgressive and transformative potential attributed to
cacophony and to the polyvocality of the polyglot certainly poses a
radical challenge to the politicisation of accents and other forms of
“insuffcient” language skills, fgured as a threshold in the integration
discourse. It may be argued with Braidotti that if we are all together “in a
tenuous and yet workable web of mediated misunderstandings” (2011, 40,
my emphasis), and if “we are all stuttering for words, even when we
speak ‘fuently’” (2011, 40), then the issues with accents or other
diffculties in language acquisition are not so much threats to perfect
communication, as the exemplary expression of the nomadic polyglot
practices.
Nevertheless, the scenarios presented earlier do not sit comfortably
with the celebration of accents and misunderstandings. Ordering hot
chocolate at a café and addressing others by name are exemplary of
quotidian communication situations. They are also considered to be good
means to practice Finnish. For example, the Finnish teacher Ilona
organised meet-ups at cafés and bars after class, so that we (the students)
could all practice Finnish by ordering drinks and food. Such practices
were also meant to encourage us to get more comfortable with speaking
Finnish in public, and in ordinary conversational settings. In light of this,
one can surely get a sense of my classmate Ilona’s anxiety and frustration.
For Ilona, the uncertainty about certain pronunciations made some of
these supposedly simple conversational routines at once enlarged and
fractured into episodes of intonation, stress, airstream and others’
responses. If nomads take pleasure from accented miscommunication, as
if playing “a constant and childlike game of persifage” (Braidotti 2011,
40), then it seems that Ilona’s anxiety and frustration disqualifes her as a
nomadic, poly-lingual subject. Indeed, while it is obvious that “polyglot
nomadic intellectuals” (Braidotti 2011, 21) such as Luce Irigaray and
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Braidotti herself could ft easily into the nomadic framework, it remains
unclear to whom the phrase “polyglot Asians of all kinds” (Braidotti
2011, 41) refers, and in what ways they exhibit polyglots’ creativity and
transgressive capacity.
I puzzled intensely over the strangeness of this question: if the
nomadic polyglot provides a model of feminist coalition through partial
connections, why do some of the everyday practicalities in terms of
language learning among adult migrants seem to be at odds with the
cacophonous pleasure of the nomadic polyglot practices? This seems to
resemble the problem of difference and representation, and by extension,
specifcity and universality, central to various forms of debates in
feminist theorisation and politics. Detailed ethnographic
contextualisation shows that the scenarios presented here could not be
adequately located in or addressed by the nomadic framework. It can be
further argued that the incorporation of such embodied subjectivities
would signifcantly contribute to a more robust feminist politics of
difference, promoted by nomadic subjectivities and cyborgian politics.
From a slightly different perspective, one can also diagnose the implicit
whiteness in Braidotti’s theorisation of nomadic polyglots and Haraway’s
fguration of cyborg politics, because the play of accents and noises
already seem to presume a certain form of bodily and linguistic
capacities, as well as class and social mobility. One can analyse Ilona’s
case further and argue that even though she was troubled by her Finnish
pronunciation, she was highly educated and fuent in English, so that she
could in any case switch to English. 
In a different Finnish for Foreigners class that I attended, a more
dramatic “miscommunication” scenario took place when a student from
the Dominican Republic, who spoke only Spanish, joined the class. Since
the Finnish course was taught in English, the teacher was not prepared
for a situation in which a student knew no English at all. This led to an
intensely awkward scenario in which the teacher’s simple questions in
English and in Finnish such as “what is your name” were returned with
nothing but a blank stare from the student. Even when the teacher tried
to ask again much more slowly, the response from the student was only
an even deeper blush and more staring. Both of them looked around the
class, almost crying out for help. “Now we have a problem”, the teacher
explained, “we have to try to make her feel comfortable. She must be very
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scared if she does not speak any language at all”.96 Luckily, a student
from Germany volunteered to translate, as she was fuent in English and
had learned Spanish at school. 
This instance troubled me even further. Who can actually qualify as a
nomadic polyglot? This echoes concerns over the ways in which
embodied specifcities are accommodated within the abstract fguration
of nomads and cyborgs. In her book Against Purity, Irene Gedalof
describes the conundrums in Braidotti’s nomadic feminism as the
diffculty in “sustaining a double focus on ‘women’ and their differences”
(1999, 123). For Gedalof, the fguration of the nomad unwittingly re-
centres the white Western feminist subject. Acknowledging the
“undoubted sensitivity” (1999, 123) towards the question of difference in
Braidotti’s nomadic project, Gedalof worries that “the differences that
race, nation and other community identities might make to her [the
nomadic] model” (127) fail to be engaged. Similarly, the ways in which
women of colour are posited as cyborgs par excellence has been criticised
for the “incorporation by analogy” (Schuellar 2009, 54). According to
Malini Johar Schueller, such an “incorporation by analogy” points to “the
methodology by which racial difference gets incorporated into and
bracketed under gender difference, locatedness under generalized
language of border crossings” (2009, 54). And as Jasbir Puar furthers this
argument, the “specifc difference of ‘women of color’, … has now become
… simultaneously emptied of specifc meaning in its ubiquitous
application and yet overdetermined in its deployment” (2012, 52). For
Schueller, the problem lies in the implicit recuperation of universalism
96 This reminds me of the question of the rationale of multilingualism in the EU
economic integration policy. This rationale grounds its motif in countering the
dividing linguistic impact of the Cold War – whereas English (and French to a lesser
extent) dominate the Western side of Europe, Russian was predominantly used for
communication and education in Eastern Europe. In contrast with and in fear of the
fascist linguistic ideology of Germany during the Second World War and the linguistic
pervasion strategy of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) in the cold war,
multilingualism was seen as a sound solution for mitigating the tension on the one
hand, and advancing the socio-economic integration of Europe on the other (cf. Bot
2010). For example, early second language teaching is made compulsory in many
European member states. The profciency in other European languages is understood
as supporting the border free movement of labour in European countries. However,
this multilingualism is a selective one, in the sense that languages spoken by
immigrants outside the European Union were neglected in the European linguistic
landscape (cf. Buchberger 2002). 
193
within feminist theory, “even as universalism is ostensibly being
challenged as imperialistic” (2009, 54). Like Gedalof, Schueller argues for
grounding analyses in “a specifc, local moment” (2009, 67). It needs to be
highlighted here that the question of race ultimately becomes the centre
in the debate about difference. This is an important point that I will
shortly return to. Importantly, Braidotti and Haraway, as well as other
theorists inspired by the nomadic and cyborgian projects, have indeed
responded to the charges of relativism through theoretical and
methodological elaborations.
Nevertheless, my point here is not to simply diagnose or to offer
correctives and counter claims. In my opinion, the claim that a
particularity is missing from feminist political and theoretical projects,
does not solve the conundrum, for the multiplication of differences
rehearses the very logic of liberal humanism (cf. Butler 1993b), or in
Haraway’s terms, a “white humanism” (2004, 20). This is because it
obtains the distinction and opposition between embodied specifcity and
abstract universality. At stake here is the difference between homogeneity
and heterogeneity, and by extension, universality and specifcity. Is this
an inevitable impasse for feminist politics, or, in Hinton’s terms, is it
“symptomatic of the convoluted nature of difference itself” (2007, 9)?
Recalling the examples presented earlier, what needs to be asked here,
rather than simply assumed, however, is this: what constitutes the
specifcity of these scenarios? Indeed, why is it that accents, understood
as embodied markers of difference that carry traces of one’s mother
tongue(s), so readily grounds claims of specifcity, signifying originary
uniqueness as well as racial and ethnic differences? How do accented
speaking subjects emerge? As I have argued in the previous chapter, the
location of accent, as linguistic habitus, involves the entirety of a
corporeography that is primordially inter-subjective. That is, even the
seemingly self-evident location of the accented speech by an individual
speaker is emergent as it is displaced and dislocated. This operation of
onto-epistemological dis/continuity also calls into question the taken-for-
granted distinction between miscommunication and communication.
With these concerns, I venture to address the tension of universality
and specifcity with a focus on the question of race and the aural as
manifested in nomads’ accents and cyborg’s noises. I want to further
think with Braidotti’s provocation to consider “the question of how
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feminists reconcile the radical historical specifcity of their embodied
experience with the insistence on constructing new values that can beneft
humanity as a whole” (2011, 66). Thinking through the nature of
difference and the problematic of race, I want to consider whether the
tension between homogeneity and heterogeneity, and by extension,
universality and specifcity inevitably persists as a virtual impasse for
feminist politics.
Nomadic Polyglots and Cyborgs
The polyglot is a linguistic nomad, an embodied subject who is at once
situated and non-unitary. The notion of “non-unitary” is crucial here.
Embedded in a Deleuzian framework of becoming and the Irigarayan
notion of sexual difference, Braidotti defnes non-unitariness in terms of
“qualitative multiplicities” (2006, 94) as opposed to “quantitative
pluralities” (94). As she notes, quantitative pluralities pertain to steady
and fxed identities, that are “merely a multiple of One” (Braidotti 2006,
94), required by the “political economy of global capitalism as a system
that generates differences for the purpose of commodifying them” (94).
Such a unitary form of identifcation entails violent exclusion that is
underpinned by the logic of noncontradiction and mutual exclusion, so
that for example “to be ‘European’ … excludes blacks and Muslims. To be
feminist assumes an identity that excludes blacks and lesbians, and so
on” (Braidotti 2006, 94). Contrary to this, non-unitary subjects indicate
qualitative multiplicities, that “express changes not of scale, but of
intensity, force, or potentia (positive power of expression), which traces
patterns of becoming” (Braidotti 2006, 94). As Braidotti makes clear, 
This subject can also be described as postmodern/industrial/colonial,
depending on one’s location. In so far as axes of differentiation such as
class, race, ethnicity, gender, age and others intersect and interact with
each other in the constitution of subjectivity, the notion of nomad refers
to the simultaneous occurrence of many of these at once. (2011, 25) 
Nomadic politics affrms differences and promotes ethical bonds with
alterity, which humbles feminism with particular, situated or located
experiences of “non-Oneness” (Braidotti 2006, 269). This is an important
attempt to elaborate the complex nature of difference, for it maps a
dynamic cartography in which any location of enunciation is inherently
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non-unitary, fractured, dispersed, differed and differentiated (see also
Hinton 2007).
In a similar vein, cyborg politics is foregrounded in multiplicity,
particularity and partial networks of connections. As a “cybernetic
organism, a hybrid of machine and organism” (Haraway 2004, 7), the
fgure of the cyborg confounds the boundary of fction and fact, as well as
its associated terms of political construction and lived social relations.
Such a fguration is enabled by the use of irony, an expressive mode that
is “about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes, even
dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together
because both and all are necessary and true” (Haraway 2004, 7). In other
words, the style of irony serves as both a rhetorical strategy and a
political method. It reconfgures the phallogocentric conception of
knowledge through an insistence on the tension between inherent
incoherence and self-contradiction. In line with the ironic rendition of
knowledge, Haraway shows that the refection of the Same is a
masculinist determination and a disembodied illusion. Instead, Haraway
invokes the optic phenomenon of diffraction as a metaphor for “a
heterogeneous history, not originals” (2004, 33), thus providing “another
kind of critical consciousness” (33). Echoed in Braidotti’s
conceptualisation of nomads as subjects of dissonance, these fgurations
have opened up alternative spaces that ground feminist politics in
situated, partial and embodied location.
For Braidotti (2011), nomads and cyborgs as travelling companions
promise a shift toward political alignment through heterogeneity and
coalition, counterposed to homogenous community formation.
Accordingly, nomads’ accents and cyborgs’ noises are celebrated as
primary tools against the unitary force of language as well as the lament
over original wholeness and lost mother tongue.  It is important to note
here that the theorisation of accents and noises in Braidotti’s and
Haraway’s respective work should be contextualised in “the surfacing of
‘difference’ as the second critical phase in feminist thinking in the late
1970s and 1980s” (Griffn and Braidotti 2002, 221). As Griffn and
Braidotti make clear: 
The move in feminism from notions of universal sisterhood and
equality of oppressedness within patriarchy, to an understanding of the
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role that differences among women play in the formation and
maintenance of power structures and inequality that affect women
differentially, was inter alia spearheaded by black American
feminists. ... Once difference became established as the key concept
through which privileged signifers might be critiqued, that concept
became transportable into other terrains in which difference had been
utilized in the service of oppression and exclusion. (2002, 221)
Central to this feminist political and conceptual movement is the issue
of race. It is thus crucial to trace the ways in which the question of race is
implicitly and explicitly confgured in nomads’ accents and cyborgs’
noises. Given that the implication of race in and for the aural does not
appear at all obvious, I want to fag here the ways in which race is
understood in both Braidotti’s and Haraway’s respective projects. In fact,
in tracing race in the fguration of nomad and cyborg, a curious anxiety
regarding biology, essentialism and universalism becomes palpable. Both
Braidotti and Haraway read race in terms of a construction, as
“ideologies about human diversity” (Haraway 2004, 21), and hence
“cannot provide the basis for belief in essential unity” (14). And as Griffn
and Braidotti assert, the question of race should not be understood as
fxed and biologically determined by for example skin colour, because
“biology is culture, and must be read as such” (Griffn and Braidotti 2002,
227, my emphasis). It is not diffcult to see that race is rendered entirely
discursively. The anxiety in associating race with biology, understood as
immutable and determining, is surely understandable. Griffn’s and
Braidotti’s following description is worth citing at length, as it provides a
genealogy of the vocabulary of scientifc racism in Europe. Moreover, it is
still highly relevant in the face of the (re)ascendence of whiteness, racism
and nationalism witnessed not only in Europe but also on a transnational
scale. As Griffn and Braidotti argue:
Sexual identity, religious affliation, political persuasion and ethnic
identity – under the Nazi regime all of these could and did serve as
indicators of a diversity that was to be eliminated in favour of a
homogenized race...Within this context biology was gestured towards
through the assertion that the Herrenvolk should consists of pure-bred
Aryans only, their racial purity being a function of a specifc genealogy.
The biological argument, underscored by evolutionary theories served
as the “scientifc” basis for the discrimination and oppression exercised
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as part of the anti-Semitism strategy of the elimination of Jews in Nazi
Germany. The complex biological, and therefore seemingly essential,
classifcations which eugenics provided enabled the racialisation of
cultural differences and personal choices, which has been at the root of
all nationalist European movements of the last two hundred years.
(2002, 227)
Importantly, Griffn, Braidotti and Haraway call for serious attention
to racialised power differentials, and at the same time endeavour to
challenge the understanding of racial differences as incontestable truths
and as biologically given, thus providing justifcation for various forms of
racism. Nevertheless, the anxiety of associating race with biology remains
a curious phenomenon in Braidotti’s and Haraway’s respective work.
This is because both writers argue for the importance of materiality, and
have in many other instances attempted to denaturalise nature, and move
beyond the binary knot of the nature/culture opposition. However as
Vicki Kirby observes, “the division surreptitiously reasserts itself” (1997,
147). In my opinion, it is by reinvigorating and opening up again the
question of race, biology and essence through the notion of difference
that the anxiety and tension in Braidotti’s and Haraway’s projects and
feminist politics of difference in general can be reconsidered. As Griffn
and Braidotti so rightly suggest, “One of the key issues, then, for dealing
with issues of race and ethnicity in Europe is a review of how we
conceptualize and deal with difference” (2002, 231). My thesis confrms
that the question of difference is in many ways kernel to the problematics
of race.
Accents/Noises against Mother Tongue and Originary 
Wholeness
Haraway’s reading of race and language provides a sound entry point for
the discussion about accents/noises which follows. Delineating the
genealogy of race or racial discourse at the end of the nineteenth century
in Europe and the United States, Haraway draws our attention to the
ways in which race was understood in terms of “accumulated cultural
differences” (2004, 251) on a social-biological continuum carried by blood.
Importantly, as Haraway points out, in this historical context, “no great
discussion could be maintained between linguistic, national, familial, and
physical resonances implied by the term of kinship and race” (2004, 251). 
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Indeed, as Haraway observes, even in the work of a writer such as Du
Bois, who takes an anti-biological approach to race and racism, racial
discourse is assimilated to that around family and lineage, and thus
inevitably evokes “discussions on the childhood and maturity of
collective human groups called race...” (Du Bois quoted in Haraway 2004,
252). Despite the evolving discourse about race, population and genomes,
according to Haraway, the idea of “the community of race, nation, nature,
language and culture transmitted by blood and kinship” (2004, 56)
sustains itself through various implicit and explicit reincarnations. The
haunting mother tongue, though rendered absent and impeded, is a myth
of origin that is salient to diasporic politics. As Anne-Marie Fortier
elaborates, “the concept of mother-tongue is part and parcel of the myth
of origins that … carries with it the obsession with their recovery, …
Moreover, the kinship trope from which the notion of mother-tongue
stems further suggests that idea of gendered and generational differences
that bears the hallmarks of ethnic difference” (2000, 83).
It is from here that I want to lead to the discussion of accents/noises
against mother tongue and origin. Despite the differences in their
respective theoretical approaches, both Braidotti and Haraway consider
mother tongue and its originary wholeness irretrievably lost. For
Braidotti, “There are no mother tongues, just linguistic sites from which
one takes as her starting point” (2011: 40). This is because “all tongues
carry that name of the father and are stamped by its register” (Braidotti
2011, 42). Similarly for Haraway, mother tongue is associated with the
“orientalist myth of the ‘original illiteracy’ of a mother” (2004, 34), and
the “once-upon-a-time wholeness before before language, before writing,
before Man” (2004, 33). 
Nomadic feminism and cyborg politics reject the illusion of
homogenous origin as ontological foundation, and strive for a radical
displacement of the centre understood as “originary sites or authentic
identities of any kind” (Braidotti 2011, 26, emphasis in original). To make
this more explicit, it is important to take note of the ways in which
language is understood in both Braidotti's and Haraway’s work. In a
sense, both writers concede to the arbitrariness of language. The notion of
the arbitrary, as already mentioned in chapter two, is understood “as
something purely random and capricious” (Kirby 1997, 24). According to
Kirby, the function of mediation and constitution are conjoined in this
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term (1997, 30). To recapitulate, this Saussurean notion offers a signifcant
intervention against the essentialism of nomenclature, that is the “causal,
or teleological, understanding of language” (Kirby 1997, 31), considered
as ahistorical and immutable. 
In this strand of thinking (and this anticipates Braidotti’s and
Haraway’s approach to origin and mother tongue), language is
circumscribed and founded negatively. In this sense, representation is
always already a mediation, so that nature and origin are rendered
inaccessible and foreclosed before and outside of the prison-house of
language. Interestingly, despite their endeavours to counter the
phallogocentric circumscription of language, Braidotti and Haraway
argue against lamentation for the lost origin and mother tongue, and the
romanticised illusion of its recuperation. For Braidotti and Haraway, even
the origin story is a myth that is mediated by and constituted in the
phallocentric order.  Haraway’s following assertion illustrates this point:
An origin story in the “Western”, humanist sense depends on the myth
of original unity, fullness, bliss and terror, represented by the phallic
mother from whom all humans must separate, the task of individual
development and of history, the twin potent myths inscribed most
powerfully for us in psychoanalysis and Marxism. (2004, 9)
Though similar in its ultimate argument, Braidotti’s reading proceeds
from a slightly different perspective, one which could be read in line with
Irigaray’s conceptualisation of the maternal debt. That is, as Kirby
observes, “attempts to recuperate the originary moment of debt to
maternity through its reifcation in the present actually bury and repress
its specifcity even more deeply” (2011, 129). 
It should to be added here, and related to the earlier discussion of race,
language and nation in Haraway’s reading, Braidotti’s vehement rejection
of mother tongue needs to be read in relation to her critique of the trope
that attributes a foundational value and an illusory unity to the mother
tongue, that “feeds into the renewed and exacerbated sense of
nationalism, regionalism, localism” (2011, 43). Braidotti’s following
contemplation is a strong critique of the violent politicisation and
racialisation of mother tongues. As Braidotti writes:
The emphasis on the sacredness of the “mother tongue”, a sort of
nostalgia for the site of cultural origin – often more fantastic than real –
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tends to be all the stronger in people who speak many languages or live
in multicultural surroundings. Is it because of their mother tongues
that women in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia are being
systematically raped and held in procreative concentration camps? Is
coercive motherhood by gang rape the price to be paid for speaking the
“wrong” mother tongue? Is not every appeal to the “right” mother
tongue the matrix of terror, of fascism, of despair? (2011, 39)
Against this background, Braidotti celebrates polyglots’ accented
speaking, characterised by “strange sounds” (2011, 40), for its inherent
“polymorphous perversity” (40), and its resistance against “the stupidity
of doxa” (2011, 41). Polyglots in Braidotti’s confgurations have “long
since relinquished any notion of linguistic or ethnic purity” (2011, 39).
Polyglot’s accents are said to “reveal the capacity to slip in between the
languages” (Braidotti 2011, 40). Their inherent creativity and playfulness
are manifested in the speaking subject’s capacity to steal “acoustic traces
here, diphthong sounds there” (Braidotti 2011, 40) and “to produce
strange sounds, phonetic connections, vocal combinations, and rhythmic
juncture” (40). 
Similarly, cyborg’s noise in Haraway’s understanding resists “a
common language” (2004, 34) and “perfect communication” (34).
Haraway’s insistence on noise or noisy pollution against universal
translation and common language operates in multiple realms –
communication science, modern biologies, language policies and writing
practices among women of colour. This weaving together indexes the
cyborgian politics of noise, and invites consideration of a multiplicity of
languages. In other words, the slippery associations of noise enable, by
analogy,  the cyber feminist’s advocacy of noisy resistance. For my
purpose here, I want to focus on the Haraway’s discussion of language
politics and writing. 
Haraway opposes the notion of writing, perceived as the phallocentric
tool of marking and inscription, against the oral, as the “original
illiteracy” (2004, 34) of the mother in the orientalist confguration. But this
is not simply writing and orality in the common sense. Indeed, writing
here needs to be read in terms of mediation and representation against
the immediacy and stability of speech. Whereas the former stance
suggests a view that the attributes of human culture are held hostage by
language, the latter indicates the lack of literacy in nature, and in
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primitive, racialised and sexualised others. Rather than reclaiming the
innocence and unity of the original mother tongue, Haraway advocates
cyborg writing that is “about the power to survive … on the basis of
seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other” (2004, 33).
In her reading of the fgure of indigenous woman Maliche for example,
Haraway praises her as the “mother of the mestizo ‘bastard’ race of the
new world, master of language” (2004, 33). As she makes clear,
“Malinche’s mastery of the conqueror’s language … [is] a violation, an
illegitimate production, that allows survival” (Haraway 2004, 33). For
Haraway, such a form of writing by a woman of colour is the prototype
of the cyborg, “as the chimeric monster, without claim to an original
language before violation, that crafts the eroded, competent, potent
identities of women of color” (2004, 33). Haraway notes that, like the
writing of women of colour, the fgure of vampire is also typical of the
postmodern subject in that it speaks too many languages. Given that race,
for Haraway, is closely tied to notions of racial purity and (the purity of)
type, the fgure of the vampire directly challenges and pollutes the chain
of association between blood, race, language, lineage and reproduction.
In this infectious copulation, the vampire embodies radical contagion,
polluting and eroding race and the integrity of the paternal language, all
in one bite.
Nevertheless, the difference between specifcity and universality is
implicitly reinstalled. The loss of a steady and fxed origin provides the
universal condition for nomad’s and cyborg’s cacophonous politics. But, to
repeat a point made earlier, if the origin is re-marked as unitary and lost
against which the evolved difference of nomads’ and cyborgs’ affrmative
politics can be measured, then at work is the simultaneous instantiation
of the lost origin and of the nomads’ and cyborgs’ subjectivities. In other
words, even though the unity and identity of the subject has been
displaced by the non-unitary, and the inherently fractured and dispersed,
it is now re-centered and reinstalled in the enclosure and confnement of
the mark qua language, as the enlarged identity of the individual. 
What is the nature of this interface, this difference in-between that
seems to relocate itself? At this juncture, I want to recall Ilona’s accented
communication in order to converse with nomads and cyborgs. Whereas
Braidotti proclaims “misunderstanding” to be the general condition and
the ground of nomadic polylingual practices, Haraway considers the
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noisy multilingual practices among women of colour for example as
disturbing universal communication, which is itself a translation process
that converts all meaning perfectly through the one dominant code. Here
we can read these two assertions through and against each other, to open
up an interesting issue regarding identity and difference itself. If the
origin, as the stable referent, is inaccessible, as Braidotti’s understanding
of the arbitrariness of language clearly posits, and as Haraway also
acknowledges, then translation, in its strictest sense, is impossible. The
radical abyss between nature/culture, origin/language means that the
translation process is eternally suspended in a state of differing, differal,
and displacement. Related to the earlier meditation on the question of
translation in chapter four, it could be further asked what the criteria or
reference point would be that enables the translation of kaakao into hot
chocolate. After all, what constitutes the identity of the invariant element
in its obvious variation?
If accents and noises are regarded as contributing to misunderstanding
and perfect translation, it is because the model of communication is here
understood in the form of a spatial-temporal model of sender,
transmission of message, and receiver. Following this logic, in the scene
where Ilona orders kaakao, the stress on the third syllable and the
aspirated pronunciation of consonant k distorts the message, and causes
misinterpretation and miscommunication. As Kirby notes, this form of
communication relies upon notions of self-presence and the unity and
sovereignty of the subjects’ intention, which interestingly is precisely
what Braidotti and Haraway reject. If language speaks us, as Braidotti
notes, and the unitary origin and the immediacy of the mother tongue is
lost, as Haraway insists, then this resurgence of the intentional universal
subject is certainly curious. 
Rather than simply dismissing this as an unfortunate mistake, could
we entertain the idea that this recuperation of origin is symptomatic of
difference itself?  In Monolingualism of the Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin,
Jacques Derrida begins with the following aporia: “I only have one
language; it is not mine” (1998, 1). Two implications could be gleaned
from this assertion. First, if language is never simply a property, but the
promise and threat of its arrival is the very condition of the I, then
nomads’ and cyborgs’ wilful play with the multiplicity of languages in
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purely self-present terms is radically qualifed.97 Secondly, if any arrival
of the language is the symptom of a general amnesia (Derrida 1998, 31),
then the uniqueness and plurality of nomads’ and cyborgs’ voices and
universal original writing must be consubstantial. As Kirby notes,
“‘Consubstantial’ in this sense evokes the ‘sameness’ of an identity that
endures (invariance) through morphogenesis (variation)” (2011, 109).
Given this, the amnesic arrival of the I and my (m)other tongue(s) carries
with it everything, so that its specifcity “might prove more
comprehensive and entangled than seems possible” (Kirby 2011, 20).
For Derrida the amnesia of original writing is symptomatic of a
general translation that translates itself. The amnesia of original writing is
here understood not as mere forgetfulness, wherein the past is lost and
forgotten, pure and simple. Rather it is the perpetual and reiterative
process of re-membering. Such a reiterative re-membering as originary
amnesia is compatible with the onto-epistemological dis/continuity that I
argue for in the dissertation. Importantly, this conception of language,
writing and translation as originary amnesia means that nothing is
excluded or written off. Derrida argues that amnesia does not arise from
the prohibition of language, which leads to the absolute loss of origin or
memory, which is a form of radical discontinuity. Neither is it driven by
the resistance to interpretation (read as dissection and delimitation) of the
self-present interiority/depth, which is supposedly, and curiously
inaccessible. For Derrida, this account assumes the simple continuity and
homogeneity of the psyche. Again reading through the lens of onto-
epistemological dis/continuity and linking to the discussion of the
writing pad and the question of depth/memory/interiority, I understand
that Derrida’s point is precisely about the radical involvement of
continuity and discontinuity, surface and depth. This is so well captured
and illustrated in his following poetic depiction of original writing: 
It ebbs and fows like a wave that sweeps everything along upon the
shores … It carries everything, that sea, and on two sides; it swells,
sweeps along, and enriches itself with everything, carries away, brings
back, deports and becomes swollen again with what it has dragged
away.  (Derrida 1998, 31)
If the scene of miscommunication is approached in terms of the
97  See Ahmed's (2014) discussion of the intimacy of will and wilfulness.
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originary writing where nothing is excluded, then the spatio-temporal
separation, and then  the succession of the  sending and receiving of the
message, are radically confounded. As Kirby argues, “If we think
temporality as textuality in the Derridean sense, we are reminded that the
grammatological textile does not wait in anticipation of time’s coming
through the promise of the punctum, a lineal unfolding through an
evolutionary march of different, separate, self-present moments” (1997,
94). Moreover, the accented speech production, understood in terms of
embodied specifcity, is exemplary of a universal structure, an originary
“alienation”. Rather than considering that Ilona’s accented pronunciation
failed to hit its mark, could we entertain the possibility that
miscommunication is communication that is spatio-temporal re-
membering, wherein language anticipates and apprehends itself in the
frst and fnal instance?  
In chapter fve it has been argued that the visual and the aural are not
two separate perceptual realms whose perceptions somehow contradict
or cohere with each other. Rather, my analysis of the scene of the
successful but surprising pronunciation of the trill shows that visuality as
aurality as tactility is self-referential. In other words, and in keeping with
Derrida’s notion of the general writing, perception is not segregated into
different ciphers or registers – the visual, the aural etc. It follows then that
this scene of miscommunication in which Ilona attempts to order a cup of
hot chocolate in Finnish could be read as referring to visual-aural
perceptions of Finnishness which re-calls, re-members and re-writes
itself. 
In light of this, we could venture to rethink the questions of accent,
race, difference and origin, in terms of the amnesic arrival that carries
with it everything, so that the specifcity articulates the with/in-ness of
universality. The remarkable implication of Derrida’s aporia “‘We only
ever speak one language,’ and ‘we never speak only one language’ or ‘I
only speak one language, (and, but, yet) it is not mine’” (1998, 27) lies in
the ways in which it affrms and undermines the specifcity of the mother
tongue, the language “we only ever speak” in one and the same gesture.
For Derrida, the point is not to simply repudiate or reject an originary
maternal language or the idiomatic specifcity or singularity of our
speaking and coming into being. Neither should it lead to a kind of
neutralisation of differences. Identifying himself as the “hero-martyr –
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pioneer – outlaw – legislator” (Derrida 1998, 47) who surrenders to the
purity of language, that is anything but purism, Derrida writes:
[O]n the contrary, that is what allows the stakes to be repoliticized.
Where neither natural property nor the law of property in general exist,
where this de-propriation is recognized, it is possible and it becomes
more necessary than ever occasionally to identify, in order to combat
them, impulses, phantasms, “ideologies,” “fetishizations,” and
symbolics of appropriation. Such a reminder permits one at once to
analyse the historical phenomena of appropriation and to treat them
politically by avoiding, above all, the reconstitution of what these
phantasms managed to motivate: “nationalist” aggressions or
monoculturalist  homo-hegemony.   (1998, 64)
This provocation reminds me of the earlier discussion of response-
ability where I have noted, following Derrida and Haraway, that justice is
never fnal and that response-ability is the condition of possibility for any
calculation, decision and judgement. Another signifcant point that needs
to be reiterated here is that the point is not to reduce difference, between
for example identifcation and disidentifcation, reaction and response,
specifcity and universality, but to re-member and identify through
opening up difference itself to the dis/continuous force of original
writing. To be more specifc, the import of the above quote assists further
consideration of the politics and ethics of rethinking race, identity,
difference and language, as well as the implications for feminist
knowledge production practices, as is detailed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Eight
Who Sings the National Anthem
Interlude: Maamme/Vårt Land/Our Land 
Sing-screen installation 
Part  of  the six-screen synchronised video installation98
98 http://rainioroberts.com/maamme/, last accessed 29 June 2015.
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From the exhibition at the Finnish Museum of Photography99
The Maamme/Vårt Land/Our Land video installation features non-
native Finnish citizens singing the Finnish National Anthem. Its lyrics are
based upon a poem written in Swedish by Johan Ludvig Runeberg in
1846. The music was composed by a German immigrant, Fredrik Pacius.
The poem consisted of eleven verses. For the respective Finnish and
Swedish versions of the national anthem, the frst and the last verse of the
original poem (or its Finnish translation) were used. In this video
installation, participants sang three verses – the frst in Finnish, the frst in
Swedish and the last in Finnish. 
Its single-screen version, as shown in the frst picture, was exhibited in
Esplanadin Lava, in the heart of Helsinki on Finnish Independence Day,
December 6th, 2012. The lyrics were translated into English as follows:
Our land, our land, our Fatherland! Ring out, dear word, oh sound! No
rising hill, or mountain grand, no sloping dale, no northern strand, there
is, more loved, to be found, than this – our father's ground. Our land is
poor, and so shall be. To him who gold will crave. The strangers proudly
pass, but we shall ever love this land, we see, in moor, and feel, and isle
and wave, a golden land, so brave. Thy blossom, hidden now from sight,
shall burst its bud ere long. Lo! From our love, shall rise aright, thy sun,
thy hope, thy joy, thy light. And higher, once, more full and strong, shall
99 http://www.valokuvataiteenmuseo.f/en/exhibitions/past/event/194---minna-
rainio-ja-mark-roberts-maamme, last accessed 10 July 2015.
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ring our country's song.100
The primary aim of this video installation was to provoke a rethinking
of the defnition of Finnishness and the current multicultural context in
Finland. As Rainio and Roberts write, 101  
The people in the work were not born in Finland, and do not have
Finnish heritage, but have – through relocation, immigration, adoption
or other reasons – all been granted Finnish citizenship. The multi-
screen installation collects various people together, forming a united
choir out of the disparate parts. Together, they sing the words of their
adopted nation's anthem, highlighting their unifed status as “new
Finns”. 
Transforming Racial Normativity
Commenting on the relation between the conception of performativity
and precarity, Judith Butler notes that the linkage between these two
terms relies on the condition of intelligibility, which is also a delimitation
and differentiation that makes certain rather than other bodies more
thinkable and liveable. In other words, whereas performativity points to
the enabling conditions for the one “‘who’ can become produced as a
recognizable subject, a subject who is living, whose life is worth
sheltering and whose life, when lost, would be worthy of mourning”
(Butler 2009, xii, my emphasis), precarity characterises those “who do not
qualify as recognizable, readable, or grievable” (xiii, my emphasis). This
strategic conjoining of the general conditions of the performative and the
hierarchical differences and specifcities of the precarious lives “that
brings together women, queers, transgender people, the poor, and the
stateless” (Butler 2009, xiii) accords with Butler's general political project;
this, as mentioned earlier, is the need to keep taut the tension between the
troubled identity and identity trouble. This is an important endeavour to
foreground a political project in hierarchical differences that also seeks to
make visible and challenge the mechanisms that produce such hierarchies
in the frst place. I want to underscore here that the ways in which the
questions are framed and posed in this dissertation, such as, for example,
the questions of how race arrives and what race will(can)/not be, are in a
sense, consistent with the ways in which performativity and precarity are
100 http://rainioroberts.com/maamme/, last accessed 29 June 2015.
101 http://rainioroberts.com/maamme/, last accessed 29 June 2015.
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theorised in Butler's work. 
To explicate her point, Butler refers to the event in which “illegal
immigrants in May of 2006 took to the streets in Los Angeles and started
to sing the national anthem of the United States” (2009, iv) in both
English and in Spanish, with the aim to claim citizenship in the United
States. Before continuing with the reading, the contextual differences
between these two specifc examples should be clarifed. The participants
in the installation Mamme/Vårt Land had already been granted Finnish
citizenship and they sang the Finnish national anthem in Finnish and
Swedish rather than in their native languages. Apart from the exhibition
on the Finnish Independence Day in December of 2012, this installation
has been presented primarily in museums and cultural centres. The
example Butler provides presents a collective petitioning for American
citizenship among illegal immigrants. They sang the American anthem in
the streets in Los Angeles in Spanish and English. In fact, as Butler notes,
they sometimes sang the Mexican national anthem along with the
national anthem of America. 
Despite their differences, both instances of singing the national anthem
could be read in terms of “performative modes of expression” (Butler
2009, x) that lay claim to visibility and recognition as Finnish and
American citizens respectively. Furthermore, both examples highlight the
affectivity of the act of singing. As Butler writes in her discussion with
Gayatri Spivak in Who Sings the Nation-State?, the act of collective singing
entails “rethinking certain ideas of sensate democracy, of aesthetic
articulation within the political sphere, and the relationship between song
and public sphere” (2007, 62). For Butler, singing the national anthem is
an excellent example of what she calls performative contradiction. I
intend here to unpack Butler's insight on this point, focusing on the
installation Mamme/Vårt land. First, singing the national anthem is
among the most expressive ways of claiming belonging to a nation. As
Rainio and Roberts explain, part and parcel of choosing this particular
aesthetic form to refect the political landscape of Finland has to do with
the way in which the Finnish national anthem is “emotionally
powerful”.102 Second, the act of singing the national anthem assumes
certain racialised norms that condition and regulate the legibility and the
recognisability of the singing subjects as Finnish citizens. Third, in laying
102 http://rainioroberts.com/maamme,  last accessed 29 June 2015.
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claim for recognition of their Finnish citizenship status, they must frst
submit to the visible and audible normative practices that render these
racialised others outsiders in the frst place. That is, in order to negotiate
and transform what Finnish citizenship consists of, racialised others must
frst conform to and appropriate certain modes of practices of established
norms, such as singing the national anthem in Finnish and Swedish,
which they were denied access to or ownership of. This is precisely what
makes both the installation Mamme/Vårt Land, and the collective
petition through singing American national anthem in Spanish,
provocative. 
Relating to our previous consideration of the juridical notion of power,
Butler’s account of the performative and the operation of the norm in her
reading of the petition will be further engaged in relation to the
conundrum of universality and specifcity vis-à-vis the problematic of
transformation in the remainder of the chapter. At this juncture I want to
explain that I begin the reading of the Mamme/Vårt Land with Butler’s
analysis of the singing of the American national anthem by illegal
immigrants in Spanish not only because of its clear relevance to my
discussion at hand, but also and importantly, because Butler’s
theorisation of the performative contradiction and its implications for
feminist politics of differences has been central to the disputation on the
conundrum of specifcity and universality, difference and identity. This
will be crucial for the engagement with these questions through onto-
epistemological dis/continuity. Further to this, as will be discussed in
this section of the thesis, the question of the performative, which concerns
the how of transformation that is kernel to a critical project on race, is
tightly bound up with the questions of power and norms. 
To begin again, we could briefy note the ways in which the
performative approach that rethinks the notions of power and agency has
shifted the terms of debate. Whereas the politics of representation
conceives of power in terms of dominance and defciency (for example
the hierarchically privileged are said to have power, in contrast to the
powerlessness, or lack of power of their racialised and sexualised
counterparts) and grounds political demands in identity claims, the
performative approach subjects identity categories such as race and
gender, understood as grids of intelligibility that are embedded in
heteronormative systems, to scrutiny. In light of this shift, what exercises
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feminist scholars’ critical attention is whether and how we could
circumvent appeals to foundationalism and identitarian essentialism, all
the while as we try to acknowledge the political saliency and necessity of
mobilising identity categories for claims of recognition and visibility. In
other words, the conundrum which ensues from this is: how to make an
appeal to identity and specifcity (for, by and with marginalised others)
through means of representation, if the very identity categories that such
claims hinge upon must be critically displaced and differentiated. Clearly,
this dilemma has profound political and ethical implications for feminist
theoretical and political practices in general. At stake here is the question
of norms or the cultural grids of intelligibility that informs what is
thinkable and recognisable. This resonates with what Butler has termed a
“normative crisis” (2002, 18). In her article “Is Kinship Always Already
Heterosexual”, Butler discusses such a normative crisis in the context of
gay marriage and kinship legislation. As Butler writes:
On the one hand, living without norms of recognition result in
signifcant suffering and forms of disenfranchisement that confound
the very distinctions among psychic, cultural, and material
consequences. On the other hand, the demand to be recognized, which
is a very powerful political demand, can lead to new and invidious
forms of social hierarchy, to a precipitous foreclosure of the sexual feld
… thus fortifying … norms of recognition and eclipsing other
possibilities within civil society and cultural life. (2002, 26-27)
Butler thus poses a series of questions, such as: how to reconcile the
tension between “maintaining a critical perspective and making a
politically legible claim?” (2002, 20); How to construct a political
community of “we” even as we concede to the provisional and
contestable claims of any “I”?  Indeed, what constitutes the contemporary
horizon of the political? What do we mean by doing politics? For Butler,
to ground politics in a circumscribed matrix of the legitimate and the
intelligible without questioning its very terms of operation, risks losing
the politics of the political. Does feminist politics necessarily entail a
persistent impasse between the “ongoing attempts to destabilize
identities and grids … [and attempts] to mandate and enforce them”
(Puar 2007, 63)?
With these questions in mind, in this chapter I bring into conversation
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another conceptual turn, often referred to as the “new materialism” (cf.
Hird 2004; Alaimo and Hekman eds. 2008; Coole and Frost eds. 2010;
Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012). As Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin
note, the term “new” in new materialism is temporally and spatially
transversal. In their words, it “simultaneously gives us a past, a present,
and a future” (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 13). Thus, introducing
new materialism here as a new theoretical paradigm is not to add objects
or perspectives that were somehow left out by or absent in earlier
scholarly work, but rather serves to transversally open up from within
insights that continue to be “produced” and “anticipated” in these work
(see Hinton 2014, 112). 
Notwithstanding ongoing debates within the vibrant scholarly feld of
new materialism regarding its theoretical and methodological
orientations, it is generally conceded that new materialism “explores a
monist perspective” (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 85, emphasis in
original) and rethinks the nature of dualism, agency, power, language
and materiality. This monistic or immanent gesture reconfgures the logic
of “and-ness” (see Kirby 2011) that presumes a priori temporal and spatial
separations that underpin a notion of difference as lack or “different
from”. As Vicki Kirby notes, the logic of and-ness inheres in much of the
contention about the relation between “signifcance and substance,
thought and matter, human agency and material objectivity” (2011, 77). It
needs to be underlined however, that new materialism does not simply
reject dualism, but traverses and affrms the perverse onto-
epistemological entanglement, in order to displace both attendant terms. 
My aim here is not to perform a detailed mapping of the genealogy
and lines of debates within this feld of scholarly work. Rather, I want to
identify and locate my position vis-à-vis what I consider as informing my
analysis. As my previous chapters have argued, the onto-epistemological
dis/continuity means that the identity of any entity - be it that of a racial
unity, of an accent, or of the felds of the discursive, the corporeal, and
even  of a division - purportedly separated by an in-between from its
other, encounters a trill that destabilises but also reinstalls these entities
and divisions, thus radically confounding the terms of their operation.
This dis/continuity is a “monistic and pluralistic”103 (Johncock 2014, 236;
103 This is in line with the monistic perspective I mentioned, but I think it also complicates
it further. I fnd it more pronounced in for example Vicki Kirby's, Peta Hinton's and
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see also discussions in Hinton 2014; Kirby 2015) gesture that helps in
rethinking the dis/continuity of racial differences and the human race.
Furthermore, as explained in chapter three, an important insight that I
glean from the monistic and pluralistic formulation is the diffractive
reading practice that is attentive to the im/possibility to abandon (Hinton
and Liu 2015) what one is arguing against. 
Surely, this diffractive reading practice, a form of generosity, a labour
of love, is rather diffcult especially in the space of a doctoral thesis. And
yet, such a diffculty is precisely the exercise of dis/continuous
non/contradiction that informs all the turns and re-turns in the writing.
But I hope that I have shown that a generous and diffractive reading
helps to open up the possibility for complicating and reconfguring the
terms of a debate so that it productively “rewrites thinking as a whole,
leaving nothing untouched, redirecting every possible idea according to
its new sense of orientation” (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 13,
emphasis in original). In other words, instead of adding more tensions to
the quandary discussed earlier, my intention is to show the ways in
which these different foci, or what are often said to be conficting political
and critical demands, do not necessarily persist as impasses but can be
more productively engaged with. What motivates my following
discussion is the conviction, as succinctly summarised by Kirby, that
“academic research, regardless of its content, political temperament,
disciplinary formation or scholarly smarts, is driven by a shared desire ...
to make a difference” (2015, 96, emphasis in original).
Rethinking the Question of Representation
What does this actually mean for the representation of racial identities? I
want to re-turn on the dilemma presented earlier. As the prevailing
approach to communication practices, the concept of representation is
often connected to questions of power and subjectivity, in order to
grapple with the ways in which discourses and images of gender, race
and sexuality, for example, are produced by and embedded in
asymmetrical power relations. The grids of intelligibility – which makes
words and images communicable and interpretable – conform to social
and cultural norms, that are often conceived of in terms of cultural
determination and prohibition. For example, tracing the genealogy of the
Will Johncock's work.
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concept of representation, Rebecca Coleman notes its emergence in the
late 1960s as a critical tool against the “narrow range of patronizing or
demeaning stereotypes through which women were represented” (2014,
32). This was understood as a “dominance and defcit approach”
(Kroløkke and Sørensen 2006, 29), that sought to make manifest “patterns
of inequality, domination and oppression” (Coleman 2006, 32) and to
“help recover women’s voices” (32).
With the discursive and post-structuralist turn, the concept of
representation comes to be understood as not simply refecting but also
constructing social reality. Nevertheless, in this strand of thinking,
representation is severed temporally and spatially from the represented,
i.e., from body/materiality/reality. For example, it is argued that what
we perceive as body or reality is actually a representation and discursive
construction of it. Indeed, as the argument goes, matter matters only
within the circumscribed feld of the recognisable. Importantly, this
incommensurable gap – “between the literal and the metaphorical,
between the body and the sign that represents it... between real and
representation, matter and language” (Kirby 1997, 52) – is imbued with
transformative potential. In other words, instead of a version of
empowerment through giving voice, the primary goal in the post-
structuralist turn is to interrogate the normative investments in
representation (for example, the defnitional constraints that normally
fnd racialised and sexualised others lacking), and the ways in which such
representations shape bodies/realities.  
Whereas the former position aims to produce counter-identities, the
latter often leads to a pluralizing gesture. One thinks here of the
signifcant and most widely adopted feminist methodological framework
of “intersectionality” (see the discussion related to intersectionality in
chapter three) which is exemplary in its engagement with the question of
differences within and between women. As an important critical
endeavour to make identity categories more inclusive and more liveable,
its importance is indisputable. Nevertheless, theorists routinely fnd
themselves in the unwitting “ampersand effect” (see Kirby 2015, 103),
which concerns the risk of what is often conceived of as the endless
incorporation of a proliferation of differences. Even though its stated aim
is to eschew universality and essentialism, and attend to the situatedness
and complexity of embodied specifcities, critiques are concerned that
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such an incorporation of differences runs the risk of reinstalling the
central status of white feminists, and thus diminishing the political
impact of an intersectional understanding. As Jasbir Puar (2012) cautions,
intersectionality may reproduce the fgure of Women of Colour that
stands in, for and as difference, and that is simultaneously
overdetermined by and emptied of specifc meaning. Spivak’s
conceptualisation of the “strategic use of essentialism” (1990, 109) is an
important attempt to grapple with this problem. For Spivak (1990), a
political axiology is unavoidably bound, and makes recourse, to
essentialism/universalism, even if the very identity categories such as
“woman” are fragile under close inspection. Similarly, Butler rejects this
need to “‘add an embarrassed’ et cetera to its catalogue of others, a
gesture of acknowledged failure” (Kirby 2015, 103). Taking a radically
constructivist and anti-essentialist stance, Butler endorses the Derridean
theorisation of language/writing, and asserts that body/materiality (for
example race and sex) is always already culture (that is language).  As
Kirby observes, situated within the question of woman, the difference
between representation and the performative approach lies in the
materiality/ideality split: 
[T]hose who purport to represent real women without recourse to
quotation marks will presume themselves to be in receipt of the truth of
(the) matter, as if the compelling facts of women’s lives simply present
themselves. According to this view, signifying practices are the mere
vehicles of such truths, having no formulative input of their own.
Although they may well be regarded as inadequate, it is assumed
nevertheless that they can be corrected. The other side of the debate
stresses the constitutive force of signifying practices, concluding that
we have no access to an extralinguistic reality because the truth of its
apparent facticity is produced in language. (1997, 105)
Despite their differences, both positions concede to and leverage
arguments from the temporal and spatial separations and a prohibitive
notion of norm underpinned by a logic of opposition. This oppositional
mode is often considered as the modus operandi of political analysis, so
much so that even for poststructuralist frameworks that insist on one
system – in which the outside is conceived of as the inversion of the
inside (of the subject, identity, normativity, power etc.) – the need to
ground politics in oppositional difference seems inevitable. It is here I
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want to turn attention to new materialist monistic/immanent gestures in
which the riddle of norms and representation could be rerouted. 
Essential to the operation of oppositional logic, is a conception of
difference as an absolute cut/gap, that exemplifes “two characteristics of
dualism (sequential negation and a narrative of progress)” (Dolphijn and
van der Tuin 2012, 100). For example, heteronormativity and the anti-
normative could be considered as analytical cognates occupying two
different temporal and spatial positions vis-à-vis  what is understood as
the feld of the normative. In other words, whereas heteronormativity is
thought to be the inside, anti-normativity is seen to fall outside of, to be
set against or to come after the established normative feld. As Kirby
provocatively asks, 
If we throw the notion of power into the mix we are confronted with
the same diffculty. What is outside power? Is resistance to power
internal to power, a torsional re-presentation of power’s own complex
identity? From where does power originate and how can we hope to
change things if we are mired in its internal machinery? (2015, 105)
As noted earlier, the ways in which power operates is central to an
analysis of representation. Most often, power is conceived of in causal
terms, and is said to act on things (see Kirby 2015; Coleman 2014). For
example, following Michel Foucault’s understanding of discourse and
biopolitics, the ways in which power operates via discourse in
constructing and shaping bodies in particular ways has been
investigated. Foucault’s by now well-known assertion that there is no
outside of power and Derrida’s aphorism that “there is no outside-text”
([1976]1997, 158) surely point to something of a radical interiority.104
Similarly, feminist postcolonial theorists Puar and Chow note the political
and analytical fatigue in “poststructuralist signifcatory incarceration”,
wherein “‘[d]ifference’ produces new subjects of inquiry that then
infnitely multiply exclusion in order to promote inclusion”  (Puar 2007,
55). Note the word “incarceration”, which is again a spatial metaphor
104  For example, commenting on what he terms the “carceral network” (Foucault [1977]
1991, 301), Foucault makes explicit the ways in which power has no outside. As
Foucault writes, “The carceral network does not cast the unassimilable into a confused
hell; there is no outside. It takes back with one hand what it seems to exclude with the
other. It saves everything, including what it punishes. It is unwilling to waste even
what it has decided to disqualify” ([1977] 1991, 301).
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accentuating a sense of interiority. Whether via biological essentialism or
semiotic constructivism, anti-normative practices that attend to
differences and specifcities seem to be brought forth from and with/in
the feld of the norm itself. As Kirby observes, “the ability of a norm to
cannibalize all opposition” (2015, 105) provokes considerable anxiety, for
it might seem that there is no space for change, for being otherwise. But,
as Kirby continues to argue, “this anxiety only arises if we perceive the
identity of a norm in restricted terms, a something that can only constrain
or prohibit, such that the promise of change that might reroute and
overturn this repression must arrive as an anti-norm – an absolute
outside” (2015, 106).
Reconfguring this line that separates inside/outside or
identity/difference as a patternment of diffraction/difference within
(Barad 2007) or the fault line that is itself breaking open and apart ( Kirby
2011), the monistic and pluralistic framework – that is the operation of
dis/continuity – insists on and pushes to the extreme the radical
interiority (which could also be said as consubstantial with the absolute
outside). In light of this, instead of starting from the distinctive poles of
the “representation/materiality dichotomy” (Colebrook quoted in
Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, 108), we can rework their spatial and
temporal coordinates through a radical rethinking of the “literacy” (Kirby
2011) and “agency” (Barad 2007) of matter. Representation matters. And
matter represents. In so doing, we could ask further how power actually
grips, constructs or acts upon an object that is supposedly outside itself.
To push this question even further, if a norm, as power, does not come
before/outside and prescribe the limits of the intelligible and the
communicable, where is the genesis of repression, exclusion, and more
importantly, of any form of anti-normative transformations, and when?
However, it should be noted here, that the affrmation of material
agency is not a recuperation of or a nostalgic return to a benign or unitary
whole/origin, which is defned against the destructiveness of
culture/writing. To do so is to reinstall the speech/writing,
matter/ideality split, albeit in its reversed form. In this enlarged
interiority, where nothing is excluded, how could one critically approach
the universalising tendencies of any categorisation, identity claiming and
its associated terms of exclusion and denigration? In what follows, I
broach this problematic through returning to the video installation
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Maamme/Vårt land by artists Rainio and Roberts based in Finland. My
central argument is that a new materialist affrmation of the radical
interiority does not relinquish representation and universality, for the line
that is drawn between the representing and the represented is
simultaneously substantiated and differentiated.
Trilling Norms: Normativity’s Performative Anticipation
Following an oppositional logic, the installation of Maamme/Vårt land
could be approached in terms of visibility and recognition. Given the
symbolic signifcance of the national anthems for a sense of entitlement
and belonging, this installation can be read as a testimony to identity
claiming, i.e., as “new Finns”. As Rainio’s and Roberts’ description of this
installation makes clear, these participants were once considered as not
ftting into the typical defnition of being a Finn, because “they were not
born in Finland, and do not have Finnish heritage”.105 For Rainio and
Roberts, their acquisition of and identifcation with Finnishness are
expressed through the act of singing the Finnish national anthem. Their
faces and their voices are repeatedly played and displayed in public, as,
for example, at the exhibition in Esplanadin Lava, at the the Finnish
Museum of Photography, and circulated on online video-sharing
platforms as well as on the artists’ homepages. These scenes of exposure
give voice and visibility to the racialised and gendered others in Finland,
and evoke consideration of and articulate the need for a more inclusive
conception of Finnishness. 
Together the images of these participants testify to the changing
demographic that shapes in new ways received notions of Finnishness.
Yet listening more closely to each participant, tracing their images and
their voices as they appear, disappear and reappear in the united choir,
one ponders about their individuality. What are their stories behind their
migration to Finland? Where do they come from? What are their
occupations, ages, sexual orientations, religions? Unlike rehearsed and
coordinated group singing, this choir is composed of independent
moments from individual participants’ solo and independent singing. In
mixing together disparate visual and aural segments to form a united
choir, viewers are presented with a vision of Finnishness that
acknowledges individuality, and thus diversity and differences among
105 http://rainioroberts.com/maamme/, last accessed 29 June 2015.
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individual members of Finnish society. 
Clearly, one can interpret the participants’ visible differences as
signifying disparities in terms of race, gender, age, and their individual,
and thus discordant, singing as indicating diversity and multiculturalism.
But the question remains as to how their differences from each other and
from the conventional Finnishness emerge? Why for example are their
visible racial differences taken as proof of a multicultural Finland? If we
simply defne the new-ness of the participants’ Finnish identity against
the presumed linear, homogenous and unifed original Finnishness (as
the term heritage and its cultural/biological connotations clearly
indicate), then the nature of difference itself would be foreclosed and
unwittingly fxed on spatial (in the sense of separated from each other)
and temporal (in the sense of the original versus the new) coordinates
through which a homogenous and unifed Finnishness is identifed. This
appeal to difference pertains to a notion of race/ethnicity that would
recuperate a prescriptive notion of intrinsic biological and/or cultural
differences. A reading of this installation in terms of adding in or
extending the accepted terms of Finnishness to the otherwise different
others leaves intact the racialised (vis-à-vis the whiteness of Finnishness)
and sexualised (especially in relation to generation and heritage that
characterises Finnishness) social mechanisms that (re)produce
Finnishness and otherness in the frst place. 
Following a performative approach, Finnishness is understood as
enacted, rather than signifying any racial truth. Embodied differences
such as the visual differences among participants are understood as
appearances/signifers that are emerged and circumscribed within a
larger semantic process of meaning making, rather than the actual
physical substance that anchors representation. Devoid of stable terms of
reference, the normative construction of Finnishness could be said to
necessitate citational practices such as singing the national anthem. In
light of this, the visual-aural parody in which racialised and gendered
“new Finns” sing the anthem in Finnish and in Swedish, reveals the
embodied reiterations that (re)produce and maintain the normative
practices of Finnishness, all the while attesting to its instability, historicity
and contingency. 
Importantly, through this line of thinking, identity categories undergo
a profound critique. Whereas the inclusive model unwittingly requires
220
the fxity of a notion of Finnishness rooted in cultural or biological
heritage, the performative approach destabilizes its point of reference and
sets it into the chain of displacement. Given the lack of a stable referent,
thus the inevitable failure of power/norms to prescribe, regulate and
prohibit, the heteronormative conception of Finnishness is forced into an
endless loop of maintenance work. Against any essentialising and
universalising gesture, a reading that follows the performative approach
does not aim to give a “better” or more “accurate” representation of
Finnishness, but would reinvigorate it as an open question in order to
uncover the defnitional constraints and limitations that defne otherness
as lacking. 
As already mentioned, the emphasis of the performative approach is
on the hierarchical differences, or which differences matter. As Butler
(2009) notes, whereas structuralism regards as impossible all claims of
recognition, post-structuralism (within which performativity is
embedded) asks why some forms of life are more recognisable, more live-
able and more valuable than others. While the inclusive model of
Finnishness stops short of asking what exactly contributes to the sense of
misft in this installation, the performative approach delves into this
parodic effect that makes viewers pause and consider the defnition of
Finnishness. Central to this interrogation are the limiting conditions that
contour and shape the feld of intelligibility – such as the feld of the
visual-aural in this case. Moreover, and this is crucial for an investigation
of communication, these limiting conditions are bound to the process of
subject formation and the question of agency. 
Consistent with an anti-essentialist stance towards subjectivity, and
with the refusal to confate the exercise of the free-will of a sovereign
subject with performativity, Butler has famously stated that there is no
doer behind the deed. Put differently, it can be said that subjects do not
pre-exist, but come into being/emerge performatively within a feld of
normativity. As Butler elaborates on this point:
[V]arious modes of laying claims to public space and to citizenship
require both translation and performative modes of expression. But let
us remember that performativity does not just refer to explicit speech
acts, but also to the reproduction of norms. Indeed, there is no
reproduction of the social world that is not at the same time a reproduction of
those norms that govern the intelligibility of the body in space and time. And
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by “intelligibility” I include “readability in social space and time” and
so an implicit relation to others (and to possibilities of marginalization,
abjection, and exclusion) that is conditioned and mediated by social
norms. (2009, xi, emphasis in original) 
We can glean two insights from this statement in relation to the
moment of misft and the performative force of the installation. First, the
subjectivities of both the viewers and the participants could be said to
emerge simultaneously within the performative reiteration of the bodily
practices of singing the Finnish national anthem in both Finnish and
Swedish. In fact, it is only in drawing on histories of repetitions and
contextual conventions that a performative act can acquire its socially
recognisable meaning. This clearly resonates with an account of power to
which one is both subject and object. But this installation of anthem
singing on the Finnish Independence Day reproduces and substantiates a
Finnishness that nevertheless does not quite ft its anticipated or expected
form. It seems that there is an excess, a gap, because of the visual and
audible differences this installation materialises. It could thus be argued
that this specifc performative reiteration enacts a moment of crisis in the
production and reproduction of normative understandings of
Finnishness. 
Nevertheless, pushing this account further, one wonders if this indeed
is a crisis of the normative. For isn’t it also the case, that racialised and
gendered differences, and what is normatively considered as  “authentic”
and “original” Finnishness, are at once reproduced, and perhaps become
more pronounced, even as the racialised and gendered normative
constraints of Finnishness are called into question? Does this not pose a
new norm, albeit a seemingly more inclusive one, wherein Finnishness
continues to be defned by, among other things, a suffcient means of
(fnancial) support and Finnish or Swedish skills with the criteria of for
example the ability to achieve at level 3 of the Finnish National Foreign
Language Certifcate? Butler also voices concerns related to this in her
reading of the singing of American national anthem by illegal
immigrants: 
The monolingualism requirement of the nation surely surfaces in the
refusal to hear the anthem sung in Spanish … Of course, it is possible to
be suspicious of all of this. After all, is it not simply the expression of a
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new nationalism? Is it a suspect nationalism, or does it actually fracture
the “we” in such a way that no single nationalism could take hold on
the basis of that fracture? It’s an open question to which I don’t know
the answer. (2007, 61)
Importantly, Butler discovers a fssure, a translation, in the inception of
the collectivity of a “we”. As Butler makes clear, this is not simply a
pluralism that folds in differences only to maintain the homogeneity of the
nation, but a performative process that is “both as plural act”  (2007, 62)
and a “translation” (62). The simultaneously plural and translational
process is certainly very similar to the dis/continuous monistic and
pluralistic gesture I am suggesting here. Nevertheless, as I mentioned
earlier, the conception of power as oppressive and the idea that the origin
of nature and the nature of origin are inaccessible return Butler’s
conception of difference to oppositional terms. This informs the ways in
which the question of norms and transformation are approached in
Butler's work. Importantly, what we can glean from the foregoing
discussion is that the process of othering is in fact reproduced with and in
the normative realm, for otherwise how could this misft/difference be
perceived and recognised at all if it is ontologically and epistemologically
outside the norm’s performative operations? This is a form of anticipation
that Butler (1999, xiv) notes as kernel to the operation of performativity,
and in the case here, the performativity of Finnishness. To paraphrase
Butler, we could note that the anticipation of the essence of Finnishness
produces that which it posits as deviant and outside its normative
enclosure.
We are here faced with the complexity of subjectivation, the intricacies
of representation, to which an oppositional mode of analysis can give
little account. In connection with the frst approach that would attempt to
make the identity category of Finnishness more inclusive, I want to lay
bare the political dilemma we are encountering here. First, the gesture
that subjects to scrutiny essentialist and foundationalist claims that feed
into various forms of racism and sexism by rendering inaccessible an
extra-linguistic referent, at the same time also puts into question the
premises that ground identity politics. Second, certain versions of
intersectional analyses that draw (perhaps uneasily) on a poststructuralist
framework, conceive of identity categories as differing endlessly. In “real-
ising” infnite differences and a long and cross-referenced list of
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exclusions, this mode of analysis risks recuperating the centre and
uncritically taking recourse to the self-present subject. Third, as norms
produce and are reproduced within the social world, wherein one is at
once the subject and object of power, it seems unclear how an anti-
normative politics can be said to be located outside and against the
domain of norms. Where would it begin, and when? This is perhaps an
urgent and key issue for feminist anti-racist scholarship. If identifcation
with/as a woman and racial subject has become an utterly intricate
matter, then how would one ground feminist anti-racist political
aspirations?
It seems ftting at this juncture to perform/enact monistic and pluralistic
concerns. As already noted, essential to this methodology is the
diffraction and transversal shift of, rather than simply moving beyond,
both poles of the oppositions. In this radical interiority, negation or
closure is never fnal, but is internal to a ubiquitous opening. Insisting on
a global scene of political production and a “relational ontology” (Barad
2007, 93), in what follows I approach this “equality-versus-difference
debate” (cf. Hinton 2014; Thiele 2014) through “the problem of
difference” (Hinton 2014, 101). 
As is perhaps already quite clear from earlier discussions, what
differentiates the politics of inclusion or visibility and from the
performative approach pertains to the presence/absence of the ground
that provides the anchorage of representation. To recapitulate, whereas
the former foregrounds and secures identity claims in a locatable essence,
the latter posits an hermetically enclosed semiotic domain, that is severed
from the stuff of bodies and matter, because these are lost and
inaccessible. In other words, unlike a politics of representation and
visibility, the performative approach eschews description, because the
referent – its actuality that is purportedly ahistorical, essential – is
understood as a phantasmatic construct or a veiled illusion. Interestingly
then, both positions concede to a notion of essence as unitary, fxed and
unchanging, and “a model of difference that is synonymous with
separation and opposition” (Kirby 1997, 64). Following Kirby, I suggest
that in rethinking difference as a “‘becoming entity’ … not a name for the
gap of supposedly dead space and time between pregiven entities” (1997,
65), the question of essence and matter also undergo a qualitative
transformation. Here I want to recall the sense of misft evoked by the
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installation. The power of testimony circulated in public through visual
media representations is to “make moral and emotional appeal to a
‘witnessing public’” (Kennedy et al. 2013,  51). It follows that to think
about the nature of the misft must include a consideration of the ways in
which it is affective. It needs to be noted here that this account of
affectivity differs from certain strands of thinking in the recent affective
turn, especially the ones that hail affect’s freedom and autonomy.
Whereas affect’s freedom means its unpredictable and random
attachments to objects (see Sedgewick 2003), affective autonomy posits
affect an ontologically separate order that defes the paranoid logic of
poststructuralist deconstruction and the problematics of biological
essentialism (see Massumi 2002; Hemmings 2005). Instead, what I am
proposing is, following Kirby’s conceptualisation of “corporeography”, to
consider “representation as ‘sensible’ in that biology is not a
supplementary ingredient to be included or excluded” (1997, 154). In
other words, it is not that one is frst bodily affected and then comes to
terms with the feelings through terms of intelligibility informed by a
semiotic web of meaning making. The temporal progression that informs
the position of “world before language, the thing (or referent) before the
sign, matter before the idea, and the sensible before the intelligible” (1997,
90) is, as Kirby points out, “a decidedly sexual and racial diacritics whose
evolutionary logic works to naturalize political asymmetries” (90). The
perception of the misft is telling of such a sensible representation or
affective communication. For this reason, I want to linger over the
question of the how of perceiving the misft. 
Visually, these squared frames/grids with white backgrounds
resemble passport photos. These images are placed adjacent to one
another to form a whole in some scenes. In other scenes, a single frame is
placed in a different part of the screen. In still other scenes, the screen is
covered by parallel frames positioned further apart from one another,
thus making visible the hollowing black background. The sharp contrast
of the white frame and the black background highlight participants’
different appearances, as well as their facial expressions and subtle bodily
movements. On one level, these rigid frames symbolise the phenomena of
racial and gender profling – in terms of grids of intelligibility – as well as
the tightened border control, symptomatic of current immigration policy.
On another level, it expresses Rainio’s and Roberts’ vision of
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multiculturalism, which is a whole consisting of disparate parts
understood as atomic entities which cannot be reduced to each other.
Furthermore, when the black background is more visible (for example as
the second picture shows), the refections of the images on the ground
give the impression that these participants are uprooted, thus making
palpable the physical and emotional displacement of bodies through
migration.
Aurally, we hear a male sonorous vocal introducing the frst line of the
anthem “Oi maamme Suomi, synnyinmaa” (“Our land, our land, our
Fatherland!”).106 This vocal is then joined by another on the second line.
As the singing proceeds, we hear and see the (re)arrangement of voices
and images. In this discordant united choir, we hear differences in terms
of accent, pitch, and rhythms. The emergence, disappearance and
weaving together of various voices blur and traverse the boundaries that
are purportedly made static by the sharp square frame. This can be read
as a deterritorialisation of parameters that differentiate individuals from
each other and from the whole/social/collective. However, the notion of
deterritorialisation, much like Derrida’s theorisation of breaching, is not
destruction pure and simple, but simultaneously involves processes of
rupturing and creation, writing and the gravity of identity. I want to
highlight its implications here, as this is important for my overall
discussion. The counter-intuitive suggestion of this breaching is that, as
Hinton writes, “an identity which assumes its place, its ability to be
located, is still made available … at precisely the same time as its claim to
self-presence is displaced. The privilege of identity is not removed, but
neither can it be assumed” (2014, 109, emphasis in original).  
Consistent with the account of onto-epistemological dis/continuity of
race, and this clearly relates to the question of identity in general terms,
breaching proves an effective way to approach perceptual modalities in
terms of non/locatability (i.e., the spatial and temporal coordinates that
defne identity), kernel to the perception of misft. Poststructuralist
criticism has taught us that our perception of race and gender is not self-
evident, but regulated by and enacted within normative regimes.
Nevertheless, as already noted, this approach forecloses the sensible and
the corporeal, and conceives of norms and power as prohibitive and
106 Translation provided by http://rainioroberts.com/maamme/, last accessed 29 June
2015.
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oppressive in the frst and last instance. Given the poststructuralist
attention to any forms of essentialism, it is curious that the essence or
identity of perception and norms are exempt from critical scrutiny (see
further discussion on this in Kirby 1997). As presented in the installation,
the boundary between perceptual modes cannot be straightforwardly
marked or secured. For example, the misft, the perceived difference is
materialised (and it is especially thought provoking here to read this with
Butler’s deployment of matter as meaning making) when our visual
perception of participants’ phenotypically and sexually differentiated
bodies diverge from what we expected to see in hearing the singing of the
national anthem. In other words, it is as if the aural perception already
recalls, anticipates, implicates and perhaps is a visual representation.
Approached in terms of corporeography, the essence/body/corporeality
is not understood as undifferentiated anchor of performative possibilities,
but reads and writes itself, and thus signifcantly confounds the received
atomic, linear and causal view of perception that underwrites the
foundationalist logic of racism and sexism. Crucially, if norms are
prohibitive in the frst and last instance in rendering the racialised
sexualised other as outside the norm, and if norms regulate and enable
the recognition of perception as Butler and others have argued, the
question arises as to how it is possible to perceive and recognise this
misft at all. Importantly, we get a sense of the “duality of kind”
(Durkheim quoted in Kirby 2015, 101) of both power and of norms that
simultaneously differentiates and affrms itself to itself. Moreover, in
accordance with new materialist monistic terms, norms are understood as
material-discursive phenomena, rather than as signifcation, opposed to
the matter of matter. In the saturated and self-differentiated feld of the
sensible and the perceptual, a norm re-members, anticipates and opposes
itself. It follows then, that what is outside the norm is reconfgured as the
inversion of the inside. More provokingly still, and situated in the context
of the discussion at hand, we can venture to consider that the internal
fracturing of normative Finnishness (as whiteness for example) is
generative of and hailed by the specifcity/difference of its outside. I
want to propose the neologism inside/outside (the slash follows Baradian
indeterminacy) to accentuate the convoluted scene of a “global embrace”
(Kirby 2011, 119). In this sense, even this misft is strangely ftting.  
To think through corporeography, or representation as sensible, is to
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qualitatively shift the dilemma of the representational and performative
approach from within. Attending to the tissue of the corporeal “knitting
signifcation within representation within substance” (Kirby 1997, 55), we
encounter a perverse force feld wherein “body as nature as woman as
other involves a différance for which oppositional logic can give little
account” (55). Difference is itself breaking open and apart, it “witnesses
and produces” (2014, 10), to borrow Hinton’s description, the specifcity
of racialised and sexed embodiment. In other words, racialised and sexed
identities/essences are displaced and fractured at the same time as they
are located and made specifc. This is where one can diffractively shift the
debate and read the two opposites of the dilemma. The visual-aural
differentiation that gives rise to perception, and which is regulated by
and remakes norms, evinces “the process of essence” (Kirby 1997, 98) that
is “an integral expression of the performativity of language in the general
sense” (98). In this radical interiority, the oppositional logic that grounds
the politics of anti-normativity is transformed. For if the economy of
differentiation is what drives and enables perception as conception as
sensitive representation, then it can also be said that norms are essentially
incoherent and dehiscent, all the while persistently constant. Following
on from the above discussion of norms as material-discursive
phenomena, I want to turn my attention to the question of universality
and specifcity, as it is another major issue within the debate at hand. The
re-markability of individuals’ singing is simultaneously a differentiation
process that is conditioned upon, rather than in spite of, a condensed and
self-differentiating perceptual realm. In other words, this differentiation
is not a closing off or quarantining of the individual from his or her
environment (i.e., other faces, other sounds or the black backdrop).
Instead, the environment, the whole, already inhabits the individual. For
example, we can consider the implicatedness of the ways in which the
black background and the edge of the white square frame are implicated
in this. Where does the boundary between the background and the edge
begin and end? As Kirby writes, the “individual is both single and
plural” (2015, 102). That is, an “I” is at once a “we”. This may generate
concerns as to whether such a postulation returns to a logic of
phallogocentrism with its totalising and reductionist gestures, and
against which the revision of objectivity through a notion of situated
knowledge production has been posed. Butler’s assertions about
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individual agency and collective political action express such a concern.
She writes, “To be a participant in politics, to become part of concerted
and collective action, one need not only make the claim for equality, but
one needs to act and petition within the terms of equality. The ‘I’ is thus
at once a ‘we’, without being fused into an impossible unity” (Butler 2009,
vii). Through a logic of the performative, Butler depicts the process of
subject formation of , that is, as Kirby succinctly summarises, the ways in
which “a culture’s specifc signature of place and time, the very texture of
its identifability, get under our skin and inform our individual
experiences with felt signifcance” (2015, 98).
Intriguingly, there is a sense of generality at work in Butler’s careful
manoeuvre to eschew any appeal to unity, whole, universality. In
thinking with and pushing further Butler’s endeavour, we could venture
to ask what unity or wholeness can actually mean if it is never static and
cannot be defned against, but is articulated through and animates, the
individual. Following Kirby, we could think of the structure of the
hologram, where “every appeal to the specifcity of a unifed perspective
returns us to a fractured differential that is at once a particularity that
again involves ‘the whole’ differently” (1997, 65). Importantly, this whole
ruptures and rewrites, for “even the ‘fragment’s perspective’ is, in its
turn, anther differentiated whole” (Kirby 1997, 65). It follows then, as
Kirby argues, that “The separation of part from whole, or the hierarchical
subsumption of difference from unity, is not simply made. …
[U]niversalizing discourses are never monolithic or unifed, any more
than a so-called situated, or particular, perspective is singular in either its
focus or location” (1997, 65). What is needed is a rethinking of the nature
of feminist politics and ethics, even if it also raises the discomforting
question of the nature of essence and difference. As Hinton writes, a
responsible feminist politics is “called on both to situate feminist practice
and to acknowledge that it is dislocated in the same gesture” (2014, 111). 
Conclusion: Part Three
This part continues the exploration of different aspects of the onto-
epistemological dis/continuity of race, such as, for example, the
questions of identity/difference, whole/part, universality/specifcity. In
fact, the ways in which power and norms are understood has signifcant
implications for the crucial question of how to transform racial thinking.
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The main argument that arises in this part is that race always arrives, but
its arrival always founders. This is not to say that origin is irretrievably
lost, but that even origin itself is never simply present or absent. Given
this, why is it necessary to shy away from the question of origin or the
essence of race? Related to this, I argue that the polyvocalities and
multiplicities of polyglots’ accents and cyborgs’ noises need not, and
cannot dispense with the wholeness of the mother tongue, because each is
constituted through, with and as the other. Furthermore, there is no
simple overturning of and moving beyond the problematics of race.
Instead, taking into account and giving an account of the how, where and
when of the location of race is the most pressing concern for a responsible
feminist political and ethical practice of knowledge production.
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Conclusion
Approaching the border control at the airport, I felt slightly anxious.
Normally I expected a long queue at the non-EU passport line. This time,
it was an open road, so to speak. Far away I saw the border guard, sitting
in uniform behind the window, looking straight ahead at the oncoming
passengers (namely me). This could go quickly, I chuckled to myself. “See
you soon on the other side”, I joked to my partner. I had always been
jealous that he rarely needed to wait. The gate for Finnish passport
holders always looked so wide and open. This time would be different, I
thought, planning what to do on the other side. Even though the other
side was just a departure hall, artifcially demarcated and separated from
this side, it always held a fascination for me. Being trapped and confned
on the other side instead felt like freedom and movement – the lightness
when walking through the gate, the excitement of hearing Mandarin or
Sichuan dialect (my mother tongue), and the very idea of going home –
all converged into an excitement as well as an anxiety about passing
through the gate.  
Arriving at the security check, I handed my passport to the border guard.
‘Hi’, I smiled, and anxiously looked at him scrutinising my visa. 
“Do you speak any Finnish”, he suddenly asked. 
“No?”, I responded. I did not know why I responded to his question with a
negation that was also posed as a question. I was probably confused about what
exactly he meant by that. At the same time, this response felt like a defence - “do
you think I should?” - rather than an apology, “unfortunately I have not
mastered Finnish yet”. Feeling confused and uneasy, I heard him asking another
question.
“Not a single word?” he pushed further his question, threw at me a quick
glance from the corner of his eyes and fipped through the pages of my passport. 
“Well, a little.” I started to feel panic, and almost began to believe that he
suspected that  I was indeed travelling with a fake passport or invalid residence
permit. 
He ignored my answer, and continued to check my visas. My heart raced. I
felt a lump in my throat. Should I say something? Maybe he found me suspicious
because I claimed to speak poor Finnish, even though, according to my visa, I
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entered this country two years ago. 
“Nå, Jag talar svenska” (well, I speak Swedish), I said, tried hard to get a
decent Finland Swedish accent. 
This time he raised his head, looked at me. “Ok” he said, and returned my
passport to me with his left hand, meanwhile lifting his right arm to show me the
way through the gate in a well rehearsed movement. 
In the end it went fast, I thought, walking through the gate and towards the
other side. 
“Huu” I sighed, somehow with relief. My partner was happy to see me on the
other side of the gate across the border. 
“What happened”, he asked, looking concerned. 
”Huu” I sighed again and found my totally blushed face refected on the tax
free shop window. It felt like burning. 
Presented is a scenario at the border control at Helsinki airport, in
which I was asked about my ability to speak Finnish while having my
passport checked. In fact, similar scenarios take place almost every single
time I travel to and from non-EU countries. The question is often asked in
Finnish “Puhutko suomea?” (do you speak Finnish?). Interestingly, I was
never asked if I happened to speak Swedish. My response to this question
has changed from “I speak Swedish” to “vähän”, a Finnish word
meaning a little. This is not so much because I have actually grown more
confdent about my Finnish skills compared to two years ago when this
incident took place, but rather because, given the routine questioning, I
have learned to rehearse the simplest ways to respond without using too
many Finnish words, but with which I could also confrm that I can
communicate in Finnish. 
It needs to be mentioned that this border control is situated between
the departure area for EU destinations and its non-EU counterparts. In
this scenario, even though I had a valid residence permit, I started to feel
that my legitimacy as a resident in Finland was fraudulent. The question
“do you speak Finnish?” for me sounded like an expectation. That is,
“you should be able to speak Finnish”. Interestingly, unlike the stated
language skill requirements for the Finnish citizenship application, the
residence permit I hold does not actually entail such a requirement. Why
then was I asked over and over again about my Finnish skills? What
reiterative cutting does such a query perform? What boundary does it
enforce? Which racialised bodies does it reproduce? What inscriptions
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and ascriptions does it mark on the specifc language? 
The question “do you speak Finnish?” becomes integral to the border
control practices. Or one could say that it performatively substantiates a
border that feels. Where and when does this border begin and end? Is the
border made manifest on my blushing face, at the border control gate, or
by the stamp that was about to mark the dates of my departure from
Finland, or by the border guard’s right arm that showed me through the
gate, the border of the nation’s body, the border of the inter-subjective
social body in this particular encounter? Or is it marked in the very
question “do you speak Finnish?”, in my anxious response to it, or in my
accented Finland Swedish pronunciation as an attempt to prove my
otherwise legible status as a resident in Finland? The location of the
border that feels is both instantiated and yet indeterminate, because
consubstantial with the whole chain of signifcation that is corporeal
through and through. In other words, the conversation between and
conversion into and of the individual body and the social body is the
generalised process of performative translation that is pluralistic and
monistic. 
Returning to the the installation of Finnexia, similar inquiries
regarding the ability to use the Finnish language skill instantiated another
kind of space, in which Finnish language learners who were interested in
the advertised effect of the fctitious drug – faster learning, better
pronunciation, and less anxiety when speaking – came together to share
their experiences in learning the Finnish language. Similarly, the Finnish
for foreigners courses I have participated in provided excellent spaces for
meeting other language learners. The enabling force of power - which
underpins social and political norms - isn’t so much only in the service of
a suppressing intention, manifested in the ways in which it “subordinates
so effectively that it even ‘activates’ (produces) its object as an object to be
subordinated” (Kirby 2006, 114, emphasis in original). Rather, it is enabling
because the onto-epistemological dis/continuity means that power's self-
affrmation, a process of splitting and self-encountering, generates an
“essential incoherence and productive proliferation” (Kirby 2015, 114). 
Power as expressed in the assertion of norms insists, only through
trilling itself. In the light of this, we can consider the question of capacity
for capacity. The slogan of the fctitious drug Finnexia, “learn Finnish
faster” at once speaks of the ways in which a defciency in Finnish
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language skill functions as a hindrance, and generates an urgent need to
acquire the capacity. As has been mentioned, this is in fact a capacity for
capacity, foregrounded in the distinction between life and death,
continuity and discontinuity. These are questions that pertain to the
question of race. We could consider capacity in terms of capital, whose
only goal is to perpetuate its regeneration. For Rey Chow (2006) and
Jasbir Puar (2007), this is precisely what whiteness is. In other words, it is
the moment-um of exchange and reproduction, which is the dynamism of
life itself, as opposed to the discontinuity and passivity that death is. 
Whereas Chow and Puar focus on whiteness as capacity/capital, Jared
Sexton notes the ways in which “Race is a production of meaning or a
form of value and hence operates as communication, an element of
exchange” (2008, 29). In a similar vein, Fred Moten (2003) observes the
ways in which Ferdinand de Saussure attempts to open up the possibility
for revaluation through a chain of signifcation, which excludes and
abstracts value from the materiality and sound of speech. That is,
precisely because objects and realities do not have intrinsic value, any
valuation proves provisional and arbitrary and is subject to the process of
revaluation. Signifcantly, in confguring the Saussurean chain of
signifcation as the political economy of racialisation, wherein racialised
others are objectifed and fetishised (see also Ahmed 2000), Moten (2003)
suggests that the ultimate resistance of the racialised others ensues from
the noisy breaking out of and from the confnement of meaning, from a
place where racialised others may shriek and scream. Pushing still further
the edge of refusal, Sexton advocates a notion of social death, which is a
radical unmappability that falls outside of the process of exchange and
valuation. This is a pessimism that is insistent upon questioning, thus
unasking and unmaking the affrmation of being and of social life, and
thus also of whiteness itself.  
Concurring in the main with their observations of the political
economy of racialisation, I am puzzled over the investment in noise, in
the extra-linguistic, as well as the inaccessible feld of social death (the
spatial metaphor here remains subject to debate). As we have seen, the
conundrum about value and the referent in Saussure’s work manifests
the im/possibility of exclusion of the substance of matter (cf. Kirby 1997)
and of reality. In view of this, the shriek and noise, as radical
discontinuity and partiality, are not so much outside, thus overturning
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the structural imposition of meaning, but embed and transform from
within the general economy of racialisation. And if we approach
whiteness, understood as the capacity of and for life, through the onto-
epistemological dis/continuity, then its seeming continuity, its lineage
and generation, relies precisely upon the discontinuous splitting, cutting
and self-encountering, that is copula-tion. Interestingly, the cut as the
genesis of life, of individuation, is also associated with death. That is, it
marks the end of a life lived, and “divides that life … from life” (Kirby
2009, 120; see also Hinton forthcoming). What does it mean then if what
marks death is also discovered at and of the origin of life itself? As
Jacques Derrida reminds us, “pure life or pure death: it is always,
infnitely, the same thing” (2005a, 291). Similarly, we could ask what is
the essence of whiteness, of Man, and the question of capacity as the
exceptional condition of humanness, if its integrity and continuity, its life,
is affrmed and sustained only through the discontinuous self-encounter,
through which racialised and inhuman others are discovered outside its
human milieu?
Rather than simply opposing life to death, capacity to disability,
whiteness to racialised others, human to inhuman others, I use the notion
of trilling race to suggest ways of rethinking the sociality of these binaries
in the racialised political economy of visual-aural encounters. The onto-
epistemological dis/continuity means that neither of these opposing
terms can be self-present, but must, in the form of obligation (Wilson
2004) emerge through, with and as each other. And it, must be noted,
such an emergence remains just that: a dis/continuous emergence, for its
identity is never fnally achieved. It follows then, that a critical project of
race does not mean that we should simply invert the hierarchy, and
revaluate the underprivileged, or perhaps abandon notions such as
capacity, Man, whiteness. If dis/continuity is originary, such an
abandonment remains im/possible. The abandoned would
surreptitiously reassert themselves (see Hinton and Liu 2015), despite,
and because of their being condemned and excluded. The task at hand is
to be attentive to the historicity, the how of the arrival of any entity,
which includes me, us. Such is the process of trilling, a gesture that
“punctuates” (see Derrida [1976] 1997) and at the same time destabilises
the reiterative inscriptions of hierarchical power relations – its sexual and
racial ascriptions – through which whiteness, as the exceptional condition
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and the capacity of the Man, emerges.
In Quantum Anthropology, Vicki Kirby (2011) encourages us to consider,
not only how speech is writing, but how writing is speech. That is, how
culture is nature all along. In conclusion, I would like to end with another
question: how does writing trill? If as Sexton maintains, in the political
economy of racialisation, the becoming of race is a form of writing – “the
scratch, the mark, the line” (2008, 29), which produces racialised bodies as
“living images of race” (29, emphasis in original), then how is the writing
already race’s trilling itself into being/becoming (its other)? 
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Svensk Sammanfattning
Denna avhandling undersöker frågor om ras i en kontext som utgörs av
språkkurser i fnska för vuxna invandrare i Finland. Avhandlingen
undersöker materialitet av ras, samt hur ras får betydelse och ett affektivt
värde. Utgående från ett auto/etno/grafskt perspektiv undersöker jag
hur det är som deltagare att lära sig det fnska språket på kurser avsedda
för invandrare. Avhandlingens övergripande syfte är att problematisera
och ifrågasätta ontologin och epistemologin av ras: vad ras är, hur det
förstås och vad en analys av ras innebär. Inspirerad av övningen av
“drillande r” föreslår jag att begreppet “drillande ras” fångar den onto-
epistemologiska dis/kontinuitet som markerar ras och processen hur ras
blir till. 
Frågan om dis/kontinuitet omorganiserar distinktionen mellan
kontinuitet och avbrott. Den ifrågasätter processen av identifering: till
exempel hur, var och när identitet formas och omformas. Mitt intresse för
frågan om identitet relateras till ett viktigt problem i rasstudier, nämligen:
hur ras kan omformuleras. Det behövs en grundlig granskning av
”representationernas tyngd” (Puar 2007, 191), det som betydelsesätter
begreppet ras, eftersom det även återupprättar rasism. Dessutom behövs
forskning som på allvar uppmärksammar hur rasiferad verklighet
upplevs och levs i vardagen.
Det är kanske inte självklart att en studie om inlärning av värdlandets
språk ansluter sig till frågor om ras. Till exempel, vad betyder
resonemanget att processen av inlärning av språk rasiferas? Betyder det
att ras, som en process av rasifering, en pågående process bestående av
uppsättningar av maktrelationer, utövar makt på en annars neutral
språkinlärning, sas. utifrån? Eller betyder det att ras som en
identitetskategori är ett bland de analytiska perspektiven, såsom till
exempel kön och klass, i en studie av språkinlärning? 
I ljuset av dessa frågor inleds denna avhandling med en analys av
konstinstallationen Finnexia av Lisa Erdman. Finnexia är ett fktivt
läkemedel som sägs stödja inlärning av fnska och minska på ångesten att
tala fnska. Konstverket Finnexia synliggör föreställningen om att
“problemet” med integrering i det fnska samhället ligger i bristen på
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fnska språkkunskaper hos invandrare. Språket är tröskeln som skiljer
mellan in- och utsidan av samhället. Installationen problematiserar
begreppet skillnad och ifrågasätter skillnaden mellan det individuella
och det samhälleliga, mellan realitet och fktion, och mellan natur och
kultur. Dessa frågor  är avhandlingens drivfjäder och behandlas i kapitel
ett av del ett. Syftet i kapitel två är att undersöka problemet  med
ethnisme/etnicitet och ras. Kapitel tre handlar om den metodologiska
innebörden i dis/kontinuitet av ras. Del två problematiserar den politisk-
ekonomiska processen av rasifering i visuell-ljud-form. Del tre ställer
frågor om möjligheter och begränsningar i att omforma ras. I korthet,
avhandlingen hävdar att ras drillas: dess identitet/olikhet är både möjligt
och omöjligt. 
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